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 Abstract 
This dissertation focuses on one of the central themes in strategic management research: 
the creation and sustainability of competitive advantage. This theme is explored in the 
context of high-technology corporate ventures. In this context, the environment is 
unpredictable and competitive. The international dimension adds additional complexity. 
High innovativeness, organizational uncertainty and inter-organizational activity portray 
the organizations studied empirically in this research. The research question of the 
dissertation is: how do internal corporate ventures achieve and sustain international 
competitive advantage in a high-technology environment? 
 
The method used in this dissertation is theory-building multiple-case study. Four cases 
of Finnish internal corporate ventures are analyzed over a period of four years: from 
1998 to 2001. The main data consists of 22 semi-structured interviews with key 
informants and insider observations in the venture organizations throughout the 
investigation period. In addition, public documents (press releases, announcements, 
annual reports, web pages, industry reports) and internal documentation (business plans, 
business support documentation, internal announcements, minutes of meetings) are 
analyzed to support and complement the main data. 
 
The theoretical starting point for the analysis is the relational view of competitive 
advantage, which describes how inter-organizational processes may lead to economic 
rents. As a result of the cross-case theory-building analysis, the explicit mechanisms 
how economic value is both gained and destroyed are presented. The developed model 
is a system, where the two categories, value creation and destruction are further divided 
into organizational and inter-organizational mechanisms. The data analysis also 
suggests that value creation and destruction are interrelated and interdependent in 
complex ways. 
 
The found value destruction mechanisms in corporate venturing include management 
failures, opportunism, politics, bureaucracy and collective blindness on the 
organizational level and on the inter-organizational level, power asymmetries, cultural 
 complexity, conflicting interests and collective blindness. Examples of explicit value 
creation mechanisms are also given in the study, the findings support earlier research on 
competitive advantage of organizations. In internal corporate venturing, the relationship 
between the parent organization and the venture is identified to be as of crucial 
importance. The concept of parent-venture dependence is introduced to describe the 
level of reliance between the organizations. Based on the findings, it is proposed that 
growth may not be the best measure of performance for venture organizations, because 
high growth rate can be artificially created for example through parent-venture 
relationship. This kind of growth may also lead to value destruction. 
 
The main contribution of this study is to the debate on the competitiveness of 
organizations. The relations between value destruction mechanisms, growth and the 
creation of competitive advantage have not been widely addressed in previous research. 
The findings of this dissertation are applicable in a wider context, even though the data 
analysis is based on a case-study on internal corporate ventures. 
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
 
 
“Knowledge is replaced in most quarters by belief. All that can be known with certainty 
are our impressions. This knowledge cannot be articulated since it is immediate and 
irreducible. Except for this type of knowledge, we are committed to skepticism – if we 
accept the empirical analysis of scientific method.”  
 
-Churchman & Ackoff, 1950 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation for the study 
The objective of strategy is to outperform competitors. Starting from ancient military, 
this issue has been a topic of interest to leaders, academics and business people 
throughout our history. Why is it that some groups of people are able to be stronger, 
more effective or more innovative than others? Why do armies, governments and 
businesses succeed? And, more importantly, why do they fail? In our modern society, 
this question is culminated in the competition between companies. Organizations are 
seeking ways to find and sustain advantage over other organizations to be able to 
survive in the modern economic system. The rules of this game are the same for 
everybody, but yet the line between success and failure is a mystery. The underlying 
factors that determine winners and losers continue to puzzle us. 
 
Since the ancient times, the concept of strategy has evolved. In the past, a successful 
strategist won the battle or the war and left the field as the winner. When modern 
organizations succeed and are able to provide value to their customers, stakeholders and 
to the society, it is only the beginning of the battle. It is a self-evident fact that the 
economy is in constant motion and our society never stops developing. Therefore, also 
companies must be able to repeat the success, constantly find new ways to outperform 
competitors and grow further. Winning must be a process, not an event. Continuous 
growth, on the other hand, means that the organizations and the people belonging to 
them must re-invent themselves, find new ways of creating value and adapt themselves 
to different circumstances. This constant change in our environment, culture and 
economy requires new ways of thinking about strategy and management. 
 
I have been working for several years in a Finnish telecommunications company that 
has fiercely pursued gaining entrance to new business areas and generating new growth 
through them. For example, there have been several different attempts to enter foreign 
markets. By establishing corporate venture units, an international competitive advantage 
 13 
has been sought. To some extent, the company has been successful, but in some cases, 
the failures have been significant. Following this process has been one of the key 
drivers for starting this research. I have been raising questions not as a researcher, but as 
a professional. 
 
Following the example of Nokia, many other corporations in Finland have established 
venture operations and new growth businesses in the area of high-technology, but most 
of them have not been able to replicate Nokia’s success story — or even bring any value 
to their stakeholders. Even though it is known that venturing is high-risk activity where 
true success is very rare and impossible to forecast, it is reasonable to expect that if high 
investments are made and the best and most competent managers are put to work, some 
value would be created. This has not, however, always been the case. 
 
Research on international entrepreneurship has bloomed, especially in the Nordic 
countries and in Finland, in particular (Alahuhta, 1990; Luostarinen et al., 1994; 
Holmlund & Kock, 1998; Vaara, 1999; Yli-Renko et al., 2001). Figure 1, which 
describes the growth of high-technology exports in certain OECD countries, shows how 
this small market has developed. Over the last decade, Finland has leapt from traditional 
industry exporter to a country with relatively one of the highest high-technology export 
volumes in the world. New high-technology companies — with Nokia leading the way 
— have changed the economy of Finland so that it is more dependent on high-
technology innovation and ventures. Even though national borders still represent certain 
types of discontinuities, the barriers of entry to international markets are lower than ever 
before. 
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Figure 1. High-technology exports as a percentage of total exports (Statistics Finland, 
2003) 
The fundamental idea behind corporate venturing is “to exploit the complementaries of 
small firm capabilities to explore new opportunities and large firm capabilities to 
exploit existing competencies” (Quinn, 1985). Growing into new markets is also one of 
the many different motives for corporate entrepreneurship (Zahra, 1991; Dess et al., 
2003). Even though corporate ventures compete and co-operate in a market environment 
in similar factor endowments as independent ventures, research has shown that there are 
some important separating factors (McDougall et al., 1992; Shrader & Simon, 1997). 
 
In a dynamic and more rapidly changing environment, the role that relationships and 
networks play is emphasized. The scholarly community investigating inter-company 
and intra-company relations is broad-ranging and there are numerous different 
approaches for different purposes (Foss, 2000). In strategic management research, this 
topic has accumulated an impressive body of research (Doz, 1996; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Gulati, 1998; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Oliver & Ebers, 1998; Tsai & 
Ghoshal, 1998; Eisenhardt & Galunic, 2000; Tsai, 2002; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). 
Based on this, it can be proposed that inter-organizational relationships are one of the 
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key elements in understanding competitive advantage, value creation, and growth in 
dynamic environments. 
 
In this research, I seek to integrate these different themes and provide a new point of 
view on understanding how competitive advantage is gained and lost in international 
markets. Drawing on existing frameworks and previous discussion on the topic, I aim at 
presenting new knowledge on what makes a venture organization internationally 
competitive and why some organizations are able to create more value for their 
customers, stockholders and eventually, for themselves, than others. I argue that there is 
still a lack of understanding on what the determinants and mechanisms of 
competitiveness and value creation are. The current body of knowledge does not fully 
address all of the aspects of the problem. My objective in introducing novel data on 
international corporate ventures and carrying out theory-building analysis on this data is 
to contribute to the academic discussion as well as provide new managerial insights. 
1.2 Research problem 
The research problem for this dissertation is: 
How do internal corporate ventures achieve and sustain international 
competitive advantage in a high-technology environment? 
The following sub-questions can be derived from the research problem and formulated: 
• What kind of inter- or intra-organizational mechanisms lead to the creation of a 
sustainable international competitive advantage for internal corporate ventures? 
• How do internal corporate ventures grow internationally and what is the role of 
different inter-organizational relationships in the process? 
• What is the relation between international growth, competitive advantage, and 
inter-organizational relationships? 
 
Inter-organizational relationships refer to both internal and external relationships, e.g., 
inter-unit, parent-venture, external inter-organizational relationships, etc. 
 16 
1.3 Research methods 
The research approach should be derived from the nature of the social phenomena that 
are to be explored (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). Based on this rationale, I have chosen a 
theory-building multiple-case study, which is recommended for this type of research by 
several scholars, as my approach (Parkhe, 1993; Yin, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles & 
Huberman, 1984). The objective is to investigate the contemporary phenomena and 
cope with the technically distinctive situation where one has many more variables of 
interest than data points. Case studies can be employed in an exploratory manner in 
order to achieve insights into a previously uncharted area. Hitt et al. (1998) also 
suggested that the creative use of longitudinal, historical case studies and qualitative 
data provides a richer and more in-depth understanding of company-based idiosyncratic 
valuable resources and other specialized topics.  
 
I selected four cases of Finnish internal corporate ventures to represent different types 
of “experiments” and to achieve the needed theoretical polarity. The events in the 
sampling frame of cases included different sizes of organizations in distinct phases of 
their life cycle and dissimilar types of parent-venture relationships. Each case venture 
had pursued several strategies to grow internationally and used different market entry 
modes; for example, two of the case organizations had carried out acquisitions and all of 
them had set up local offices in foreign markets. 
 
The main source of information was interviews with people who were involved in the 
strategy planning and internationalization operations of the case organizations that were 
examined. This research takes an idiographic theory-building approach, which is 
individual-centered and uses naturalistic environmental contexts and qualitative 
methods to recognize the particular and unique experiences of the subject (Parkhe 
1993). I was able to follow the development of the investigated organizations as an 
insider throughout the four-year period, but I did not take part in the actual decision-
making. I took notes and wrote down my impressions throughout the data collection 
process. In addition to the interview data and notes, I collected an extensive amount of 
various types of secondary data to support the interviews. 
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The data was analyzed within-case and cross-case by using several different data 
analysis methods. By using the method called triangulation (Jick, 1979), the aim was to 
increase the validity and reliability of the results. By induction, I developed theoretical 
concepts and relationships between them. Based on the analysis, the concepts were 
integrated into a theoretical model. Finally, I went back to the previous body of 
literature to discuss the implications of the developed model in light of the previous 
research. 
1.4 Contributions 
Internal corporate venturing in a high-technology environment is an activity where the 
role of both internal and external relationships is emphasized. The markets are 
unpredictable, highly competitive, dynamic, and international. A high-level of 
innovativeness, organizational uncertainty, and high risk portray the organizations 
investigated in this dissertation. It is unclear whether the prior models explaining the 
creation of a sustainable competitive advantage apply in this kind of environment 
(Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Rindova & Kotha, 2001). This dissertation mainly 
contributes to the discussion on how the competitive advantage of organizations is 
explained. The three main contributions are briefly presented below. 
 
The first contribution is to take part in the on-going discussion about the determinants 
of competitive advantage. According to the findings of this dissertation, the creation of 
superior economic value and thus, competitive advantage cannot be fully explained by 
organizational or inter-organizational resources and capabilities. In spite of valuable, 
rare, non-imitable, and non-substitutable resources (Barney, 1991) that organizations or 
clusters of organizations might possess, they may fail to create value and to sustain 
competitive advantage. Despite the managers’ ability to “integrate, build and 
reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing 
environments” (Teece et al., 1997) or the processes by which managers alter their 
resource base (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000), they may not find that they have a 
competitive advantage. I argue that, in addition to the determinants of value creation 
and capture, the determinants of value destruction and the factors that hinder value from 
being created and captured must be considered. Organizational and inter-organizational 
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mechanisms may or may not lead to competitive advantage, and this process cannot be 
fully understood by investigating certain types of value creation and capture 
mechanisms. I propose that in order to understand competitive advantage, we must 
investigate a complex system, where value creation and value destruction are equally 
important forces and that the determinants of these forces are interdependent and 
interrelated. This system must be considered as a single unit. Furthermore, if we accept 
this kind of view, the sustainability of competitive advantage becomes a question of the 
sustainability of the whole system, not just some parts of it. The determinants of 
organizational sustainable competitive advantage become a paradox, since such 
determinants can lead to value destruction mechanisms as well as value creation 
mechanisms. Optimizing certain parts of the system does not lead to optimal 
performance of the entire system. 
 
Second, explaining organizational growth or the creation of advantage requires analysis 
beyond the organizational boundaries. Even though the competitive advantage is 
measured by the economic profits related to the organization, the value system is larger 
than the organization itself. By focusing solely on what single organizations do or have, 
the underlying factors might not be fully uncovered. In this dissertation, this was shown 
by investigating internal corporate ventures and the mechanisms in the parent-venture 
relationship and in external market relationships. The creation of international 
competitive advantage may be seen in its context only by extending the analysis to the 
mechanisms in the parent-venture relationship and to the mechanisms between the 
organization and its partners, customers and other external stakeholders. 
 
The third contribution is in examining the relationship between organizational growth 
and value creation. As suggested by Ackoff (1999), growth is not always the right 
measure for organizational performance and success; in fact, according to the results of 
this dissertation, less growth might even lead to a better long-term value creation. In the 
empirical part of this dissertation, I observed four organizations that grew very rapidly 
in international markets. However, in all cases, the growth did not lead to superior 
performance or value creation, as was expected. I argue that growth can be “artificially” 
created and investing too much into the growth of venture organizations might lead to 
value destruction processes. The system may produce growth for the organization 
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without generating value. “If each part of a system, considered separately, is made to 
operate as efficiently as possible, the system as a whole will not operate as efficiently as 
possible” (Ackoff, 1999). In the case of internal corporate ventures, I argue that making 
the venture rely too much on the support of the parent makes it more vulnerable for 
value destruction mechanisms. Even though growth may be achieved by providing lots 
of resources and heavy financial support, it may lead to value destruction rather than 
value creation. 
1.5 Core concepts 
1.5.1 Competitive advantage and value creation 
The concept of competitive advantage has been under active debate throughout the 
history of management and strategy research. The definition, creation, sustainability, 
and preconditions of competitive advantage have been addressed in previous works. It 
has been argued that the very foundations, the previous definitions of sustainable 
competitive advantage by the key authors in the field, e.g., Barney (1991) or Peteraf 
(1993), have been contradictory and not entirely clear (Foss & Knudsen, 2001). There is 
still disagreement on what the determinants are, how they should be measured, and 
whether it is possible to establish sustainability at any level. This section only 
superficially addresses the topic and defines the concept in the scope of this 
dissertation.1 
 
Barney (1991; emphasis in original) defines sustainable competitive advantage in terms 
of the strategies that companies implement in product markets: “A firm is said to have 
competitive advantage when it is implementing a value-creating strategy not 
simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential competitors. A firm is 
said to have a sustained competitive advantage when it is implementing a value-creating 
strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential competitors 
and when these other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of this strategy.” 
According to Barney, the determinants of sustainable competitive advantage are 
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valuable, rare, non-imitable, and non-substitutable resources. Peteraf (1993) offers a 
definition for sustainable competitive advantage with more economic terms, as 
“sustained above-normal returns”. According to Peteraf, sustained competitive 
advantage is simply “positive differential profits in excess of opportunity costs 
(including the cost of capital) that are sustained in equilibrium” (Foss & Knudsen, 
2001; emphasis in original). Peteraf’s (1993) sustainable competitive advantage is 
determined by four conditions: heterogeneity, ex post limits to competition, imperfect 
mobility, and ex ante limits to competition. 
 
In the scope of this dissertation, I adopt the latter definition by Peteraf, mainly because 
it is identical to the economic term “economic profits”. Economic profits have been 
precisely defined in previous economics works as the difference between revenues and 
costs including opportunity costs. This type of unambiguous definition makes the 
variable easier to operationalize. In addition, defining sustainable competitive advantage 
as sustained differential economic profits extends the scope to inter-industry as well as 
intra-industry, whereas Barney’s (1991) analysis is in terms of product markets (Foss & 
Knudsen, 2001). This definition also captures the international dimension of 
competitive advantage, as product markets might be limited to certain geographical 
area, but the process measuring economic profitability is similar regardless of the 
location of the organization. A more thorough explanation on how competitive 
advantage (economic profit) is measured and analyzed in this study is carried out in the 
methodological part of this dissertation. 
 
The concept of competitive advantage is closely related to the notion of value creation. 
Barney (1991) referred to “value creation strategy” and “valuable” resources and further 
discussed the parametrizing value in his 2001 article (Barney, 2001). Through cost 
effectiveness and the creation of a superior value for customers, superior differential 
profits can also be attained and thus the shareholder value can be increased. From the 
industry point of view, by finding a position on the market where customer value 
creation is optimal and costs are low, competitive advantage can also be achieved, if 
new entrants cannot enter at the same position (Porter, 1980). From an organizational 
point of view, by picking resources that are the most valuable (Barney, 1991) or by 
                                                                                                                                          
1
 For a more complete analysis of the concept, cf. Hoffman (2000) and Foss & Knudsen (2001). 
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developing capabilities (Teece et al., 1997) that cannot be imitated, economic profits 
can be generated.  
 
Value creation specifically has been extensively discussed by Moran and Ghoshal 
(1999) and Ghoshal et al. (2000). According to Moran and Ghoshal (1999), “the 
creation of economic value, be it by individuals or organizations, is a process that 
involves the use of resources.” Thus, their definition follows in the line of Barney 
(1991) and Teece et al. (1997). However, Moran and Ghoshal make a clearer distinction 
between the creation of value potential and the realization of this potential. Ghoshal et 
al. (2000) stated that “companies create new value for society by continuously creating 
innovative products and services and by finding better ways to make and offer existing 
ones; markets, however, relentlessly force companies to surrender most of this value to 
others.” These discussions on value creation, however, refer to the concept in terms of 
economic development of the markets, not the organization as the focal unit. From the 
point of view of the stakeholders of the organization, what creates value for the society 
or the markets is not necessarily beneficial for the organization itself. The process of 
“creative destruction”, where after the value creation, the organization surrenders the 
created value to other market actors, workers, shareholders and consumers (Moran & 
Ghoshal, 1999) might lead to the organization not benefiting from the fruits of its own 
work.  
 
Value creation is similarly a controversial concept as sustainable competitive advantage 
is. Typically, value creation of an organization is measured through changes in stock 
price (Anand & Khanna, 2000), etc., although this kind of measurement is not possible 
in companies that are not listed on a stock exchange. This kind of measure only captures 
how organizational value realization is perceived by the external markets and what are 
the expectations on future value creation. The concepts of value chain and value nets 
have been introduced as systems of value creation and capture. Value can be measured 
purely in economic terms (i.e., profits) or in more qualitative and indirect terms, e.g., 
via learning or capability development. It can be argued that indirect value creation 
(e.g., learning) can only be turned into economic profit in the future and that this causal 
ambiguity poses challenges for examining such mechanisms. As the basic dilemma of 
this dissertation is to understand why some organizations are able to perform better than 
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others, the focus is on the value creation and realization inside the organization. Based 
on the definition of competitive advantage, this study adopts a simple definition of 
value creation as the process of increasing the economic profit and thus competitive 
advantage of the organization.  
1.5.2 Inter-organizational relationship 
Discussion about inter-organizational relationships (IORs) is related to the concept of a 
network. A network on a general level has been defined as “a set of nodes (e.g., people, 
organizations) linked by a set of social relationships (e.g., friendship, transfer of funds, 
overlapping membership) of a specified type” (Laumann, et al., 1978). Inter-
organizational relationships tie the nodes of an organizational network to each other. An 
inter-organizational relationship has been defined as an arrangement between 
organizations involving the exchange, sharing, or co-development of products, 
technologies, or services (Gulati, 1998). Products, technologies, or services could be 
considered resources that also involve intangible resources, i.e., knowledge and 
expertise. These relationships can be, for example, buyer-seller relationships, sales 
partnerships, R&D co-operation alliances, joint ventures, joint memberships in an 
organization, etc. They can be established for a wide range of motives and goals and 
occur across vertical and horizontal boundaries (Gulati, 1998). No formal legal 
agreements are required, although it is expected that some form of statement about the 
established relationship exists. Besides an agreement, this could be a press release about 
co-operation, a declaration of joint membership in an organization or some other such 
similar arrangement.  
 
The two most common approaches to IORs are the dyadic and network/multiple 
approaches. Dyadic ties are the study of the relationship between two parties. The 
network perspective is concerned with the relationships amongst multiple parties, and 
the studies usually approach the subject through social theories and models, such as the 
concept of social capital (Bordieu, 1986; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998), resource 
dependence, or embeddedness. The units of analysis are different in these two 
approaches. The network perspective is usually concerned with the performance or 
operation of a network as a whole, while the dyadic perspective concentrates on a single 
organization or relationship. In this study, the IORs are treated as dyadic relations. The 
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level of analysis in the scope of this thesis is that of the organization, i.e., the focus is on 
the properties or actions of individual organizations. Other possibilities for levels of 
analysis would be individual, groups of individuals, groups of organizations, industry, 
or society. Research on networks and relationships on all of these levels has taken 
place.2 
1.5.3 Internal corporate venture 
The fundamental idea behind corporate venturing is “to exploit the complementaries of 
small firm capabilities to explore new opportunities and large firm capabilities to 
exploit existing competencies” (Quinn, 1985). The direct motivations for corporate 
venturing include new business development, growth, and diversification through new 
ventures. The indirect motives include strategic renewal, the development of new 
competencies and technologies, the promotion of diversity, the promotion of an 
innovative corporate culture, and learning through exploration (Backholm, 1999).  
 
In this thesis, I use the definition of corporate ventures developed by Block and 
MacMillan (1999). The term “internal corporate venture” is used to refer to these kinds 
of ventures in order to distinguish them from external corporate ventures, i.e., venturing 
capital, spin-offs, and other external investments. The internal corporate venturing 
process, like any other entrepreneurial activity, is characterized by uncertainty and 
ambiguity (Garud & Van de Ven, 1992). Block and MacMillan (1999; emphasis in 
original) defined an internal corporate venture by using the following characteristics: 
• Involves an activity new to the organization 
• Is initiated or conducted internally 
• Involves a significantly higher risk of failure or large losses than the 
organization’s base business 
• Is characterized by greater uncertainty than the base business is 
• Will be managed separately at some time during its life 
• Is undertaken for the purpose of increasing sales, profit, productivity, or quality 
 
                                               
2
 For a comprehensive review of different approaches, cf. Oliver & Ebers (1998). 
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The requirement of newness means that the venture organization has existed and the 
business operations have been conducted for no more than a maximum of 6–8 years 
(McDougall & Oviatt, 1996; Zahra, 2000). In internationalization research, corporate 
venture has often been considered to be one form of a new venture and included in the 
same category as the independent ones. In some new venture studies, corporate 
environments are separated only by a dummy variable denoting the origin of the venture 
(Backholm, 1999). However, even though corporate ventures compete and co-operate in 
a market environment using similar factor endowments as independent ventures do, 
research has shown that there are some important separating factors (McDougall et al., 
1992; Shrader & Simon, 1997). These differences are more thoroughly discussed in the 
literature review Chapter and only the two most substantial differences are presented 
below. 
 
First, corporate ventures are not usually short on resources. From the time they are 
established, they usually have, if not a vast amount of resources, at least more adequate 
resources at hand than independent ventures do. The parent organization often plays a 
more active role in providing assets, both intangible and tangible, and this may mean a 
better market position than independent ventures might have. The real challenge is in 
managing these resources in an effective and dynamic manner. Corporate venture 
managers encounter difficulties in applying resources to strategies and not in accessing 
resources (Shrader & Simon, 1997). The second substantial difference between these 
and independent new ventures is the close connection to the parent organization. 
Corporate ventures have to operate on two fronts simultaneously. Product success or 
success in the service market and success in establishing legitimacy and the exploitation 
of the resources of the parent company are very much intertwined (Backholm, 1999). 
There are several dimensions on which the venture has to find a way to fit in with the 
parent; Thornhill and Amit (2001) identified relational and economic dimensions. A 
relational fit reflects organizational culture and structure, while an economic fit is a 
function of the needs of the venture and the resources of the parent. The strategy of the 
venture is heavily influenced by the strategy of the parent organization. The fact that the 
new venture is rarely fully independent makes it more difficult to promote real 
entrepreneurship inside the organization. If the venture is successful, action persistence 
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creates heroes. If the venture is unsuccessful, action persistence creates villains who 
continued with a failing course of action (Garud & Van de Ven, 1992). 
1.5.4 High-technology environment 
In previous works, a lot of discussion about the concepts of a high-technology 
environment, high-technology markets, high-technology companies or fast-changing, 
dynamic industries has taken place (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Alahuhta, 1990; 
Oviatt & McDougall, 1994; Preece et al., 1999; Zahra et al., 2000a; Rindova & Kotha, 
2001). These concepts are widely used with different meanings in other literature. In the 
scope of this dissertation, high-technology environment is characterized by five 
identifiable key parameters (Zahra, 2000): 
• Rapidly changing 
• Focused on research and development 
• Knowledge-intensive 
• Fiercely competitive across national borders 
• Networked 
 
First, there is constant and rapid change in the environment. This means that there may 
be change in demand, competitors, technology, or regulation (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 
1988). Second, because the environment is so turbulent, the most critical function is 
usually R&D and the time windows tend to be short (Autio & Burgel, 1999). The life 
cycle of a typical new product is very short and companies spend more than the average 
on research and development. Time-to-market, the number of new products, or product 
quality are important measures of performance. The third characteristic describing the 
environment is closely related to research and development: high knowledge-intensity. 
This concept can be defined as “the extent to which a firm depends on the knowledge 
inherent in its activities and outputs as a source of competitive advantage” (Autio et al., 
2000). Knowledge can be seen as one of the most valuable resources of high-technology 
companies. Fourth, as far as fierce competition is considered, new players are entering 
the market and the industry is perpetually in motion. Competition also extends beyond 
national borders — it is expected that similar customer needs exist in several markets 
and that new innovations and products can be sold to several markets. Therefore, 
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companies operating only in one national market also face competition from other 
markets and from international players. Fifth, the industries are networked and because 
of the competition and fast development, a network of relationships is essential for 
success on all interaction levels — the industrial, corporate, and individual levels. The 
new ventures usually need support from several directions to be able to grow as much as 
they are expected to. It has been argued that fast growth can be achieved by creating a 
network of businesses and establishing relationships (Oliver & Ebers, 1998; Eisenhardt 
& Galunic, 2000). 
1.6 Structure of the dissertation 
The overall structure of this dissertation is depicted in Figure 2. In the first Chapter, the 
reader is presented with the subject and motivation for the research, research questions, 
and objectives. In Chapter 1, I also discuss and define the most important concepts that 
occur throughout the dissertation to ensure consistent terminology. The concepts that 
are presented are competitive advantage and value creation, inter-organizational 
relationship, internal corporate venture, and high-technology environment. 
 
The theoretical perspective for the purposes of this research has been selected based on 
the research questions and objectives; I present these choices and their justifications in 
Chapter 2. The chapter commences with a discussion of the different theories that 
explain competitive advantage. The theoretical approach that I have selected is the 
relational view, a theory of inter-organizational competitive advantage. This view is 
analyzed in detail in Chapter 2.  
 
Previous works related to venturing and business growth are presented in Chapter 3. A 
lot of research related to these themes has been produced; therefore, in this chapter, I 
review and summarize the most relevant pieces of research from the point of view of 
this dissertation. The aim of the chapter is to point out the gaps in the current body of 
knowledge and to show that the topic of this dissertation is relevant. 
 
In Chapter 4, I discuss the research approach in the empirical part of the study and put 
forth the methodological choices made in this dissertation. The tactics for meeting the 
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scientific criteria for good research are presented. In the chapter, I deal with such issues 
as reliability, validity, sampling, and objectivity. I also describe the data collection and 
analysis process. 
 
Chapters 5–6 form the empirical part of the dissertation. In these chapters, the data is 
presented, theoretical models are developed, and the evidence on which the analysis is 
based is shown. In Chapter 5, I present the separate case descriptions. A longitudinal 
analysis is carried out by outlining the general development of each case and the most 
important milestones of each organization during the investigation period. The parent-
venture relationship and external relationships of each case are presented and dealt with 
in more detail. 
 
In Chapter 6, I carry out a cross-case analysis of the cases by presenting the different 
categorizations, the themes that emerged from the data and the tools that were used to 
codify and categorize the data. Evidence is shown from the initial categorizations to the 
different comparisons that were made between the themes and constructs in each case. 
The cross-case analysis forms the basis for theory development. Based on the cross-case 
analysis, I present variables, define the concepts and relations between them, and 
integrate them into a tentative theoretical model.  
 
Finally, in Chapter 7, I summarize and analyze the contributions this research makes. 
The empirical findings are linked to previous research and a comparison with earlier 
results is carried out. A critical investigation is carried out by discussing the limitations 
of the results. In the final chapter, I also point out some possible directions for future 
research. 
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Introduction
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development
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Review of previous literature
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Conclusions and discussion
 
Figure 2. Structure of the dissertation 
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2 Theory of inter-organizational competitive advantage 
This chapter outlines the basic theoretical choices made in this dissertation and makes 
the reader familiar with the theoretical framework within which the results of the 
research are interpreted. My purpose in this chapter is to present the “tools” that are 
used for tackling the research problem and why these particular tools have been chosen. 
In addition, all theories have shortcomings and it is good to recognize the limitations 
and critique of the theory approach that has been selected; I discuss these issues in this 
chapter. Given the versatility of different approaches in the current state-of-the-art 
research, the theoretical discussion is often a very challenging task. The development of 
certain theoretical approaches might be incoherent and during the theory’s development 
history, the interpretations and applications it has may even be contradictory. Hence, the 
justification of the underlying theoretical choices must be done thoroughly. Parsing a 
coherent entity of the main theoretical framework, the relational view, is the main 
objective of this chapter. 
2.1 Search for a theoretical approach 
Research in any science should be based on a theory or theories that are suitable for the 
purpose. The theoretical approach or approaches should directly address the area of the 
research question and offer the best possible framework for finding answers to the 
questions at hand. In the social sciences, theories are often described as “lenses” that 
can be used to view a certain phenomenon and to give various perspectives on it. 
Several theoretical contexts are sometimes used in studies to support each other, and to 
obtain a more complete reflection of the investigated phenomena. Many of the 
theoretical views in management sciences have common historical roots and it is 
usually required that several related views be discussed in order to provide a more 
complete understanding of the theoretical background of the study. This can, however, 
also cause conceptual and methodological confusion, and oftentimes it does not lead to 
the desired result. The process of creating and defining a theory is often a messy one, 
and “perspectives”, “approaches”, and “11 views” that are not theory may still guide 
research (Priem & Butler, 2001a). A lack of agreement as to whether or not a model and 
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a theory can be distinguished, whether or not a typology is properly labeled a theory, 
whether or not the strength of a theory depends on how interesting it is, and whether or 
not falsifiability is a prerequisite for the very existence of a theory exist (Sutton & Staw, 
1995).  
 
This dissertation examines an activity where inter-organizational relationships are 
emphasized. One of the aims is to clarify how relationships can affect the creation of a 
competitive advantage for internal corporate ventures. Thus, the theoretical approach 
should reflect the aspects of organizational relationships and offer a framework for 
analyzing the characteristics of different business organizations, the linkages between 
them and their growth. A central unit of analysis in this research is a relationship 
between two organizations, the internal corporate venture, and its stakeholder. Hence, 
the chosen theory approach should focus on explaining the differing success of 
organizations by reflecting the network of relationships in which the organization is 
embedded. On a high level, the question of differential organizational success can be 
approached from two basic perspectives: the industry structure or resource-based view 
(Teece et al., 1997; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Ghemawat, 2002; Makhija, 2003). 
 
The industry structure view builds on a subfield of economics called industrial 
organization. The roots of industrial organization date back to the 1950s when Joe Bain 
from the Harvard Economics Department published two studies that explored the 
profitability of different industries and how in some industries there are lower barriers 
of entry than in others (Ghemawat, 2002). Industrial organization is concerned with the 
structural reasons as to why some industries are more profitable than others are. In 
1980, Michael Porter published his landmark book “Competitive strategy”, which first 
introduced the “five forces” approach to understanding the attractiveness of an industry 
environment. Since then, Porter (1980, 1996, 2001; Porter & Fuller, 1986) has modified 
his view and described in several contexts the structure of the industry and the forces 
that affect the rivalry amongst existing competitors. 
 
The industry structure model treats companies as equal “average” units. It does not take 
into account that companies could have unique resources or knowledge that provides 
them with an advantage over the other companies. Porter’s model explains what kind of 
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environment a company should choose and what kind of forces there are in an industry. 
What the company should itself do and how it should organize its activities is not 
directly addressed by the model. Each organization also operates in several different 
contexts, with the competitive market landscape described by Porter being one. The 
competitiveness of a company must always be considered in relation to the contexts that 
the company finds itself in. These contexts are also in perpetual motion; the 
environment is dynamic in the same way as the organization itself is. Therefore, one of 
the contexts is always the context of change (Mintzberg & Westley, 1991). A detailed 
analysis has been carried out suggesting that industry, corporate-level, and business-
specific effects are related in complex ways (McGahan & Porter, 1997). 
 
The other fundamental view on differential organizational success, the resource-based 
view, turns the spotlight on the focal organization. In the scope of the resource-based 
view, it is argued that companies are sets, or bundles of resources. The resource-based 
theory has mainly been developed based on the seminal work of Edith Penrose (1959), 
which in fact describes the growth of the company rather than the creation of a 
competitive advantage. The basic thesis in the resource-based view is that all companies 
have different sets of resources and the competitive advantage is created through rare, 
valuable, non-substitutable, and/or non-imitable resources (Barney, 1991). Resources 
can be tangible, e.g., physical assets, people, etc., or intangible, e.g., knowledge or 
processes. The creation of economic rents is thus based on the scarcity of these 
resources. I will discuss the concept of economic rent later in this chapter.  
 
Wernerfelt published an article in Strategic Management Journal in 1984 entitled “A 
Resource-based View of the Firm”. One major contribution of this article was to direct 
strategy scholars back toward resources as important antecedents to products, and, 
ultimately, company performance (Priem & Butler, 2001a). In that sense, the article did 
not set out to compete with the industry structure view, but to remind people that there 
are “two sides to the coin”. Wernerfelt (1984) focused on the corporate-level 
implications of resource heterogeneity. Two years later, Barney (1986) set forth new 
arguments about the creation of competitive advantage and value. In fact, value is fully 
endogenous to Barney's framework, as the value of resources that a company acquires is 
hypothesized to be a function of the private information it possesses about the resources 
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available for purchase. In his 1991 article, Barney (1991) focused on how competitive 
advantages and value, once created, can be sustained. Finally, Peteraf (1993) tied all of 
the pieces together in a single coherent framework encompassing how competitive 
advantage is created and how it is sustained, with applications at both the business-unit 
and corporate levels. (Makadok, 2001a) 
 
Teece et al. (1997), amongst others (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Kogut & Zander, 1992; 
1993; 1995; 1996; Amit & Schoemaker, 1993), suggested a dynamic capabilities model, 
which also treats companies as the primary unit of analysis, but then builds on the 
notions of capabilities and competencies rather than resources. This shifts the focus of 
developing competitive advantage to capability development rather than resource 
picking. The influential article on core competencies by Prahalad and Hamel (1990) is 
also based on this insight. Companies are heterogeneous with respect to their resources, 
capabilities, and endowments. Furthermore, resource endowments are “sticky”, 
companies may have to live with what they lack, as business development is viewed as 
an extremely complex process and new innovations or competences are not quickly 
implemented. (Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Rindova & Kotha, 2001)  
 
A text from the 1960s suggested that “the capability of an organization is its 
demonstrated and potential ability to accomplish against the opposition of circumstance 
or competition, whatever it sets out to do. Every organization has actual and potential 
strengths and weaknesses; it is important to try to determine what they are and to 
distinguish one from the other. Resources like this create rents that give companies 
advantage over others.” (Learned et al., 1969) It has also been suggested, that 
knowledge is the key resource that should be focused on, when considering the 
competitive advantage of companies (Kogut & Zander, 1993; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995; Grant, 1996; Liebeskind, 1996; Mowrey et al., 1996; Spender & Grant, 1996). 
The theory of a knowledge-based view is based on a similar Schumpeterian logic as the 
dynamic capabilities model is. Hence, the focus is shifted towards acquiring new 
knowledge through learning, innovating, and knowledge-exchange. In Schumpeterian 
value creation environment, all companies are able to mimic any particular company’s 
behaviour and, therefore, to replicate that company’s performance and, eventually, 
appropriate some or all of its rent streams (Moran & Ghoshal, 1999). There is no clear 
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consensus as to whether or not the resource-based view, the knowledge-based view, and 
the dynamic capabilities model are separate entities, different interpretations of the same 
theoretical roots or whether or not the capabilities and knowledge models merely 
represent sub-categories of the resource-based view. 
 
A well-known fact is that the scholarly community that works on inter-company 
relationships is extremely broad-ranging; for example, this community encompasses 
management scholars, economic geographers, sociologists, and new industrial 
organization economists, in addition to transaction cost and resource/capability 
theorists. All of these individuals study inter-company relations using different 
approaches and for different purposes (Foss, 2000). In history, the starting point for 
understanding inter-organizational relationships has been the interaction between the 
company, a specific stakeholder of the company and the market (Hayek, 1949; White, 
1981). Andrews (1971) stated that the strategic actions of companies are the outcome of 
a match between a company’s existing competence and the availability of new 
opportunities. Andrews’ view was one of the early approaches on how companies enter 
different IORs, alliances, or partnerships. 
 
As a branch of theory development, the resource-based view can also be used for 
investigating inter-organizational relationships and networks (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996). One possibility — suggested by Molina (1999) — is to revise 
some of the principles behind the resource-based view — those referring to the unit of 
analysis — so that, rather than offering an alternative perspective, the existing one is 
reformulated. This line is followed by Molina and Camisón (1998). Through 
partnerships, organizations may gain access to new or complementary resources or may 
be able to utilize and leverage existing ones. Donada (2002) also used the resource-
based view, together with several other views, to investigate co-operative gain in 
vertical partnerships. Combs and Ketchen Jr. (1999) explained inter-company co-
operation and performance by reconciling both the resource-based view and the 
industrial organization. These theories that explain competitive advantage do not, 
however, directly assess how to systematically examine the inter-organizational rent-
generating process (Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
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Another stream of theory, the transaction cost economics, offers an alternative approach 
to analyzing inter-organizational relationships. According to the transaction cost theory, 
the performance of the organization can be maximized (Combs & Ketchen Jr., 1999) by 
minimizing the costs of governance in the transactions between organizations. 
“Transaction costs are the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems” and the 
transaction is the fundamental unit of analysis (Williamson, 1985). The managers 
should then be preoccupied with the origins, incidence, and ramifications of transaction 
costs (Williamson, 1979). Transaction cost theory also comes to term with bounded 
rationality and the notion of opportunism — self-interest seeking that is an essential part 
of economic organization and the concept of governance that is enforced (partly) to 
mitigate the hazards caused by opportunism (Williamson, 1999). 
 
Gulati (1998) identified some of the theoretical explanations for entering alliances or 
partnerships, one of them stemming from the transaction cost economics: transaction 
costs resulting from small numbers bargaining, strategic behaviour that leads companies 
to try to enhance their competitive positioning or market power and a quest for 
organizational knowledge or learning. On a high level, “transaction cost economics also 
can be reduced to tautology: hierarchical forms of governance will replace market forms 
of governance when the costs of market governance are greater than the costs of 
hierarchical governance. Indeed, this is known as Coasian tautology.” (Barney, 2001) 
 
From a strategic point of view, the transaction cost theory both complements and 
competes with the resource- and capability-based views (Williamson, 1999). It has been 
suggested that a more integrative view of combining elements from both the transaction 
cost economics point of view and the resource-based point of view should be pursued, 
as previous research has shown that neither fully explains the mechanisms between the 
organizations and their performance implications (Combs & Ketchen Jr., 1999; 
Ahmadjian & Lincoln, 2001).  
 
Based on the rationale explained above, I chose the relational view of the competitive 
advantage (Dyer & Singh, 1998) as a central model in this thesis. As written below, this 
choice is justified by first examining the background of the theory, its main theses, how 
it has been applied in previous research and finally, by discussing how the theory 
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addresses the context of this dissertation. The relational view explains the growth of 
organizations through inter-organizational linkages and how the competitive advantage 
is embedded in inter-company routines. The view has been influenced by both 
transaction cost economics and the resource-based view. This uses both advantages and 
problems related to the view and these issues will be discussed in the following 
chapters, as well as a more thorough explanation of the view. 
2.2 The relational view 
2.2.1 General 
The basic underlying argument behind the relational view has been recently presented 
by several scholars: companies are embedded in networks of social, professional, and 
exchange relationships with other organizational actors. This means that the advantage 
an individual company has are often linked to the advantage that the network of 
relationships in which the company is embedded has (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 1995; 
Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1998; Khanna et al., 1998; Gulati et al., 2000; Andersson 
et al., 2002). Relationships can be either arm’s length or embedded. Embedded 
relationships involve the social exchange of private knowledge and self-enforcing 
governance (Uzzi, 1999). Arm's length ties “are characterized by lean and sporadic 
transactions and function without any prolonged human or social contact between 
parties” (Uzzi, 1999). The parties involved in the exchange do not need to enter into 
recurrent or continuing relations as a result of which they would get to know each other 
better. The main proposition related to arm's-length ties is that “they determine the 
degree to which an actor can access heterogeneous information in a market, even if that 
information is publicly available through advertising or publicity, as actors use network 
ties to search for opportunities and investments” (Uzzi, 1999). 
 
The related concept of weak, non-intense, infrequent ties that are restricted to a narrow 
type of relationship has been discussed by Granovetter (1973). Granovetter 
hypothesized that a company having diverse weak ties would have access to more 
resources and more knowledge. This in turn provides both opportunities and constraints 
 36 
for companies and can have implications for their behaviour and performance. Viewed 
from this standpoint, much of the research on strategic alliances represents an under-
socialized account of company behaviour. (Gulati, 1998) It was, however, emphasized 
by Dyer and Singh (1998) that arm’s length relationships or weak ties cannot act as 
sources for a long-term competitive advantage, as they are not rare or difficult to 
imitate. Some special qualities or routines in the relationship must exist in order for the 
parties involved in sustainable competitive advantage to obtain it. 
 
The theory of relational rents has been derived from the characteristics of arm’s length 
relationships. By reflecting the basic propositions behind theorizing with arm’s length 
relationships and considering the requirement of sustainability and non-imitability, the 
basic arguments for the sources of relational rents and their preserving mechanisms can 
be derived. Many of the concepts in the relational view also relate to transaction cost 
economics and Williamson’s (1985) discussion on companies, markets and relational 
contracting. Before discussing the actual determinants of relational rents, processes 
facilitating relational rents and the preserving mechanisms, the notion of relational rent 
must be considered. 
 
Dyer and Singh (1998) define the relational rents as “a supernormal profit jointly 
generated in an exchange relationship that cannot be generated by either company in 
isolation and can only be created through the joint idiosyncratic contributions of the 
specific alliance partners”. This type of definition poses challenges when categorizing 
the relational rents in light of previous research. A discussion on economic rents follows 
below. 
 
All economic rents are based on scarcity. “Earnings in excess of breakeven are called 
rents, rather than profits, if their existence does not induce new competition” (Peteraf, 
1993). Four basic types of economic rents are usually distinguished: Ricardian rent, 
Schumpeterian rent, Pareto rent, and monopoly rent. The rent generation of resource-
based view is mostly based on Ricardian rents. “According to the Ricardian logic, 
heterogeneity in performance is due to ownership of resources that have differential 
productivity” (Makadok, 2001b). Thus, an organization must “outsmart” other 
organizations by picking the right resources, those capable of generating the economic 
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rent. Schumpeterian logic, on the other hand, emphasizes capability-building rather than 
resource picking (Makadok, 2001b). Unlike resources, capabilities are based on 
developing, carrying, and exchanging information through the organization’s 
intellectual capital (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). “Capabilities reflect an organization’s 
ability to achieve new and innovative forms of competitive advantage” (Teece et al., 
1997). Schumpeterian rent occurs when competitors take time to build the capabilities 
developed by the market leader. Hence, the scarcity related to Schumpeterian rent is 
temporal. The dynamic capabilities model and the knowledge-based view can be said to 
be based on the Schumpetrian logic. It can also been seen that Schumpeterian rent is the 
source of other rents. Pareto rent is defined as “the difference between the payments to a 
resource in its best and second best use” (Amit & Schomaker, 1993). Pareto may also be 
referred as quasi-rent — suggesting that the rents are not permanent in nature (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998). Monopoly rent occurs when the scarcity of the resource is artificially 
limited or governed by an authority (i.e., government or other regulatory body). 
 
What makes the interpretation and operationalization of relational rents challenging is 
that Dyer and Singh’s (1998) definition includes Pareto, Ricardian, and Schumpeterian 
logic. Even though the developers categorize relational rents as a type of quasi-rent 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998), the definition of Pareto rent does not fully address all of the 
aspects of the relational view. In previous literature, the relational view has often been 
categorized as an extension of the resource-based view (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Ahuja, 
2000b; Griffith & Harvey, 2001; Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Kotha et al., 2001; Farjoun, 
2002; Douglas & Ryman, 2003) or representing the knowledge-based or capabilities-
based views (Gulati, 1999; Chung et al., 2000; Doh, 2000; Kale et al., 2000; Kogut, 
2000; Stuart, 2000; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Sarkar et al, 2001; Mustakallio et al., 
2002). As I will explain in the following chapters, the different sources for relational 
rents consist of such elements that Pareto, Ricardian, Schumpeterian, and sometimes 
even monopoly rent generating logic can be found in them. Thus, the relational view 
can be loosely labeled as a type of “meta-theory” that has been built on the theoretical 
foundations of multitude of previously separate streams of theoretical literature. By 
doing so, it addresses a question not directly addressed before and offers normative 
prescriptions that contradict the previous explanations (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Doh, 2000; 
Donada, 2002; Douglas & Ryman, 2003). On the other hand, comprehensiveness 
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usually correlates with complexity and abstraction level. It may be more difficult to 
apply the model by using the previously known application models and methods, as it 
requires operationalizing a single entity that consists of various interrelated parts. I 
discuss these parts, the determinants of relational rents, and the facilitating sub-
processes below. 
2.2.2 Sources for competitive advantage 
In their model, Dyer and Singh (1998) identified four sources of inter-organizational 
competitive advantage based on previous research: 
• Relation-specific assets  
• Knowledge-sharing routines 
• Complementary resources/capabilities 
• Effective governance 
 
The notion of relation-specific assets and more specifically, asset specificity, can be 
traced back to transaction-cost economics and arguments made by Williamson (1985). 
Williamson (1985) stated that “asset specificity refers to durable investments that are 
undertaken in support of particular transaction, the opportunity cost of which 
investment is much lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users should the 
original transaction be prematurely terminated” and “at least four different types of asset 
specificity are usefully distinguished: site specificity, physical asset specificity; human 
asset specificity; and dedicated assets.” Hence, the assets invested in the relationship 
can be location-bound (e.g., a certain geographical proximity to the production facilities 
of co-operating parties), physical (e.g., property, production facilities, plant, or 
equipment), or human (e.g., personnel working in a joint venture) (Amit & Schoemaker, 
1993; Teece et al., 1997; Dyer & Singh, 1998). Dedicated asset specificity refers, for 
example, to investments in expanding an existing plant on behalf of a particular partner 
(Williamson, 1985). Evidence of relation-specific assets as a source for competitive 
advantage was found by Dyer (1996). Dyer carried out a survey of the supplier network 
of the automotive industry. One of the conclusions was that specialization and heavier 
involvement in the design process generated extraordinary returns for the supplier 
network members. Bensau and Anderson (1999) found in their research on automaker 
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suppliers that specific assets also provide a way of coping with a scarcity of qualified 
suppliers, particularly as part of the larger relationship between two companies.  
 
Two key sub-processes that influence the ability of partners to generate relational rents 
through relation-specific assets are the duration of safeguards and the volume of inter-
organizational transactions (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Williamson (1985) formulated the 
notion of safeguards with the following imperative: “organize transaction so as to 
economize on bounded rationality while simultaneously safeguarding them against the 
hazards of opportunism.” Safeguards can take several forms, for example, common 
ownership or a contract period. Poppo and Zenger (2002) referred to trust as a self-
enforcing safeguard. I will deal with the notion of trust and other safeguards in 
paragraphs below in connection with effective governance. According to Dyer and 
Singh (1998), it is the duration of the safeguards that affects the potential to generate 
relational rents. 
 
The volume (both scale and scope) of the transactions is a self-evident sub-process 
facilitating relational rents under the relation-specific assets. The concept of volume can 
be compared with the economies of scale in production operations. According to 
transaction cost economics, the frequency of transactions is a relevant dimension when 
considering the asset specificity. One reason for this is that the cost of specialized 
governance structures would be easier to recover for large recurring transactions 
(Williamson, 1985; Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
 
Knowledge-sharing routines — the second source of a competitive advantage in the 
relational view — are defined as “a regular pattern of inter-company interactions that 
permits the transfer, recombination, or creation of specialized knowledge” (Grant, 1996; 
Grant & Baden-Fuller, 1995). Intense interaction indicates that the parties in the 
relationship have both a great incentive and opportunity to share knowledge (Ahuja, 
2000b). In fact, there is a distinct class of “learning alliances” where the primary 
purpose of the co-operation is to share knowledge and learn from each other (Khanna et 
al., 1998). The ambiguous definition of knowledge must be briefly discussed to fully 
understand the implications of the concept of knowledge in the theory; this I do below. 
 
 40 
The classical theory of knowledge says that (Goldman, 1986; Niiniluoto, 1999): 
 
X knows that p, iff 
a) X believes (is convinced that) p, 
b) X has evidence that p, 
c) p is true. 
 
Condition a) separates knowledge from a guess, b) from an assumption, and c) from a 
mistake. In short, the classical theory states, that knowledge is a well-justified, true 
belief. From the point of view of management and human sciences, this definition has 
some shortcomings. 
 
For example, content of knowledge is an assertion or a group of assertions in the form 
of a proposition. The knowledge object can be a single phenomenon, a process or a fact 
(singular knowledge) or laws and causalities (general knowledge). The subject of the 
knowledge is usually considered a person, a human that knows. In the case of 
organizational knowledge, knowledge is inter-subjective, i.e., it is shared by a group of 
people (Niiniluoto, 1999). In the case of inter-subjective knowledge, however, it is very 
hard to define whether the content of the knowledge is the same, especially if the 
content is something else than factual knowledge (subjective knowledge, tacit 
knowledge, etc.; these concepts are discussed later on). In the scope of this theory, it can 
be assumed that, if the content and the object are nearly enough similar to several 
individuals, the knowing subject can be a group of individuals, i.e., an organization. 
This is an awkward definition and it can only be measured by observing the members of 
the organization and their application or expression of their knowledge. To test a 
hypothesis, one would need to develop gauges for inter-organizational differences in the 
stock of proprietary tacit knowledge (McFetridge, 1995). It has also been suggested, by 
Spender and Grant (1996), etc., that organizations could as such be learning entities, in 
addition to individuals: “While an individual’s knowledge is inherently transferable, 
moving with the person, the social types of knowledge are either publicly available or 
collective and embedded in the company’s routines, norms and culture”. This view 
makes the utilization of knowledge in management sciences even more problematic: it 
is less clear what it is about an organization that facilitates the generation and 
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subsequent application of such knowledge and learning. (Spender & Grant, 1996) Even 
more unclear is how to actually measure or operationalize these concepts. 
 
In this dissertation, knowledge is considered a “dynamic human process of justifying 
personal belief toward the ‘truth’” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Furthermore, a 
distinction is usually made between two different types of knowledge: “knowing that” 
and “knowing how” (expertise). “Knowing that” is based on propositions; one can 
always articulate what is known. Expertise can be articulable, i.e., explicit, or not 
articulable, i.e., tacit (Polanyi, 1966; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Orlikowski, 2002). 
Especially in industries where science and technology rapidly advance, collaborative 
arrangements between companies are likely to occupy an important role in the transfer 
and integration of explicit knowledge (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 1995). The relational 
view focuses on the routines of how knowledge is shared, and therefore partly succeeds 
in escaping the tricky operationalization of knowledge itself. 
 
Under knowledge-sharing routines, key sub-processes are partner-specific absorptive 
capacity and incentives to encourage transparency and discourage free riding (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998). Absorptive capacity is defined as the ability of a company to recognize 
the value of new external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). This is a function of the company’s level of prior related 
knowledge and the capacity may also be partner-specific (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
Dyer & Singh, 1998). Repeated interactions and relationships seem to improve the 
capability transfer tacit information (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). The complexities of 
absorptive capacity lie in the tacitness of inter-organizational co-operative routines. 
Thus, specific investments of managerial time and effort to learn from past co-operative 
experiences may be important for cultivating relational capabilities. This may require, 
e.g., identifying, codifying, and discussing systematically the activities that were carried 
out in the past (Zollo et al., 2002). 
 
Informal and formal incentives also facilitate knowledge-sharing routines. These 
incentives may be formal (e.g., equity arrangements) or informal (e.g., dense social 
interactions) (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Common goals and a shared vision between the 
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parties may also be informal incentives to share knowledge; these kinds of mechanisms 
relate to the theory of social capital (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). 
 
The third source for competitive advantage is complementary resources and capabilities. 
In other words, the organizations are mutually supplying what the other organization 
lacks. It means that the alliance partners have distinctive resources or capabilities that 
collectively generate greater rents than the sum of those obtained from the individual 
provisions of each partner (Dyer & Singh, 1998). External linkages between 
organizations have an important bearing on the rate and direction of innovation and on 
how competences and capabilities co-evolve (Teece et al., 1997). Capabilities refer to 
an organization’s ability to deploy resources, usually combined, using organizational 
processes to achieve the desired end (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). In dynamic high-
technology markets, this refers to integrating, building, and reconfiguring internal and 
external competencies to address rapidly changing environments (Teece et al., 1997; 
Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). The generation of relational rents may also require the 
ability to identify and evaluate potential complementarities and depends on the role of 
organizational complementarities to access benefits of strategic resource 
complementarity (Dyer & Singh, 1998); for example, reputation is often highlighted as 
an intangible resource in studies investigating internationalization (Kotha et al., 2001). 
Organizations that have reputations or brands that complement each other (e.g., the 
other organization is known in different geographical areas) may have a higher 
probability of success in internationalization than the alliance partners would have 
separately. Identifying the right alliance partners is the key to generating relational rent 
and, according to Dyer and Singh (1998), the identification ability can increase through 
three factors:  
1. prior alliance experience 
2. investment in internal search and evaluation capability  
3. ability to obtain information through social networks 
Thus, one sub-process that facilitates the generation of complementary resources and 
capabilities is the ability to identify and evaluate complementarities. 
 
Leveraging an organization’s strategic capabilities with access to the complementary 
capabilities of other organizations requires that the organization’s own processes, 
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systems, and cultures support the activity as well as offering a certain degree of 
complementarity with the other party (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Chung et al., 2000). In 
other words, even though there would be strategic complementarity between the parties, 
it may not realize, without the organizational complementarity and competence to take 
advantage of the complementarities. This is the other sub-process facilitating 
complementary resources and capabilities. 
 
The last of the sources for relational rents is effective governance. Organizations must 
control, direct, and influence the actions and conduct of the parties in the relationship. 
The actors and stakeholders of the relationship exert a determining or guiding influence 
in or over the relationship.3 Governance plays a key role in the network relationships 
because “it influences transaction costs as well as the willingness of alliance partners to 
engage in value-creation initiatives” (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Inter-organizational 
relationships are complex organizational arrangements that can require multiple levels 
of internal approval, search issues in identifying partners, and detailed negotiations and 
contracts (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). The possession of relationship formation 
capabilities can therefore be a significant resource for companies due to the managerial 
challenges associated with forming and managing the relationship networks (Gulati et 
al., 2000).  
 
Governance in inter-organizational relationships can be further divided into two 
categories according to the enforcement: third-party enforcement (e.g., legal contracts) 
and self-enforcement (e.g., trust, reputation, financial hostages). Self-enforcement is 
further divided into formal and informal (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Since its beginnings, 
transaction cost economics has been concerned with governance, and minimizing the 
costs of different governance mechanisms (Williamson, 1979; 1999). In transaction cost 
economics, “governance is a means by which to infuse order in a relation where 
potential conflict threatens to undo or upset opportunities to realize mutual gains” 
(Williamson, 1999, emphasis in original). In addition, “governance emerges from the 
values and agreed-upon processes found in social relationships” (Poppo & Zenger, 
2002). 
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Formal contracts are crafted for the purposes mentioned above. The more risks and 
potential conflicts there are, the more complex the contract will be. “The more complex 
is the contract, the greater is the specification of promises, obligations, and processes 
for dispute resolution” (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Furthermore, the more complex the 
contract is, the more costly it will be to create and enforce it. This is the dilemma of 
transaction cost economics and third-party enforcing. More formal governance means 
more costs through negotiation and enforcement; less formal governance means more 
risks and hence more costs through risk management. In the relational view, it is 
considered that the ability to employ more self-enforcing safeguards rather than formal 
contracts facilitates the creation of relational rents due to self-enforcing mechanisms 
minimizing transaction costs and maximizing the possibility of value-creation 
initiatives. (Dyer & Singh, 1998)  
 
The importance of self-enforcing safeguards in inter-organizational activities has been 
widely recognized in previous literature (Williamson, 1985; 1999; Ring & Van de Ven, 
1995; Das & Teng, 1998; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1998; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998; Uzzi, 1999). A frequent example of informal safeguard, especially in the social 
relationship literature stream, is trust or trustworthiness. The concept of trust here is 
defined as confidence in the goodwill of others. Trust and its underlying normative 
behaviours may operate as a self-enforcing safeguard that is a more effective and less 
costly alternative to both contracts and vertical integration (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). 
The interaction between trust and co-operation is also two-way: trust lubricates co-
operation and co-operation itself breeds trust. Where there is more trust, people are 
more willing to take risks in the exchange of knowledge (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). It 
emphasizes faith in moral integrity or goodwill, which is produced through 
interpersonal interactions that lead to social-psychological bonds of mutual norms, 
sentiments, and friendships in dealing with uncertainty (Ring & Van de Ven, 1995). 
Previous research has shown that trust is created from a shared vision and interaction 
ties and that trust and trustworthiness may result in different levels of resource exchange 
and combination (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). Tsai (2000) also stated that the benefits of 
intra-organizational strategic linkages can be achieved only if trustworthiness exists 
among organizational units. Transaction cost economics, however, considers trust to be 
                                                                                                                                          
3
 Definition of governance adopted and modified from the Merriam-Webster On-line Dictionary 
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either an “environmental” variable that creates differences in contracting needs or a 
“weakness” of the contracting parties that makes the contracts fragile and subject to 
exploitation by more opportunistic agents (Williamson, 1985). To express this more 
clearly, from purely a transaction cost economics point of view, trust is just another 
hazard of opportunism that may cause the organization involved in the relationship to 
incur costs. This kind of approach has recently been rejected by many of the 
management scholars and trust has been seen as a positive force in inter-organizational 
relationships that should also be considered in addition to transaction costs (Gulati, 
1995).  
 
Gulati (1998) noted that a social network of prior ties promotes trust. Informal self-
enforcing safeguards are, however, subject to two key liabilities: they require substantial 
time to develop, as they require a history of interaction and personal ties and they are 
subject to the “paradox of trust”, which means that trust provides the opportunity for 
abuse (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Locke (1999) pointed out that putting too strong an 
emphasis on personal relationships and trust generated through them might lead to 
creating “politics” (i.e., who you know rather than what the facts are) in organization’s 
dominant operating philosophy, which is not the desired situation.  
 
Figure 3 summarizes the determinants of relational rents and the key sub-processes 
facilitating them. 
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1. Relation-specific assets
2. Knowledge-sharing routines
3. Complementary 
resources and capabilities
4. Effective governance
1a. Duration of safeguards
1b. Volume of interfirm transactions
2a. Partner-specific absorptive capacity
2b. Incentives to encourage transparency
and discourage free riding
3a. Ability to identify and evaluate potential
complementaries
3b. Role of organizational complementaries
to access benefits of strategic resource
complementarity
4b. Ability to employ informal versus formal
self-enforcement governance mechanisms
4b. Ability to employ self-enforcement
rather than third-party enforcement
governance mechanisms
Determinants of
relational rents
Subprocesses facilitating
relational rents
 
Figure 3. Determinants of inter-organizational competitive advantage (Dyer & Singh, 
1998) 
The concepts and processes described in this chapter and depicted in the figure above 
define the overall framework as to how relational rents are created, and thus competitive 
advantage, through inter-organizational relationships. In the following chapter, I deal 
with the mechanisms that may preserve the relational rents. 
2.2.3 Preserving mechanisms 
According to Dyer & Singh (1998), the following mechanisms preserve relational rents: 
• Causal ambiguity 
• Time compression diseconomies 
• Inter-organizational asset interconnectedness 
• Partner scarcity (rareness) 
• Resource indivisibility (co-evolution of capabilities) 
• Institutional environment 
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Causal ambiguity occurs when the link between the resources, capabilities, or activities 
of an organization and its sustained competitive advantage is not understood, or 
understood only imperfectly. This is one of the very root problems of all social sciences, 
although it is also a pragmatic problem for managers. It cannot be assumed that the 
processes leading to competitive advantage are both deterministic and continuous. The 
stochastic nature of the process may stem from the inability to identify some of the 
relevant variables as well as the inability to control them (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). This 
is especially the case with the complex and situation-specific processes, i.e., the 
development of trust (Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
 
Time compression diseconomies are related to the Schumpeterian logic of rent 
generation; for example, tacit knowledge or capabilities take time to develop and time, 
as such, cannot be bought or sold in the marketplace (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Amit & 
Schoemaker, 1993; Teece et al., 1997). Time compression diseconomies and imitability 
are related; basically, most resources, capabilities, and mechanisms can be imitated, it is 
only a matter of how long it takes to do so. High absorptive capacity in an organization 
means that a certain capability may be imitated more quickly and thus decreasing the 
effect of time compression diseconomies.  
 
Even though described as a “mechanism not discussed previously in the literature” 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998), the concept of asset interconnectedness is quite similar to the 
“interconnectedness of asset stocks” as discussed by Dierickx and Cool (1989), etc. In 
the relational view, the concept is just extended beyond the organizational boundaries. 
As an example of asset interconnectedness, Dyer and Singh (1998) used a case from the 
automotive industry, comparing the ways that Nissan and GM operate with their 
suppliers. By building plants on adjacent properties, Nissan and its supplier created a 
connection between their assets. The investments created a situation where the physical 
proximity of the plants acted as a preserving mechanism for their joint co-operation. 
GM’s supplier, on the other hand did not make any site-specific investments so this kind 
of preserving mechanism was not created and there was no incentive to make further 
relation-specific investments. 
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Partner scarcity is one of the basic underlying preserving mechanisms of relational 
rents. The fewer potential partners there are in the market, the less possibilities there are 
for companies to create a sustainable competitive advantage through inter-
organizational relationships. A partnership of two companies creates a competitive 
advantage for the parties as competitors “cannot find a partner with the requisite 
complementary strategic resources or relational capability” (Dyer & Singh, 1998). In 
addition to a preserving mechanism, partner scarcity is, of course, one of the pre-
requisites for the initial creation of the rent. 
 
Resource indivisibility is a preserving mechanism based on the Ricardian logic of rent 
generation. If the complementary resources jointly generated in an inter-organizational 
relationship are such that others cannot replicate or buy them, a competitive advantage 
over other competitors has been created. Indivisible resources are, according to the 
resource-based view, valuable, rare, and difficult to imitate (Barney, 1991). “The use of 
external resources, acquired through long-term relationships, can generate growth and 
can help in the pursuit of opportunities” (Beekman & Robinson, 2004). Competitors 
cannot access the resources of a potential partner, as these resources may have co-
evolved with another company (Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
 
The last preserving mechanism is institutional environment. As an example of a 
different institutional environment preserving relational rent, Japanese companies incur 
lower transaction costs than U.S. companies and generate higher relational rents, in part 
because of a country-specific institutional environment that fosters goodwill, trust, and 
co-operation (Dyer & Singh, 2003; Huff & Kelley, 2003). Learning or the transfer of 
tacit knowledge is thus contingent upon the exchange environment and the mechanisms 
that exist between the alliance partners (Kale et al., 2002). In the context of Japanese 
companies, environment refers to the different cultural environment. Kotler (2000) has 
identified six different “forces” that may also be used as different contexts from which 
the institutional environment can be approached: demographic, economic, natural, 
technological, political-legal, and social-cultural. As these forces also have causal 
interactions, they cannot be artificially separated from each other. 
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2.3 Application of relational view in this dissertation 
The comments made on the relational view are mainly related to the applicability and 
usability of the theoretical framework (Molina, 1999). It has been argued by Molina 
(1999) that shifting the unit of analysis from the individual company to the inter-
organizational relationship(s) does not essentially contradict the previous theories — as 
a resource-based view — and that this kind of new model is not required. Instead, the 
old models should be reformulated to fit the new perspective. Developers responded to 
this commentary stating that there are some differences and in some instances, it offers 
an independent set of explanation on how companies earn rents (Dyer, 1999). The 
applicability of the relational view in different types of networks and IORs has been 
questioned. One must be aware of the different types of networks when applying Dyer 
and Singh’s (1999) model and it is best suited for only certain types of network 
structures and not for all network structures (Molina, 1999). New insights about 
competitive advantage can, however, be gleaned by studying networks and inter-
organizational relationships (Dyer, 1999). The most recent research implies that the 
relational view may even better explain why some companies succeed better through 
inter-organizational relationships as compared to the resource-based view or transaction 
cost economics (Donada, 2002).  
 
To illustrate the operationalization of the theory, I give a few examples of concepts 
from the relational view, how they address the topic of this dissertation, and how the 
issues have been approached in previous works. Knowledge-sharing routines offer 
answers to the research questions of this dissertation by explaining how internal 
corporate venture organizations learn from their internal co-operation partners and 
external market actors through these routines and are thus more innovative (Ahuja, 
2000a). “Depending on the alliance form, the nature and type of resource allocations 
will be different, as will the process of learning, motives for learning, competitive 
dynamics, learning mechanisms, and knowledge types” (Inkpen, 2000a). Relation-
specific assets explain the international competitive advantage of internal corporate 
ventures purely by implying that the volume of resources committed to international 
inter-organizational transactions leads to the internationalization and onto the creation 
of a competitive advantage. The duration of safeguards in these relationships also 
addresses the research question as safeguards are necessary pre-requisites in internal 
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and external relationships to ensure the continuity of co-operation and hence facilitate 
the benefits gained from the relationship. The resource endowments in the relational 
view address the research question of this dissertation by suggesting that concrete 
resources must be endowed by the parties in a relationship. Only through this 
mechanism is the creation of an international competitive advantage possible. A venture 
operating in an international environment must commit resources to the relationships in 
order to succeed and outperform its competitors and grow. The institutional 
environment has been explored for preserving mechanisms in previous research; for 
example, Huff and Kelley (2003) compared the level of trust in organizations in seven 
nations. Kotabe et al (2003) investigated the difference between U.S. and Japan. In the 
internationalization literature stream, the institutional environment has also been an 
issue. Reardon et al. (1996) had several variables related to the environment, e.g., 
culture, in their study of service company internationalization. Sherman et al. (1998) 
investigated the effect of regulatory environment on international growth and Zahra et 
al. (1997) studied the domestic competitive environment. The different variables 
analyzed in the previous internationalization research are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3. 
 
One of the basic premises in this dissertation is that the relational view addresses the 
questions of this dissertation by offering an overall framework for analyzing the 
different aspects of inter-organizational relationships of internal corporate ventures and 
their effect on the creation and sustainability of an international competitive advantage. 
I suggest that this theoretical lens is suitable for investigating, describing, and 
explaining the phenomena within the scope of this research. This statement is further 
justified in the following chapters by exploring previous literature for corporate and 
international venturing. I intend to show, based on previous literature, that corporate 
venturing and international growth are phenomena where the role of inter-organizational 
relationships is essential, the research questions are relevant and that there is an 
identifiable gap in the literature.  
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3 Review of previous literature on venturing 
In this chapter, I analyze the previous research on the concepts important to this 
dissertation: venturing, new business generation in dynamic industries and creation of 
international growth. Where the previous chapter concentrated on the general theoretical 
foundations behind this research and how the inter-organizational relationships are 
interpreted and analyzed, this chapter outlines how the topical research areas have been 
investigated and treated in the past. The themes of venturing, internal corporate 
venturing and venturing as an option for international growth are treated separately and 
conclusions from the literature analysis are drawn at the end of the chapter. 
 
The concept of corporate venturing has been widely discussed in previous works and 
the highlights of these works from the point of view of this dissertation are presented in 
this chapter. There are similarities and links between the literature on independent 
venturing and corporate venturing; therefore, this chapter also includes pointers to 
research on venturing in general, even though the empirical part focuses on 
investigating only internal corporate ventures. Understanding how independent and 
corporate ventures differ is one of the objectives of this chapter. The results concerning 
the performance of corporate ventures and independent ventures are mixed, perspectives 
vary, and the research on the subject in general is vast and sometimes confusing in its 
diversity.4 
3.1 Overview of venturing and entrepreneurship 
“The meaning of entrepreneurship is intimately bound up with the concept of 
uncertainty” (Jones & Butler, 1992; emphasis in original). Uncertainty, lack of sureness 
about the something, mainly caused by the complexity of reality and inability to 
forecast state of affairs in the future, may range from a falling short of certainty to an 
almost complete lack of conviction or knowledge especially about an outcome or 
                                               
4
 For a more thorough analysis of previous works, I recommend Backholm (1999) and Thornhill & Amit 
(2001). 
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result.5 Uncertainty precludes the setting of objective probabilities and one of its 
manifestations is variable returns (Jones & Butler, 1992; McGrath, 1999). “In an 
uncertain environment – that is, when the parameters that influenced the more the future 
states of nature are unforeseeable – the question is not so much knowing whether it is 
profitable to invest but whether it is opportune to invest immediately instead of 
waiting.” (Sauner-Leroy, 2004).  
 
As stated by McGrath (1999), entrepreneurship creates new processes, puts 
underutilized resources to new uses and initiates the formation of new industries. Early 
studies on entrepreneurship were mainly studies on innovation and new business 
development. Innovation is seen as a departure from the status quo; an opportunity to 
not face the restricting control of mature operations is a prerequisite (Schumpeter, 
1934). Penrose (1959) and Schumpeter can be said to be the early “pioneers” explaining 
innovation and development of new business, Schumpeter mainly with economic terms 
and Penrose with early forms of resource-based arguments. Ansoff (1965) addressed the 
question of business development from the corporate strategy point of view, stating that 
corporate strategy is considered a guideline setting the scope for where the company 
should be involved in. Similarly, the questions of innovation and diversification in large 
organizations were tackled from different perspectives by Burns and Stalker (1961), 
Marquis (1969), Bower (1970), Kirzner (1973), von Hippel (1977), and Cooper (1979). 
 
Table 1 compares the characteristics of independent ventures (IV) and corporate 
ventures (CV) as collected from different sources. It can be seen that several substantial 
differences have been found between these two types of ventures. The results related to 
the performance, profitability, ROI and the origin of ventures, however, are mixed 
(McDougall et al., 1992). Corporate ventures compete and co-operate in market 
environments with similar factor endowments as independent ventures do (Backholm, 
1999). According to Shrader and Simon (1997), the performance differences between 
the two venture types are not significant. 
                                               
5
 Description of uncertainty adopted and modified from Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 
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Table 1. Independent and corporate ventures (modified from Shrader & Simon, 1999 
and Zahra, 1996) 
Capital 
CVs frequently have access to more capital. The retained earnings or depreciation charges of the 
corporate parent may allow them to move into new markets. 
CVs can frequently obtain outside capital more cheaply than other newcomers can. 
The funds of CVs are provided through politicized budgetary processes. 
IVs supported by venture capital companies may have a longer term commitment of funds. Often the 
timing of cash inflows is consistent with the business development process.  
Controls 
CVs have multiple review levels. 
CV sponsors impose tight cost controls and strict, relatively short-term quantitative targets. 
IV managers have a great deal of autonomy. 
IVs do not suffer from bureaucratic inertia. 
IVs have simple, centralized structures, allowing for quick action. 
Managerial motivations 
CV managers often view venture assignments as unwelcome. 
CV managers must balance a variety of political and corporate objectives that pull the venture manager 
in different directions. 
CV managers are often evaluated on how closely they adhere to a plan. 
IV founders are oriented toward the ends achieved, as they are compensated based on venture 
performance. 
IV founders must make a success of the venture, as they do not have the luxury to be in business with 
high, continual losses. 
IVs have clear and definite objectives. 
Personnel and functional orientation 
CVs have easier access to executives from diverse functional areas. 
CVs emphasize the marketing function. 
IVs top management teams are more likely to be dominated by personnel with technological 
backgrounds. 
IVs may have greater access to entrepreneurial managers. 
Assets provided by the parent companies of CVs 
CVs may be able to gain from the brand reputations or trademarks of the parent company. 
CVs, through the existing facilities of parent companies, may have access to effective distribution 
systems and dealers at a low cost. 
CVs may be able to exert more control over input suppliers through entry by vertical integration. 
CVs may be able to access the underused capacity of their parent companies, thus gaining economies of 
scale. 
Technology strategy and performance 
Heavy R&D spending, the use of both internal and external R&D sources, frequent product 
introductions, and patenting seem to be positively associated with the performance of CVs.  
Pioneering, a focus on applied R&D, and the extensive use of internal R&D sources seem to be 
positively associated with the performance of IVs 
 
These differences comprise the context of corporate ventures as they differ from 
independent ventures; therefore, the propositions that also apply to independent 
ventures do not necessarily apply to corporate ventures. In particular, the context of 
internal environment and the role of politics are emphasized with corporate ventures. 
Corporate venture managers face the risks of being an entrepreneur combined with the 
internal politics and bureaucracy of large corporations and without the possibility of 
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similar awards and with the risks of losing their career in the organization. While 
independent entrepreneurs often face the loss of personal assets and life, corporate 
entrepreneurs do not invest their own money in the venture, although they risk their 
personal career by carrying out entrepreneurial activities. The different governance 
mechanisms needed to support corporate entrepreneurship has been recently studied by 
Zahra et al. (2000b), Chesbrough (2000) and Chesbrough and Socolof (2000). 
 
Chesbrough (2000) and Chesbrough and Socolof (2000) further identified the 
differences between corporate venturing and venture capital. When comparing these 
two, differences can be identified at least in the dimensions of scale, scope, goal, 
success measures, portfolio approach, focus of work, governance, decision-making, 
funding, compensation and environment (Chesbrough & Socoloff, 2000). Therefore, 
corporate ventures cannot do well by just mimicking venture capital companies, but 
they must be able to leverage potential advantages of corporate ventures (Chesbrough, 
2000). 
 
Different categorizations have been suggested for corporate venturing in the previous 
literature. According to Zahra (1996b), corporate entrepreneurship, in general, includes 
radical product innovation, risk taking, proactiveness, business venturing, 
intrapreneuring, and organizational renewal. Corporate entrepreneurship has two basic 
dimensions: innovation aimed at business creation and venturing, and strategic renewal. 
These dimensions can be seen as company processes, which systematically interact with 
corporate venturing. Studies on diversification, capability development and 
organizational learning are also linked to the study of corporate venturing (Backholm, 
1999; Keil, 2003). 
 
On a high level, the most common categorization of corporate venturing is done into 
two main categories: internal and external. In internal corporate venturing, ventures are 
kept within the established organization and therefore have a strong link to them. 
External corporate venturing, on the other hand, refers to activities where the parent 
organization does not necessarily wholly own the venture and that result in the creation 
of semi-autonomous or autonomous organizational entities that reside outside the 
existing organization (Sharma & Chrisman, 1999; Keil, 2003). The modes of external 
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venturing are corporate venturing capital, venturing alliances and transformational 
arrangements, e.g., acquisitions and spin-offs. Even though this study mainly focuses on 
internal venturing, external venturing modes and their related strategies are quite often 
used to support internal corporate ventures and the distinction between these two forms 
is sometimes artificial in practice. During its life-cycle, a business unit within a 
corporation may start as an internal corporate venture and at the same time, invest 
corporate venturing capital or make acquisitions; it may be incorporated and finally 
spun-off as an independent company (Parhankangas & Arenius, 2003).  
 
Campbell et al. (2003) categorized corporate ventures according to objectives set for 
them. While the common joint objectives were always new business creation and 
growth, four additional subcategories were found. These categories included ecosystem 
venturing, innovation venturing, harvest venturing and private equity venturing. 
“Ecosystem venturing supports and encourages a company’s network of customers, 
suppliers and complementary businesses; innovation venturing improves the 
effectiveness of some of a company’s existing activity; harvest venturing increases a 
company’s cash resources by harvesting its spare intellectual property or other assets; 
private equity venturing diversifies a company’s business into the venture capital 
industry.” (Campbell et al., 2003) 
 
It can be concluded that most of the research that has been made about venturing and 
new business creation apply on all types of ventures, corporate and independent, 
internal and external. However, there are some issues that are specific to internal 
corporate ventures. In the next section, I focus specifically on internal corporate 
ventures and the previous literature on them. 
3.2 Internal corporate venturing 
The literature on internal corporate venturing and entrepreneurship started to bloom in 
the 1980s. Burgelman (1983a, 1983b, 1984a, 1984b, 1988) published several pieces of 
research on the subject, depicting the process models and its relationship to the 
corporate strategy process. Macmillan et al. (1986) provided different alternatives for 
corporate venturing and discussing the effects of experience on performance as well as 
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the parent organization’s support options for the venture. Several studies were published 
on the performance and success factors of corporate ventures (Sykes, 1986; Miller et al., 
1988; Sykes & Block, 1989; Miller et al., 1989; Sykes, 1992).  Issues of compensation 
and importance criteria were addressed by Block and Ornati (1987), Desarbo et al. 
(1987), Chesbrough, (2000) and Chesbrough and Socolof, (2000). Measurement and 
reward issues arise, as it is often misleading to measure new venture performance in the 
same way as an established business is measured (Backholm, 1999). 
 
In the 1990s, studies on radical innovation, organizational learning, and inter-
organizational relationships started to be more common in corporate venturing 
literature. More structured frameworks were also sought. Kuratko et al. (1990) 
identified three groups of measurable parameters, management support for corporate 
entrepreneurship, organizational structure and resource availability, for conditions 
needed to foster entrepreneurial activities within corporations. The question of 
measurement and parameters for corporate venture performance was addressed 
frequently by Zahra (1991, 1993, 1995, 1996b; Zahra & Covin, 1995; Zahra & Garvis 
2000), McDougall et al. (1992), Shrader and Simon (1997), Thompson and McNamara 
(2001), etc. It has been explicitly suggested that corporate entrepreneurship improves 
company performance in the long term (Zahra & Covin, 1995). More modern and recent 
approaches to corporate ventures include the agency theory approach (Jones & Butler, 
1992), which examined how agency problems affect the dynamics of internal corporate 
entrepreneurship and the level of entrepreneurial behaviour. The process of internal 
venturing was also discussed by Garud and Van de Ven (1992), Brazeal (1993), 
Hornsby et al. (1993), Day (1994), Hitt et al. (1999) and Dess et al. (1999), to name a 
few. Issues like championing processes, trial-and-error learning, action persistence and 
processes that characterize evolutionary and revolutionary changes were of interest in 
these process studies. Day (1994) recognized that successful entrepreneurship can be 
championed both top-down or bottom-up or these processes can coexist. This was an 
important realization, because it brought top management of the corporation more 
significant role in corporate venturing. According to Day (1994), “understanding the 
importance of a direct role for corporate top management in some ventures is crucial.” 
On the other hand, developing successful innovations without the support of top 
management or even secretly from them, “bootlegging”, has been suggested to produce 
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successful result in certain types of cultures and venturing activities (Abetti, 1997; 
Augsdorfer, 2005). Hence, it is uncertain whether top management support is needed, 
what are the conditions when it should be avoided and promoted and what kind of 
support leads to success and what kind of support leads to failure. 
 
The cultural context, both internal and external to the corporation, has been identified to 
have an important role in innovation and corporate venturing (Dougherty, 1992). Abetti 
(1997) found out that attributes involved in corporate venture success included national 
culture, organizational setting and personal qualities of the entrepreneurs. Cross-cultural 
differences in individualism versus collectivism and their effects on corporate 
entrepreneurship were studied by Morris et al., (1994). This same issue was recently 
approached from corporate culture and ethical point of view by Kuratko and Goldsby 
(2004), who stated that “without an organization providing the proper entrepreneurial 
environment and ethical guidance, some middle managers may display rogue behavior 
in attaining these goals. In other words, they cross the line of good judgment and 
commit unethical acts with the hopes of personal gain.” Hornsby et al. (2000) also 
identified the organizational factors to support entrepreneurship from the point of view 
of middle managers. These factors were management support, work autonomy, rewards 
and reinforcement, time availability, and organizational boundaries. It has been 
identified that the concepts of management, entrepreneurship and leadership are 
intersecting (Brazeal, 1996; Cogliser & Brigham, 2004) and this holds true especially in 
large corporations seeking new innovations. 
 
Knowledge- and learning-based approaches have emerged during the last few years 
(Floyd & Woolridge, 1999; Zahra et al., 1999; Day et al., 2001); these investigate how 
organizational knowledge and competences can be created, processed, and used through 
corporate venturing and what effect social networks have on the venture performance. 
Types of innovation in corporate entrepreneurship (David, 1994) and breakthrough 
innovations specifically (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001) have been topics in the area of 
innovation studies. Strategic management literature has also handled corporate 
venturing and its links to corporate strategy and sustainable competitive advantage 
(Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999; Covin & Miles, 1999) or different types of corporate 
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entrepreneurship and innovation as sources for economic rents (McGrath et al., 1994; 
McGrath et al., 1996; Miles et al., 2003). 
 
Despite that most of internal corporate projects fail, the determinants of failure or 
mechanisms leading to it have been quite rarely explicitly analyzed in the impressive 
body of corporate venturing literature. It is widely recognized that failure is more 
probable than success in internal corporate venturing and many of the studies in the area 
include failed cases, but the internal processes that lead to failure are not fully revealed 
by these studies. The specific question why so many of the internal corporate ventures 
fail was addressed recently by Chesbrough (2000) and Campbell et al. (2003). 
Chesbrough (2000) described internal corporate venturing program of the company 
Exxon, where 19 internal corporate venturing units were established to grasp new 
market opportunities. None of the 19 ventures were able to reach break-even points. 
Cambell et al. (2003), on the other hand, stated that “although each model is subject to 
its own pitfalls, the greatest cause of corporate venturing failure is companies’ inability 
to define which model their venture unit is supposed to be following. As a result, the 
strategic and/or financial objectives are ambiguous, the structure and staffing decisions 
are out of alignment, and the unit’s managers find themselves being pushed in several 
directions at once.” 
 
To be able to understand corporate venturing as a phenomenon and to further analyze 
the different aspects of the concept, the issue must be approached from a process 
perspective. The development of the organization and the operations from idea to 
successful business is long and includes different phases that have been investigated in 
the previous literature. It is beneficial to identify these phases and how they have been 
dealt with in the previous research. I present the different approaches more in detail in 
the following section. 
3.3 Internal corporate venturing process 
The process of internal corporate venturing has received attention from researchers, 
especially during the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s. Robert Burgelman’s 
dissertation and the research stemming from it (Burgelman, 1983a, 1984b, 1984a, 
 59 
1984b, 1988) are among the most important pieces of work in this area. His research 
extended the theory of strategic management by providing a conceptual integration of 
literature on entrepreneurship in organizations and on the strategic process (Burgelman, 
1983a). It has been argued that the venturing process is, above all, an iterative trial-and-
error learning process and that action persistence — entrepreneurs continuing on a 
certain course of action despite experiencing negative outcome — is likely to occur in 
the presence of ambiguity and when slack resources are available (Garud & Van de 
Ven, 1992). Venturing is considered one of many strategy options for a corporation to 
enter a new business and the process of internal corporate venturing has several 
advantages and disadvantages compared with the other options, e.g., internal 
development or acquisitions (Roberts & Berry, 1985). The general venturing process 
has been described by Block and MacMillan (1993) with the following specific stages: 
1. Laying the groundwork for venturing: Conditions conducive to the generation of 
entrepreneurial ideas are created, and the process for managing entrepreneurial 
activity is designed. 
2. Choosing ventures: Opportunities (i.e., ideas or needs) are identified, evaluated 
to determine whether they are feasible and worth the effort, and then selected. 
Managers are selected to implement the venturing program. 
3. Planning, organizing and starting the venture: The venture’s location within the 
organization is determined, a business plan is developed, use of the required 
resources (people, money, plant and equipment is obtained, and operations 
commence). 
4. Monitoring and controlling the venture: The overall venturing process is 
monitored and controlled, as are the day-to-day operations of the venture itself 
and the level of risk associated with it. 
5. Championing the venture: As the new entity is expanded, institutionalized, and 
established as an ongoing activity of the organization, its management learns to 
survive and manage the internal corporate politics of venturing. 
6. Learning from experience: By collecting and examining information on the 
venturing experience, the organization learns to manage both individual ventures 
and the overall venturing process more effectively. 
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Another point of view to internal corporate venturing process was developed by Abetti 
(1997). He used the analogy of human life from conception to adulthood, when 
describing the phases of internal corporate ventures. The phases included stillbirths, 
conception, gestation, adolescence and adulthood. Each phase included certain reactions 
and actions of corporate entrepreneurs and champions. 
 
The details of the process model described and discussed here are mainly based on 
Burgelman’s work; there are also some other detailed studies in the subject on how, for 
example, the relationship between the parent and the venture evolves as the venture 
matures (Garud & Van de Ven, 1992; Schrader & Simon, 1997; Sykes, 1986). Some 
research has suggested that employing venturing as an organization’s source of growth 
and renewal is preferably a strategic decision (Block & Macmillan, 1993; Burgelman, 
1984b). The establishment of an internal corporate venture and links to the corporate 
growth strategy process and goals are described below (Figure 4). 
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Strategic goals Growth objectives
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Implement
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Figure 4. Venturing as a strategic growth option (Block & Macmillan, 1993) 
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Burgelman’s (1984a) framework focuses on two key dimensions of strategic decision-
making concerning internal entrepreneurial proposals: strategic importance for 
corporate development and operational relatedness, which is the degree to which 
proposals are related to the core capabilities of corporation. There are clear linkages in 
Burgelman’s model to the resource-based view and Prahalad’s and Hamel’s (1990) 
concept of “core competence”. According to Burgelman (1984a), after an assessment of 
the entrepreneurial proposal or activity on these two dimensions, the administrative and 
operational linkages must be determined and the organizational design alternatives 
chosen. Figure 5 describes the different organizational mode options. 
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Figure 5. Organization designs for corporate entrepreneurship (Burgelman, 1984a) 
Three major issues and potential problems have been identified in the implementation 
of these design alternatives: the communities of interest and interdependencies, reward 
systems and dynamic nature of strategic importance and operational relatedness 
(Burgelman, 1984a). A better understanding of the entrepreneurial process at the 
corporate level may reduce the size of the oscillations in commitment to corporate 
entrepreneurship, as well as provide better and earlier evaluation of the merits of 
particular entrepreneurial projects (Burgelman, 1983a). The venture must also 
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determine which activity should be the venture’s focal point and major driver, which is 
determined by what major challenges must be met if the venture is to succeed (Block & 
MacMillan, 1993). From the venture manager’s point of view, the organizational design 
of the venture, the operational relatedness and communication with the parent 
organizational are key issues; the available resource and strategic moves may be 
determined and limited depending on the decisions made about these matters; for 
example, the options related to international market entry will depend on the financial 
resources available from the parent organization. 
 
Sorrentino and Williams (1995) studied 88 corporate ventures and concluded that when 
there is relatedness between the venture organization and the parent organization, it is 
more likely that the venture benefits from the parent’s resources and know-how. 
However, they also stated that level of relatedness does not explain the success of the 
venture. Sorrentino and Williams (1995) defined relatedness more with operational 
terms, sharing of personnel, plant, equipment, marketing activities and customers. They 
were not concerned of the strategic dimension of relatedness, nor social relatedness, the 
shared understanding and vision between the corporate management and venture 
management. 
 
According to Dougherty and Hardy (1996), there are three key characteristics in the 
parent-venture relationship: 1) resource availability, 2) collaboration to solve problems 
and to connect innovations with existing businesses, and 3) fusing innovation with 
meaning in strategic context. In addition, internal politics, the personal relationships of 
the venture managers with the managers in the parent company and the previous roles of 
venture management are issues of importance as suggested by Shrader and Simon 
(1997). 
 
This study is specifically interested in internal corporate ventures that grow 
internationally. Because it is assumed that high-technology environment is international 
by definition, the venture set up to compete in this industry, must be able to grow 
internationally. They may also be set up for the specific reason to grow beyond the 
home market of the corporation. Therefore, in the next section, I analyze the 
internationalization literature relevant to this study. 
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3.4 Venturing as an option for international growth 
Recently, it has been suggested that the link between corporate entrepreneurship and 
internationalization is an emerging subject of great interest to entrepreneurship, 
international business, and hence strategy scholars (Dess et al., 2003). “In their search 
for new growth opportunities, managers realize that the pickings adjacent to their 
existing businesses are limited. They therefore start searching more widely and latch 
onto corporate venturing as a low-cost way of experimenting and trying out new 
businesses.” (Campbell et al., 2003) The internal corporate ventures that have been 
established for the specific reason of international growth is a relevant research topic: it 
has been suggested by Zahra et al. (2000b) that international venturing is positively 
related to company’s future performance. 
 
According to the corporate behavioural theory, internationalization is seen as a process 
in which “the enterprise gradually increases its international involvement” (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1990). The process can be manifested in the establishment of foreign 
subsidiaries, in international joint ventures, in licensing agreements, in international 
advertising campaigns, in international trade, exhibitions and other events and actions 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1990). In this thesis, the concepts of internationalization and 
international growth are used with the same meaning. Even though it may be questioned 
whether the term “global” is necessary (Kogut, 1989), here it refers to the organization 
operating or the phenomenon in question appearing on several (at least three) 
continents.  
 
Internationalization as a phenomenon has been studied for decades. Table 2 describes 
these different approaches in general. This model is artificial as the researchers in the 
field usually tend to be influenced by several approaches and several theories are used 
to explain the phenomena, although it gives a good framework for analyzing the body of 
knowledge. 
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Table 2. Different approaches to internationalization 
Eclectic paradigm 
Foreign direct investment 
Economic approach 
Transaction cost 
Uppsala model Behavioural approach 
Other stage models 
Resource-based model 
Knowledge-based model, organizational and 
individual learning 
Strategy theories approach 
Industry structure model 
Inter-organizational networks Network approach 
Social networks, cultural aspects 
“Born global” model Entrepreneurial approach 
Entrepreneurial theories 
 
Early research focused on the behaviour of big multinational companies and developed 
models that explained the phenomenon essentially with economic theories and 
behaviourally oriented theories. In the past, most multinational enterprises developed 
from large, mature, domestic companies (Buckley & Casson, 1977; Chandler, 1977; 
Henart, 1982). Economic approaches, as well as the foreign direct investment (FDI) 
(Hymen, 1960; Dunning, 1981) and eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1988) have been 
widely used in previous literature. This theory argues that for a company to invest in a 
foreign market, internalization, ownership-specific, and location-specific advantages 
must be present (Coviello & Martin, 1999). 
 
These approaches present the decision-maker as a rational creature that chooses the 
most optimal solution by using the perfect available information. The fact that various 
decision-makers can make different strategic decisions is not acknowledged by these 
approaches (Anderson, 2000). The availability of information usually restricts using 
these theories in practice. In a high-technology environment, the information might not 
be available or it is inaccurate by the time it is received. The environment might be too 
dynamic for obtaining the necessary data, processing it, and thus using it for 
commercial purposes.  
 
The early theories also include behaviourally oriented stage models; among these, the 
Uppsala model (Johansson & Vahlne, 1977; Johansson & Vahlne, 1990) is considered 
one of the most important models in this field. The Uppsala model presents a 
framework of company behaviour, where the internationalization process proceeds 
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incrementally, as experience with and knowledge about the foreign markets increase. 
The first model concentrated solely on company behaviour and did not include the 
effect the environment had on the internationalization process. In response to criticism, 
Johansson and Vahlne developed the model further to take into account the networks of 
companies and the environment in which the company operates. Hence, the importance 
of networks was already acknowledged by these early models, even though the 
development of the theory was not taken very far and there was no empirical data to 
support the theory. It was stated that personal relationships and networks are especially 
important in turbulent, high-technology industries (Johansson & Vahlne, 1990). 
 
The theories of competitive advantage (i.e., theories drawing on some established 
strategy framework, e.g., resource-based view, industry structure) have also served as a 
platform for many different points of view on internationalization. Even with the rapid 
globalization of competition, the company’s domestic industry environment remains a 
key frame of reference in determining strategic moves (Zahra et al., 1997); for example, 
general human capital resources, management expertise, industry expertise, the ability 
to obtain financial resources and variables relating to resource availability have been 
used as factors in the resource-based studies of internationalization (Westhead et al, 
2001). The resource-based view has been combined with behavioural models to obtain 
more explanatory power for the internationalization of SMEs (Reuber & Fischer, 1997). 
One stream of research has been increasingly focused on the factors that affect the 
accumulation of knowledge in the internationalization process of companies (Eriksson 
et al., 2000). A premise in this genre is that knowledge about international markets and 
operations, as well as the efficiency, by which such knowledge is learned, is an 
important determinant for the international sales growth of entrepreneurial companies 
(Autio et al., 2000).  
 
One way to analyze a company’s internationalization is to use the network approach as 
the starting point. This approach provides an appropriate framework for understanding 
small companies, in particular, as embedded actors in business networks (Holmlund & 
Kock, 1998). This type of research draws on the theories of social exchange and 
resource dependency and focuses on company behaviour in the context of inter-
organizational and interpersonal relationships. Internationalization also emerges as 
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patterns of behaviour influenced by network members, whereas economic approaches 
assume a rational, strategic decision-making (Coviello & Martin, 1999). 
 
The recent development of a high-technology environment has also shown that these 
early models are not applicable to certain types of new companies that are international 
from the day they are established. Basically, in the late eighties and in the early nineties 
several researchers noticed that there is a new category of ventures that have strategies 
other than that which the old models suggest (Alahuhta, 1990; Gupta, 1989). The 
academic community started to develop a new model for new ventures that would 
explain this phenomenon (Oviatt & McDougall, 1994). This new venture model 
emphasizes the importance of entrepreneurial vision and the initial resource endowment 
of the company in allowing early internationalization decisions (Autio & Burgler, 
1999). Lately, the research paths of international business and entrepreneurship have 
been intersecting with an increasing frequency (McDougall & Oviatt, 2000; Zahra et al., 
2000a). There are two major themes that have been appearing in the articles: the 
internationalization of entrepreneurial businesses (Autio et al., 2000) and a comparison 
of national cultures that are associated with entrepreneurial activities (Mitchell et al., 
2000). 
 
The traditional stage theories suggest that the internationalization of a company is a 
continuum, where the choices for mode of entry include exporting, licensing, alliances, 
and start-ups (Andersen, 1993). The entry mode literature has further developed the 
evolution of international supply methods, including licensing and joint venture 
arrangements (Root, 1998). Zahra et al. (2000a) added that some new ventures may 
forgo these stages and undertake “high-control” transactions, such as mergers and 
acquisitions. According to Trautwein (1990), one motive for mergers is to ford and 
conquer international markets. Summarized from previous literature, the different 
modes of entry are (Kogut, 1988, 1991; Kogut & Singh, 1988; Johanson & Vahlne, 
1990; O’Farrel et al., 1998; Roberts, 1999; Zahra et al., 2000a): 
• Exporting 
• Licensing 
• Partnering, alliances 
• Joint ventures 
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• Foreign direct investment (“greenfield” operations) 
• Mergers and acquisitions 
 
These entry modes differ from each other in their key dimensions such as the amount of 
resource commitment, extent of risk, potential for returns, and degree of control. The 
same options apply for new ventures as well as for established international companies. 
It can be said, however, that new ventures have more limited possibilities of taking 
advantage of these options, due to their scarcer resources (O’Farrell et al., 1998). The 
reason why independent ventures prefer indirect modes of representation here is that 
“very small internationalizing companies, confronting a need to quickly establish global 
reach for an innovative product within a limited window of opportunity, lack the 
resources to achieve the needed market scale quickly by foreign direct investment 
(FDI). The rationales that drive the agent/ownership choice in traditional theorizing do 
not concern themselves with the problem of limited time, or of the multi-fold expansion 
in scale required of internationalizing SMEs.” (Chetty & Campbell-Hunt, 2003) Whilst 
corporate ventures do not usually have this limitation, they have more freedom and 
possibilities to use these options than independent new ventures do, provided that the 
parent organization supports them. 
 
Exporting is an important means of expanding, especially among new ventures, which 
may not have the expertise or resources in the beginning to pursue broader international 
strategies (Zahra et al., 1997). Exporting fits the capabilities of small business by 
offering a greater degree of flexibility and minimal resource commitment yet limits the 
company’s risk exposure (Wolff & Pett, 2000). Empirical findings have shown that 
initial exports markets are usually those situated in countries nearby and that these also 
tend to remain important export markets (Holmlund & Kock, 1998). 
 
Even though there are high costs associated with licensing, there are various reasons 
non-equity forms of international involvement are increasing (Lau, 1992). According to 
Contractor (1981), licensing could be a good alternative for market expansion if 
managed properly. Motivations for joint ventures have been reduced to three factors: the 
“evasion of small number bargaining, enhancement of competitive positioning (or 
market power) and mechanisms to transfer organizational knowledge” (Kogut, 1988). 
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Inter-organizational arrangements, e.g., partnering, alliances and joint ventures, are 
strategies to enter new markets, obtain new skills, and to share risks and resources 
(Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). Inkpen & Beamish (1997) studied bargaining power and 
local knowledge acquisition in international joint ventures. It was found that individual 
and structural attachment lower the likelihood of international joint venture instability, 
thus making it possible for the parties to take full advantage of the relationship. In 
addition, Kogut (1988, 1991) and Inkpen (2000b) found similar results: personal and 
structural ties are related to the success of international joint ventures and thus to the 
international growth of the parties involved. This stream of literature is not, however, 
directly linked with internationalization research. Given that the focal company’s 
success in a given foreign market is intertwined with and sometimes even completely 
dependent on the performance of the partnership, a major challenge for its management 
is to ensure that the partner company conforms to its contractual obligations to optimize 
partnership performance (Aulakh et al., 1996). Cross-border marketing partnerships 
(Aulakh et al., 1996), international joint ventures (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997), and 
technology alliances (Steensma et al., 2000) are amongst the different possibilities to 
take benefit of inter-organizational relationships in internationalization. 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are a tool to increase the speed of a company’s technological 
learning, gather market and competitive data quickly, analyze trends and rapidly obtain 
feedback from its stakeholders (Zahra et al., 2000a). When the acquisition opportunity 
is sound, the expected synergies have to be realized during the integration phase (Zahra 
et al., 2000a). This is especially challenging in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
The process of integration has been examined from several perspectives: psychological, 
organizational, managerial, strategic, economic, macroeconomic, etc. Larsson and 
Finkelstein (1999) took several perspectives and integrated them in their study. They 
also suggested that researchers should consider several perspectives simultaneously. 
 
Table 3 includes those studies that have concentrated specifically on venture 
internationalization. The purpose of this table is to show how little research has been 
done on corporate ventures and how they have been treated in the same category as 
independent ventures have been. 
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Table 3. Units of analysis and samples in studies of venture internationalization 
Author(s) Unit of 
analysis/sample 
Comments 
 
McDougall & Oviatt, 
1996 
62 U.S. new ventures No information on the ownership structure in 
the sample 
Reuber & Fischer, 1997 Independent 
ventures/132 Canadian 
SMEs 
No subsidiaries of another company 
Zahra et al., 1997 531 U.S. new ventures No information about the ownership structure 
in the sample 
Holmlund & Kock, 1998 312 Finnish SMEs No information about the ownership structure 
in the sample 
Autio & Burgel, 1999 Independent 
ventures/230 British 
SMEs 
Legally independent companies 
Chetty, 1999 5 New Zealand –based 
SMEs 
No information about the ownership structure 
of the cases 
Coviello & Martin, 1999 4 New Zealand –based 
SMEs 
No information about the ownership structure 
of the cases 
Jones, 1999 860 British SMEs Both independent and not wholly independent 
Andersson, 2000 3 Swedish companies No corporate ventures 
Autio et al., 2000 Independent 
ventures/134 Finnish 
SMEs 
No subsidiaries of another company 
Crick & Jones, 2000 10 UK–based SMEs Domestically owned companies, no other 
information about the ownership structure 
Wolff & Pett, 2000 Independent 
ventures/1,600 small 
U.S. companies 
No information about the ownership structure 
in the sample  
Zahra et al., 2000a New ventures/321 U.S. 
ventures 
Both corporate and private new ventures 
Westhead et al., 2001 Independent 
ventures/621 British 
SMEs 
Only independent ventures 
Chetty & Campbell-
Hunt, 2003 
4 New-Zealand-based 
SMEs 
No information about the ownership structure 
of the cases 
Bell et al., 2004 30 UK-based SME 
manufacturing 
companies 
Different ownership structures, not 
subsidiaries of larger domestic or international 
companies 
 
The table shows that only a few authors have indicated what the ownership structure in 
the investigated organizations is. Mostly it is assumed that the sample is composed of 
independent ventures; only a couple of pieces of research have actually included both 
independent and not independent ventures or compared results between these two types 
(Jones, 1999; Zahra et al., 2000a). Several authors have specifically stated that 
subsidiaries of other companies have been excluded from the population. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
Together, Chapters 2 and 3 comprise the pre-understanding of the phenomena 
investigated in this dissertation. Based on these chapters, the overall a priori 
understanding of the investigated phenomenon is formulated. This understanding is 
further developed into the interview framework and the constructs used in the data 
collection. Venturing and inter-organizational relationships are related in complex ways. 
Internationalization plays an important role when investigating ventures that operate in 
a high-technology environment as the markets are international. Partnering and 
relationships beyond national borders are a necessity for ventures that seek international 
operations. It cannot be reasonably argued that corporate ventures should be classified 
under the same category as independent ventures are as earlier research has shown some 
substantial differences between these two types of venturing. 
 
In addition, the purpose of this chapter was to show that there are still identifiable gaps 
in the literature and that the research questions formed for this dissertation are 
attempting to address these “gray areas”. The process of internationalization has not 
been investigated from the point of view of corporate ventures. Only a couple of authors 
have been concerned with the issue of ownership structure and the dependence of the 
venture organization. In connection with the corporate venturing research, it was shown 
that the characteristics in corporate ventures make them a special case. The models 
developed for independent ventures are not applicable for corporate ventures as such.  
 
Venture growth has been studied widely, but the previous literature does not succeed 
well in connecting new business creation, growth and the creation of competitive 
advantage. It was shown that even though international business and internationalization 
of ventures has been studied for decades, the specific case of internal corporate ventures 
has not received much attention in academic research. 
 
Based on the analysis in these chapters, I argue that studying international internal 
corporate ventures and their inter-organizational relationships adds new insight to 
understanding how organizations grow beyond national borders and what are the 
mechanisms that facilitate the creation of international competitive advantage. There are 
gaps in the literature and deepening the understanding related to these issues requires 
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more research and combination of previous research topics. As stated in the introduction 
of this dissertation, one of the objectives here is to create such an integrative model. The 
next chapter deals with the methods to achieve the goals. 
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4 Methods 
In this chapter, I present the research procedure in this dissertation. First, I discuss the 
choice of methods and the general research approach, after which I outline the different 
phases in the research and the research procedures in each phase from the sampling 
procedure to data collection and analysis. Finally, the methodological issues of validity, 
reliability, and objectivity are addressed. 
4.1 Choice of methods 
This research investigates complex phenomena, searches for relationships between 
variables and aims at finding a framework of concepts related to the process of creating 
international competitive advantage for internal corporate ventures. The research 
questions are formulated as starting with “how” and “what kind of”. By using models 
available from the previous theory, the research problem cannot be addressed in a 
satisfactory manner; there is an identifiable gap in the existing body of knowledge. I 
also suggest that the investigated phenomenon conflicts with the patterns of earlier 
findings discussed in the literature review chapters. According to Morgan and 
Smirchich (1980), the research approach should derive from the nature of social 
phenomena to be explored. Based on this rationale, I have chosen the theory-building 
multiple-case study, recommended for this type of research by several scholars (Miles 
& Huberman, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1991; Parkhe, 1993; Chetty, 1996) as the 
research method for the empirical part of this research. My objective is to investigate 
the contemporary phenomenon and cope with the technically distinctive situation in 
which there will be many more variables of interest than data points. Case studies can 
be employed in exploratory manner in order to achieve insights into a previously 
uncharted area (Bryman, 1989). Hitt et al. (1998) also suggested that the creative use of 
longitudinal, historical case studies and qualitative data provides a richer and more in-
depth understanding of company-based idiosyncratic valuable resources and other 
specialized topics. This research benefits from the prior development of theoretical 
propositions to guide data collection and analysis. 
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A distinction can be made between “experimental” and “correlative” studies (McGrath, 
1982).6 The first refers to designs that compare average values for different batches of 
cases (relative to the variation in values within each batch) for some attribute. The 
second refers to designs that examine the co-variation of the values of two or more 
attributes, among the cases of a single batch (McGrath, 1982). Because of the setting of 
the research question in this thesis, the approach is more the latter one. The two designs 
are not completely exclusive and the underlying logic in both of them is the same: 
finding out the Baconian logic-of-relations between events or properties of events. The 
method of this study can also be loosely labeled as inductive, i.e., the researcher 
discovers recurrent phenomena in the stream of local experience with an incremental 
approach to case selection and data gathering and ends up with a theoretical framework 
of links between factors, events, and their possible causes. (Miles & Huberman, 1984; 
Eisenhardt, 1989) 
 
The model developed by Eisenhardt (1989) for theory-building multiple-case study is 
modified for the purpose of this research. Derived from this model, the phases in the 
method are: 
1. State the research problem 
2. Read the theory and previous research and investigate for possible research 
constructs 
3. Carry out pre-research to find the constructs, theory background and cases 
4. State the a priori understanding and research models and constructs 
5. Collect the data 
a. Describe the case 1 
b. Collect data from case 1 
c. Repeat phases a) and b) for cases 2 to N (N being the number of cases) 
6. Analyze the collected case data within each case 
7. Make a cross-case analysis of the collected case data 
8. Carry out theory-building together with the previous theory and literature 
 
The phases are described as a flow diagram in Figure 6. 
                                               
6
 Cf. Cronbach (1957). 
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Literature study,
previous theory
Pre-research
Constructs Case analysis
within case
Cross-case
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Theory building, 
conclusion
and discussion
Research question Data collection
Adding cases and checking constructs 
 
Figure 6. Theory-building multiple-case study method 
The first phase of the research was to state the initial research problem. After that, the 
pre-understanding of the topic and the constructs were established. I derived the initial 
models and constructs by combining three different sources of information: previous 
literature, my own experience, and small-scale pre-research made in potential case 
organizations. During the pre-research phase, I surveyed potential cases according to the 
chosen sampling criteria. My own experience also guided the search for cases and 
constructs. Experience helped in figuring out where to start looking.  
 
After the pre-research and literature study, I chose the theoretical frameworks, the initial 
models (constructs) and the first cases. The next step was to go out in the field and start 
collecting data. A key feature of theory-building case research is the freedom to make 
adjustments during the data collection process (Eisenhardt, 1989). Cases are added until 
the certain theoretical saturation point is reached. This means that no new information 
could be gained by adding more cases. At this point, incremental learning is minimal as 
the researcher(s) observing the phenomena have seen it before.  
 
I started analyzing the data during the data collection phase. This is a widely used tactic 
in case study research; for example, Burgelman (1983b) kept extensive idea booklets to 
record his ongoing thoughts in a study of internal corporate venturing. During data 
collection and analysis, the tools and research questions can still be modified and 
sharpened (Eisenhardt, 1989). New constructs also naturally arose from the data. During 
the process, however, research questions and methods were altered with extreme 
caution. It can easily happen that the researcher starts to guide the data rather than the 
data guiding the researcher. I analyzed the cases separately and then a cross-case 
analysis was carried out by using replication logic. The data collection and analysis 
procedures are described in more detail in the following chapters. Subsequently, I 
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shaped the results and theoretical models based on the analysis. Finally, I compared 
these new models with the previous literature and drew conclusions pertaining to the 
contributions of the research. 
 
Numagami (1998) argued that two of the criteria for nomothetic social science often 
failed in case studies: 1) reliability and replicability, and 2) external validity. This 
argumentation is related to the discussion as to whether or not these criteria are relevant 
and whether invariant laws exist and should be looked for in management sciences. 
These issues are discussed in the following chapters, by first discussing the processes of 
case selection and sampling, data collection and data analysis and what were my tactics 
for maintaining scientific rigor in each phase. 
4.2 Case selection and sampling 
Whether or not it is believed that invariant laws should be sought, the academic 
community agrees that there is value in investigating single cases and in a deep 
understanding of the phenomena that cannot be replicated or generalized (Numagami, 
1998). However, if the purpose of the research is to develop a model based on 
reoccurring patterns, several cases are needed. Thus, the number of cases (population) 
must be discussed and defined. The population defines the set of entities from which the 
research sample is “drawn”, and a sample of four to twelve cases has been suggested for 
theory-building multiple-case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989). The population in the context 
of my research is the internal corporate ventures. In addition to the sampling of the 
cases themselves, sampling also involves decisions on other parameters, e.g., people to 
observe or interview. 
 
The goal of theoretical sampling in a theory-building case study is to choose cases that 
are likely to be able to be replicated or extend the emergent theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Thus, the cases must encompass different aspects of the phenomenon that is being 
investigated. The aim is to establish analytic generality instead of statistical generality. 
For the purposes of this research, I chose corporate ventures in different stages of 
growth cycle, at the same time making sure that the chosen organizations can be 
considered as “ventures” according to the definition adopted in this dissertation. In 
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addition, I searched for internal corporate ventures that have chosen different strategies 
for their international growth, had different types of relationships with the parent 
organization and were operating in different competitive contexts. Questions of 
practicability, however, must also be considered. The availability of data, time, and 
resources are limiting factors. There is a finite amount of time, with variable access to 
different actors and events, and an abundance of logistical problems (Miles & 
Huberman, 1984). One cannot easily obtain data for corporate ventures as the 
companies protect their new businesses quite fiercely.  
 
Miles and Huberman (1984) listed the following parameters to sample: settings, actors, 
events, and processes. These parameters are partially set by the selected theoretical 
framework and the research question. The choices made in this study concerning the 
sampling parameters are summarized in Table 4. This was another sampling framework 
that I used in the search for cases, interviewees and other possible secondary data 
sources. This framework also helps to understand the units and levels of analysis in this 
dissertation. 
Table 4. Sampling frame 
Sampling parameter Choices 
 
Settings International internal corporate ventures, high-
technology environment 
Actors Organizations through their top executives, 
managers 
Events International growth, partnering, acquisitions, 
international entry, joint ventures, foreign 
investments 
Processes Internationalization, business development,  
entrepreneurship, learning, innovation 
 
The settings in the research include international internal corporate ventures and the 
high-technology environment that the ventures are operating in. The actors are the 
organizations through their top executives and operational managers. These are the 
people interviewed to obtain information about the mechanisms and relevant factors. 
The events studied include international growth as the main focus of interest; other 
related events are partnerships, acquisitions, market entry, joint ventures, and foreign 
investments. Similarly, the main process followed in the focal organizations is 
internationalization, and the related processes are business development and 
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entrepreneurship in the organizations and knowledge accumulation through learning and 
innovation. 
 
Table 5 lists more detailed theoretical sampling criteria, i.e., the parameters that I 
expected to remain constant in the selected cases and choices I made to achieve 
theoretical polarity. These parameters also guided the pre-research phase, when the 
potential cases for investigation were searched. 
Table 5. Sampling parameters in case selection 
Parameter Choices 
 
Comments 
Parent organization No polarity, all cases have the 
same parent organization 
Parent organization is same for 
all ventures, because the aim is 
to investigate different 
relationships to the parent. 
The relationship with the parent 
organization 
Internal units, subsidiaries, close 
to distant, both bottom-up and 
top-down types of venturing 
Different types of relationships 
were sought 
Strategy All cases have intention to grow 
internationally  
Different modes of entry in the 
cases 
Stage of international 
development 
Early stage to more advanced 10%–95% of sales coming from 
outside home markets 
Organization Different sizes of organizations <100–1000 employees 
Age At least 2 years during the 
investigation period, maximum 8 
years 
According to the definition of 
corporate venture 
Customers Both consumers and corporate 
customers, different segments 
 
Financial situation Profitable and making losses Different maturities in business, 
profitable and non-profitable 
Partnering strategy Aggressive and cautious Measured by publicly announced 
partnerships and internal 
documentation 
 
The first parameter in the table, the parent organization was the same in all of the cases. 
I chose this approach in the beginning of the research process as it enabled one of the 
environmental factors, the parent organization, to remain the same throughout the cases. 
However, I expected that the governing modes of internal corporate ventures are 
different, varying from internal business units with a close relationship with their parent 
organization to more independent subsidiaries. As suggested by Day (1994), both types 
of ventures with bottom-up and top-down types of managers were selected. I also made 
sure that the internationalization strategies of the cases organizations varied between 
cases. It was checked that different entry modes were included in the data. I searched 
for cases with a different speed of internationalization. I anticipated that the range of 
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cases should include those ventures that have started internationalization quite soon 
after being established and also those that had been cautious in their international 
operations and conducted market operations in their home market before entering 
international markets. Different sizes of organizations were sought, ranging from 100 
employees to no more than 1,000. Organizations larger than 500 full-time employees 
are typically considered to be large in internationalization studies (Wolff & Pett, 2000). 
In corporate venturing, however, there are more resources available and business units 
can grow in size quite rapidly once they have been established. Table 6 shows the 
average sizes of the chosen organizations during the investigation period. From 1998, 
no exact data was available, because some of the organizations were not fully formed 
and some were an integral part of the parent organization. 
Table 6. Average number of personnel in case organizations during the investigation 
period 
 1999* 2000 2001 
Alfa 50 490 443 
Beta 400 640 754 
Gamma 600 602 628 
Epsilon 30 174 352 
*estimates 
 
My main objective was to obtain different sizes of organizations. According to the 
definition of internal corporate ventures in this dissertation (see Chapter 1), the business 
cannot be more than 6–8-years old. I took into account this guideline when selecting my 
cases. Three of the cases (Alfa, Beta and Epsilon) had no revenues in the beginning of 
the investigation period. There were no strict limitations on the nature of the businesses 
themselves, as long as they were dealing with a high-technology environment. The 
customer segments, as well as the financial situation, of the cases were expected to be 
different, businesses with relations to both corporate and consumer customers were 
searched for. One of the most important issues was to ensure that the internal corporate 
ventures that have been selected as the cases in the study were conducting different 
types of partnerships and heavily relying on inter-organizational relationships in their 
international growth. I investigated this from the press releases and internal 
announcements of the potential case organizations and by making some preliminary 
queries inside the organizations. 
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4.3 Data collection 
The data collection and analysis for each case was commenced in the pre-research phase 
of the case study process. During pre-research, I determined the possible available cases 
according to the sampling criteria and analyzed the types of available data. I did this by 
conducting small-scale interviews, having discussions with experts in the organizations, 
and scanning the available internal and external documentation. In the early phases of 
pre-research, some of the case operations had not actually been commenced yet. The 
results of the pre-research phase were short descriptions of the first potential cases and 
some initial notes on a priori constructs. I combined these results with the results of the 
literature review. After that, the first cases were chosen and I started collecting main 
empirical data.  
 
As is recommended for the theory-building case study method, the data in this research 
includes multiple sources of information and both qualitative and quantitative data. 
Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection is recommended to 
establish internal validity (Jick, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1989). The main data source was 
semi-structured interviews with key informants. In these interviews, I used a semi-
structured questionnaire, but recognized that departures would occur if interesting 
themes emerged from what respondents said (Bryman, 1989). The list of themes used in 
the interviews has been appended to this study as Appendix 1. The interviewees 
included at least two upper executives and at least two from operational/middle 
management of the case organization. Altogether, 22 interviews were carried out 
between December 2001 and November 2002. The numbers of interviews in the 
different organizations consisted of five in Alfa, five in Beta, six in Gamma, five in 
Epsilon, and one in the parent organization. Interviews lasted from 45 minutes to 1.5 
hours. I transcribed all of the interviews and sent the written transcriptions to the 
interviewees for checking. In addition, I wrote down notes and impressions throughout 
the data collection process. 
 
I chose the interviewees based on my previous knowledge about the investigated 
organizations. I also used the organizational chart of the case ventures and verified the 
list of interviewed people from the interviewees themselves. By these procedures, I 
aimed at minimizing the impact of the so-called “selection problem”, i.e., the problem 
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of identifying competent informants (Kumar et al., 1993). I updated the list of 
interviewees during the interview process according to feedback from the interviewees 
themselves. According to my experiences during the data collection, not much new 
information was acquired after 4–5 interviews. Therefore, no more than six interviews 
were conducted per case, even though the list of possible interviewees would have been 
longer. I also ensured in the selection of the interviewees, that I acquired information 
about all kinds of used entry options and different types of inter-organizational 
relationships. This was done by choosing the informants according to what projects they 
were involved in and by checking from the informants themselves whom should be 
interviewed about different issues. 
 
During the time of data collection, I was an employee in the parent organization under 
which the studied cases operated. This made it possible for me to access company 
confidential data that would not have been accessible otherwise. I could check the data 
and follow the development of the case organizations inside the corporation. I was not 
directly involved in the case organizations’ operations during the investigation period. 
For instance, my daily work did not include interaction with the interviewees and this 
made it possible to make the interviews as an “outsider” to the investigated 
phenomenon itself. However, during the investigation period, I had discussions also 
with other informants related to the investigated organizations almost on daily basis. 
Some of the analysis presented in the empirical part is based on these discussions, my 
observations and my interpretation of events inside the investigated organizations. 
These observations and discussions are partly stored in notes wrote down during the 
data collection process. The possibility to work near the studied organizations has 
provided me with an excellent opportunity to get detailed first-hand information of the 
events to support the interviews and analyzed documentation. Thus, there are some 
elements of action research my data collection process. There is always some 
subjectivity involved in qualitative data collection and the analysis process and I discuss 
this issue from the point of view of my research as well as the interviewees’ bias 
problem later in this chapter. 
 
In addition to interviews and observations in the organization, business descriptions, 
public (press releases, announcements, annual reports, web pages), and internal 
 81 
documentation (descriptions, business support documentation, internal announcements, 
minutes of meetings) were used to back up the interview data. Some of the interviewees 
provided documentation to support their statements. I searched the internal web pages 
and announcement archives for material related to the subject at hand. The database of 
secondary data included four annual reports (more than 300 pages), more than 80 public 
press releases, industry reports and more than 300 pages of other internal documentation 
(e.g., strategy documents, minutes, presentations, guidelines, internal communication, 
and announcements). 
 
The quantitative data used in this study included, for example, financial data, 
organizational figures, other related variables (venture age, time of entry, number of 
foreign executives, etc.), and data from the inter-organizational relationships (number of 
partnerships, the financial value of acquisitions, etc.). I collected this data mainly from 
public records, annual reports, financial reports, web pages, and press releases of the 
case organizations. All in all, the data included information on 75 inter-organizational 
relationships. The table depicting the relationships, the cases and what kind of data was 
collected from each relationship is included as Appendix 2 to this dissertation. 
4.4 Data analysis 
After the organizing of the data, I started the analysis by going through the available 
data, reading the interview reports, listening to the tapes and going through 
documentation. I made a longitudinal case analysis from each case and wrote down a 
detailed case report. I coded the data from several points of view: by using the relational 
view as a framework, by organizing the evidence into a process, by searching for new 
themes rising from the data, by linking these themes to the existing frameworks, and 
then by shaping them. By direct interpretation, single instances were looked at and 
meanings were deduced for them without looking for multiple instances, as suggested 
by Creswell (1998). 
 
The next step in the highly iterative process of data collection and analysis was to 
systematically compare the emergent frame with the evidence from each case in order to 
assess how well or poorly it fits the case data (Eisenhardt, 1989). From the within-site 
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analysis plus various cross-site tactics and overall impressions, tentative themes, 
concepts, and even relationships between variables began to emerge. I used replication 
logic in the cross-case analysis. This means that I treated each case as an independent 
experiment that confirms, extends, or contradicts the emergent theory. The situations, 
where different or contradictive results are found, can often provide an opportunity to 
refine and extend the theory. 
 
My data analysis process included the following phases (modified from Creswell, 
1998):  
1. Data management: creating and organizing files for data. 
2. Reading, memos: reading through text, listening tapes, making notes, forming 
initial codes. 
3. Describing: describing the case and its context. 
4. Classifying: using categorical aggregation, establishing patterns of categories. 
5. Interpreting: using direct interpretation, generalizations. 
6. Representing, visualizing: presenting narrative through quotes, tables, and 
figures. 
 
After I categorized some of the themes found in the data, I compared these categories 
across cases and clustered them into groups of concepts. I looked for patterns, themes, 
concepts, and correspondence between two or more categories. I used the counting of 
themes when rapidly verifying the propositions rising from the data. In addition, when 
presenting some relations between variables, quantitative measures were used to 
simplify the presentation of a relationship or to summarize the results of the analysis.  
 
In the operationalization of the measure for internationalization, i.e., international 
growth of an organization, I used measures that are adopted from the frameworks of 
Sullivan (1994, 1996) and Zahra et al. (2000a). The availability of data restricted the 
usability of different variables to some extent; for example, it was not possible to obtain 
exact data about the profitability of foreign operations. The following measures were 
used: 
• Foreign sales as a percentage of total sales (%) 
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• Top management international experience (the percentage of 
international/Finnish individuals in the management team) 
• The number of countries in which the company has foreign business operations 
(n) 
• The number of diverse social cultures of the countries in which the company 
operates (High/Medium/Low) 
• The geographic diversity of a company’s foreign markets (High/Medium/Low) 
• Number of foreign subsidiaries (n) 
 
In this dissertation, the ability to create value means that the organization is both able to 
create value and also realize it (Moran & Ghoshal, 1999). Both processes are needed for 
the balance of the economic system (Teece et al., 1997). Hence, if company is able to 
create value potential, realize and capture it, it may achieve competitive advantage and 
generate economic rent. The competitive advantage of the case organizations was 
evaluated through two methods: EVA (economic value-added) and a qualitative analysis 
of case data. By calculating the EVA for each year, I aimed at evaluating the true 
economic profits of the cases and thus the ability to generate rents. “Economic Value 
Added is the financial performance measure that comes closer than any other to 
capturing the true economic profit of an enterprise. EVA also is the performance 
measure most directly linked to the creation of shareholder wealth over time.” (Stern 
Steward & Co, 2004) EVA is calculated for the cases with the basic formula: net 
operating profit minus an appropriate charge for the opportunity cost of all capital 
invested in the venture. Using EVA also makes it possible to include the investments 
made by the parent organization in the operations of the venture and thus capture the 
opportunity costs. I used the cost of capital at 10% for all of the cases, as this would be 
a reasonable level for expected returns on investments. As no exact number was 
available on how much capital was invested in the ventures each year, I used 
estimations by gathering the data from the annual reports, interviews, and internal and 
external documents. Even though the figures were not exact, they provided an adequate 
level of accuracy as to how much economic value the ventures created. The other gauge 
used for competitive advantage was to evaluate the more “intangible” elements, i.e., 
learning and capability development, from the case data. This was done by analyzing 
the interviews and secondary data and evaluating the level of how much “intangible” 
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value was generated based on the analysis. In the analysis, I used the variables and 
criteria described in Table 7. Based on the criteria presented in the table, I evaluated 
how much “hidden” strategic value was created each year. The purpose of the 
qualitative evaluation was to support the EVA calculation. As competitive advantage 
was defined in this dissertation as economic profits, the hidden value only provided 
secondary, additional information about the competitiveness of the organization. This 
evaluation, however, was useful, especially for the two first years of the investigation 
period, when exact financial data for most of the cases was not yet available. 
Table 7. Criteria for the qualitative analysis of value creation 
Variable 
 
Analysis 
Learning Did several interviewees mention that new knowledge was 
acquired and utilized? 
Did the case data contain any specific situations where 
learning effects can be recognized (e.g., a new product or 
process that made the organization more competitive)? 
Did the interviewees consider the organization to be more 
innovative than its competitors were? Was there evidence 
of innovativeness in secondary data, e.g., a faster product 
development cycle, external recognition of innovativeness, 
etc.? 
Capability development 
 
Did big organizational or managerial changes occur in the 
organization? 
Did the interviewees state that new processes or routines 
would have affected the competitiveness of the 
organization? 
Did the interviewees consider that the organization had 
more strategic capabilities than its competitors did? 
 
I did not use any sophisticated quantitative analysis methods due to the research 
approach that had been selected and the nature of the data. When I identified variables, 
themes and concepts from the data, I aimed to understand the relationships between 
them and rated how well the relationships could be verified.  
 
I also considered alternative explanations and inspected spurious relations throughout 
the data analysis process. The generated explanations were also put to test in conformity 
with “Occam’s razor”, the philosophical rule that the simplest of competing theories is 
preferred to the more complex theory. If there was room for simplifications in the 
generated models, I continued the analysis and repeated the verification processes. By 
doing so, I pursued the criterion of parsimony (Whetten, 1989). 
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4.5 Reliability, validity and objectivity analysis 
One of the most widely used criteria for science is reliability, which simply refers to the 
fact that two or more researchers studying the same phenomenon with similar purposes 
should more or less reach the same conclusion(s). A study with high reliability can thus 
be replicated by others (Gummersson, 1991). One can use the notion of “doing things 
with reasonable care” with reliability. In this research, only one researcher collected and 
analyzed the data. Even though special emphasis has been placed on a rigorous and 
thorough documentation of the data collection and analysis phases, there is room for 
speculation about its reliability and replicability. To minimize this speculation, I created 
an “audit trail” during the data collection and retained all of the relevant data.  
 
Miles and Huberman (1984) listed the following relevant queries in this domain to 
ensure the reliability of the research. I raised these questions regarding my own work 
during the data collection and analysis process: 
1. Are the research questions clear and are the features of the study design 
congruent with them? 
2. Is the researcher’s role and status explicitly described? 
3. Do findings show meaningful parallelism across data sources (informants, 
contexts, and times)? 
4. Are basic paradigms and analytic constructs clearly specified? 
5. Was data collected across the full range of appropriate settings, times, 
respondents, etc., as suggested by the research questions? 
6. If multiple field-workers were involved, did they have comparable data 
collection protocols? 
7. Were coding checks made and did they show adequate agreement? 
8. Were data quality checks made (e.g., for bias, deceit, informant 
knowledgeability)? 
9. Do the accounts of multiple observers converge in instances, settings, or times 
when they might be expected to? 
10. Were any forms of peer or colleague review in place? 
 
The objective of raising these questions is to convince an outside reviewer about the 
reliability of the research methods and it has been recommended that information on 
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these processes should be provided in the research report (Eisenhardt, 1989). “Whatever 
documentation a researcher devises, the ultimate quality of the research findings from 
qualitative approaches ought to vary with his or her social and conceptual skills” 
(Numagami, 1998). That is, if these criteria are applied strictly, even some of the most 
rigorous quantitative survey studies cannot meet the requirements as language systems 
and thus the meanings of wordings vary over time and space. In the context of this 
dissertation, I have taken a more pragmatic approach to the issue of reliability. If an 
external reviewer can agree, after investigating the process of data collection and 
analysis, that the conclusions made are justified, even though there is room for 
alternative explanations, the results can be considered to be reliable. I have presented 
and discussed the analysis and the resulting models with experts and managers 
throughout the research process. As the goal is a new theory, replication as such is not 
fully appropriate (Eisenhardt, 1989). I assumed that the interpretations made do not 
represent an invariant law. The resultant theory is likely to be empirically valid as it is 
intimately bound by evidence and it presents new insights, although whether or not it 
applies to other, different settings can be questioned and is left for the reader to assess.  
 
Validity means in essence that a theory, model, concept, or category describes reality 
with a good fit, just like a good map properly describes Earth, or and architect’s 
blueprint is useful for erecting a functioning building (Gummersson, 1991). Three types 
of validity can be identified: internal, external and construct validity. The validity of 
research can also be evaluated in terms of comprehensiveness and parsimony. The 
results of the research should include all of the relevant factors that relate to the research 
question, but no more than those factors; if a factor adds little additional value to 
understanding, it should be deleted (Whetten, 1989).  
 
Internal validity refers to the credibility and authenticity of the results. In ensuring 
internal validity, emphasis should be placed on the process of checking, questioning, 
and theorizing (Miles & Huberman, 1984). This kind of criterion is relevant regardless 
of whether or not invariant laws are believed to exist. I used multiple informants and 
multiple sources of data to strengthen the internal validity of data; I checked the 
informant reports against other available secondary data, when possible. I used multiple 
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data analysis methods to rule out alternative explanations and the interview reports were 
accepted by the interviewee to reduce researcher bias. 
 
The question of external validity is often raised in connection with case studies. 
External validity in this dissertation is considered not to mean the existence of universal 
laws and the gauge for how many settings the developed theory can be applied in, i.e., 
how universal it is. What I aimed for was a description of results so that they can easily 
be compared with other similar settings. Miles and Huberman (1994) noted that the 
process of generalizing is far from mechanical; it is more like translating, refuting, or 
synthesizing two or more studies of similar phenomena. It is a question of interpretation 
and subjective point of view. 
 
Systematically using such methods as replication logic and theoretical sampling makes 
it easier for the reader to start a reflective dialogue among researchers and professionals 
about the results of this research. The quality of the insights offered by this study is 
difficult to define by any external criteria since no statistical methods have been used. I 
describe the cases to the extent that was possible without breaking their confidentiality. 
This enables the reader to understand the settings and the data that is being used and 
evaluate the scope in which they can be generalized. I show detailed evidence of the 
data and the analysis process, with direct quotations from the interviews to convince the 
reader with the connections to the original data. Finally, the results of the study are 
compared widely with previous research and similar research settings.  
 
To have construct validity means that the constructs formed during the research are 
checked against multiple sources of data and that no alternative explanations exist; for 
example, constructs that are similar could replace the suggested constructs that may 
emerge. In this study, I ensured the construct validity with multiple sources of data and 
establishing chains of evidence, explicit links from research questions to the data in use 
and finally to the results and conclusions made. 
 
Generally, several forms of bias might be encountered during research: bias because of 
the researcher’s background, bias in the interpretation of the data, bias in the data itself 
(interviewees have motivations of their own, annual reports are biased since they are 
 88 
marketing the company to stockholders, internal documents are written for 
management, etc.), bias caused by the method (e.g., the use of a recorder during 
interviews may cause the interviewee to behave in a “special” way). According to 
Kumar et al. (1993), informant reports may suffer from an individual’s memory failure, 
or inaccurate recalling of past events, as well as from memory distortion. The latter can 
result from hindsight bias, attributional bias, subconscious attempts to maintain self-
esteem, or impression management. The use of retrospective data and its shortcomings 
have been dealt with in previous research (Daft et al, 1987; Golden, 1992; 1997). As 
strategies to reduce bias, the acknowledgement of the nature of possibly biased data 
(“retrospective accounts of past facts or behaviors are likely to be more accurate than 
accounts of past beliefs and intentions”), the use of multiple respondents, the creation of 
incentives to provide correct data, being wary of collecting data shortly after big 
organizational changes and using multiple sources of data are mentioned (Golden, 
1992). Because the research relied very heavily on the interviews of key informants, I 
applied these strategies during the data collection and analysis process. 
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5 Cases 
This chapter familiarizes the reader with the longitudinal case data utilized in the 
empirical part of the dissertation. In this chapter, I present the most important evidence 
related to each case in the study. The analysis includes the general longitudinal 
description of each case organization and its development, the most important 
quantitative measures, a description of the parent-venture relationship, and the different 
external inter-organizational relationships during the investigation period. The chapter 
begins by first introducing the common denominator for all of the cases: the parent 
organization. For confidentiality reasons, the descriptions are at some parts superficial 
and I have removed the company names, interviewees’ names, and some other parts 
from direct quotations. 
5.1 Parent organization 
The parent organization has a long historical background of doing business in Finland. 
The company has offered telecommunications, high-technology, and ICT-related 
services and products to companies and consumers in Finland for several decades. The 
size of the organization during the investigation period (1998–2001) was at its highest 
with more than 10,000 employees. In 2001, the company was listed on the stock 
exchange and had a wide range of public and private owners. During the 1990s, the 
parent organization made a number of major investments in companies outside of 
Finland. These investments were mostly minor stakes in foreign companies. At the end 
of the decade, most of the corporation’s revenues were still coming from its home 
market, Finland. 
 
In public documents published during 1998–1999, the CEO of the corporation described 
the challenges and direction of the company in the following manner: 
We are determined to further develop these strengths [technical expertise and 
experience in marketing] and to foster the growth of our core businesses in the 
international market. [Parent organization] is actively seeking co-operation models 
 90 
that will enable us to leverage our expertise, achieve international growth, and build 
shareholder value. 
According to the annual reports of the parent organization before and during the 
investigation period, the parent organization adopted a strategy of two parallel and 
mutually complementary paths: developing new international service businesses and 
significantly expanding its market area. According to the company’s statements, both 
strategic paths rested on its core expertise: the innovative development of services and 
efficiency of operations. Apart from continuous innovation, the development of services 
was being promoted through acquisitions in the high-technology field as well as by 
forming partnerships in areas that were related to the services provided. This strategy 
included setting up new ventures and expanding the existing new businesses 
internationally beyond the markets where the corporation was operating at that time. 
During 1997–2001, the company aggressively implemented its strategy. New ventures 
were established and these ventures started aggressive internationalization strategies 
with variable success. The inter-organizational arrangements of the new ventures can be 
described as especially aggressive. During the investigation period, there was evidence 
of over 70 partnerships or co-operation relationships publicly announced by the newly 
established venture organizations. Most of these inter-organizational relationships were 
international in nature and aimed at boosting the international growth of the ventures. 
 
Development inputs into the service businesses were based on the premise of substantial 
short and long-term growth potential. The parent organization had a reputation as a 
pioneer as being the first in the world to offer a number of new technology-based 
services to its customers. A new departure for the parent company was the company’s 
decision to begin developing and offering new services for a new customer group: 
operators and service providers; for example, the main target markets for such 
businesses as Alfa and Epsilon were in Europe and, in part, also in Asia and the United 
States. These ventures also included operations that were somewhat unfamiliar to the 
parent organization’s previous history, e.g., developing software and selling it to such 
completely new target customers as financial institutions on the European market. 
 
In 2001, the company listed as its major future challenges the areas of human resources 
development, retaining and increasing the company’s global competitiveness and 
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managing an organization made of experts. In addition, the ability to adapt to change 
and to ensure the growth of new areas were also seen as one of the key objectives at the 
time. During that year, the technology-related companies’ growth slowed down as 
market demand weakened, and the parent organization began to scale down its service 
offerings through aggressive cost-cutting. New start-up businesses were not supported 
and old ones had to significantly cut costs, which was due to the rapid change in the 
market environment. Organizations were downsized and operations were pulled out of 
some new markets. The international growth of the new businesses continued, however, 
and none of the previously started new ventures was completely discontinued or sold. 
The focus of the strategy was changed and this also meant that the ventures had to 
adjust themselves to the new situation. At the end of 2001, the parent organization 
announced a spin-off of one of the ventures and the intention was to sell some of the 
other new ventures as well during 2002. 
5.2 Alfa 
Establishing Alfa was, from a strategic perspective, the biggest leap out of the parent 
organization’s core business. The business started from scratch and it was not based on 
any operation conducted by the parent organization before. The business plan was built 
around certain technology innovations by a few entrepreneurial people in the company. 
This also showed in the development of the venture as it operated more freely on the 
market and resembled a more independent venture than one being under a corporate 
parent. Alfa formed the highest number of partnerships of the case organizations. From 
the establishment, it tried to establish relationships in many directions in the external 
markets, many of which did not bring benefits or growth to the organizations by any 
scale. 
5.2.1 Longitudinal analysis 
The history of Alfa dates back to 1998, at which time, few innovative people developed 
new technology in the product development organization of the parent organization. A 
business plan was set up and the new unit was established in 1999. The idea behind the 
venture represented a revolutionary application of high-technology by combining two 
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different concepts in the area of telecommunications. The early employees of the 
organization described the idea: 
It was a revolutionary idea to bring something on to the markets that clearly aims at 
a certain discontinuity point and the offering for the period after the discontinuity 
point. 
It all started about four years ago, when we started to form a unit around 
[technology]. 
It started from [Alfa] looking to be a certain technology area. 
The development of the technology and the business plan was continued in a separate 
organization as the business model and the target customers substantially differed from 
the parent organization’s business and customers. Alfa’s initial business plan was to sell 
products and services to service providers, mobile operators, and financial institutions. 
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Figure 7.  Longitudinal analysis of Alfa 1998–2001 
Figure 7 describes generally the longitudinal development of the venture after it was 
established. All of the major milestones and transactions are included. Alfa developed 
the technology and intellectual property rights into sellable products during 1999. The 
first public presentations were made in February 1999 at an international exhibition. 
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After it was established, the market launch was done with great fanfare and a lot of 
publicity, as one of the management team members described: 
It was a child of its own time, meaning that it started very aggressively finding 
customers and marketing itself elsewhere in the world. 
During 1999, Alfa got its first customers and also two big international partnerships 
were announced. In addition, Alfa was a founding member in a global forum of industry 
players that was formed to promote the compatible solutions of different vendors and 
service providers. As references, Alfa used pilot customers from Finland, even though 
the actual volumes were low: 
There were two reference customers in Finland, [name removed] and [name 
removed], but they were meant as references, in particular, they were so small in 
volume… 
…Customer cases were a small portfolio, early stage pilots, pilot projects, there was 
not any good customer portfolio. 
In 2000, Alfa started to actually implement its aggressive growth strategy. It made two 
fairly big acquisitions in Sweden, buying companies that would complement its product 
portfolio and both bring international customers and product development resources. 
Alfa acquired both products and customers, trying to complement its product portfolio 
and the range of technologies supported by the venture. The financial cost for the 
acquisitions was very high as the stock prices were high and the valuations had risen to 
all time highs. There was lots of hype around high-technology industry. The following 
quotes are from people that were closely involved in planning and implementing the 
acquisitions: 
It was both buying products and customers. 
We tried to… strengthen the product strategy and vision by buying these companies. 
There we bought their customers and we bought the competitor out of the markets... 
But it happened that they swallowed the old [Alfa] and not other way around. 
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Especially [acquired company – name removed] had a very good customer base. 
It was a good match, because they [acquired company] saw [Alfa] as a great threat, 
all interest was towards [Alfa], because they were 'dull'. [Alfa], on the other hand, 
had own problems, because concretely cases were lost to those, who had already 
something to offer. 
As the last quote describes, the problem that Alfa was facing was that the company had 
an appealing concept and had succeeded in awakening the interest of the markets and 
customers, but it did not have anything concrete to deliver at that point in time. 
Salespersons and directors of Alfa had done presentations and exhibitions around 
Europe for potential customers and the overall attitude towards them was good. 
However, when the discussions moved to delivering solutions, Alfa could not respond. 
 
Alfa did not have its own products ready and the deals were lost to companies that 
already did have something to deliver. The interviewees described the challenges in the 
following manner: 
Turning them into practical ideas was quite difficult since, with these kinds of 
revolutionary ideas, it is difficult to make it concrete and to start selling it 
immediately. 
We have been to the customer, we have sold the idea, but it has been very difficult to 
do the technical implementation. 
The markets were growing fast and there seemed to be a real hurry to buy something 
and to obtain real customers and products. This meant that the management of the 
venture was quite ready to make drastic solutions to get sales growing, as the following 
quotes show: 
…We had this due diligence group that went to investigate the company and they 
said that it’s not worth buying… It was still bought, even though the experts said not 
to. 
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I did the basic… analysis, the investment paper, but if I had known what kind of 
prices we are talking about in the end, I would probably never have submitted the 
paper.  
The acquisitions brought ready products to the portfolio and a truly international 
customer base. As described by the people involved in the planning and 
implementation, the change in business was drastic: 
Then, when [Alfa] at some point did these two acquisitions… It changed quite 
drastically, because we got a ready organization that had a longer history and sales 
offices around the world… 
Our sales at the moment are based very much on their [acquired company] 
references… One can only say that many times acquisitions are necessary to 
internationalize and to obtain access to certain markets. 
The acquired companies were not, however, directly in line with Alfa’s initial business 
plan. The product development carried out by the organization originally established for 
the purpose of the original plan faced a competition situation with already launched 
products of the acquired companies. After the acquisitions, there was no real integration 
experience in Alfa and the three existing product lines started an internal competition 
with each other. 
 
The organizations that had been bought were similar size to Alfa itself. Because of a 
lack of experience and a clear integration plan, the confusion with different products 
caused delay for the growth. Consults were hired to provide their expertise in the 
process, but, according to the interviewees, the people that were in charge at the 
organization did not have the necessary qualifications or experience to handle the actual 
projects.  
…There were [name removed] consults here and all kind of people telling us how 
these things should be handled. They showed us with slides how this process should 
go, but we put completely inexperienced people as project managers to handle those 
things. 
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We wasted a year in between. We might be even further now, if somebody would 
have known how to handle those acquisitions. 
After the acquisitions, Alfa had customers on all of the continents and there were about 
60 operator customers and 160 service provider customers. There were several different 
product lines, tailored solutions for large business customers, more standardized 
software for service providers and even bulk software for corporate and consumer end 
users. As the CEO of Alfa described, the business started to find its focus and shift 
away from its original plans: 
The business has changed from the original idea to something very different…We 
found customers in the mobile management side, and that niche area… 
In 2000, Alfa had revenues of approximately EUR 18 million, of which the majority 
came from foreign markets, and had more than 400 employees. Product development 
was distributed between Finland and Sweden. There were offices in several parts of the 
world: in Asia, the United States, and Europe. Aggressive partnering strategy was still 
being pursued. During 2000, approximately ten partnerships, co-operation programs, 
and alliances were published. Big customer projects around the world also boosted the 
growth towards the end of 2000 and these projects also required local resources and 
setting up local offices, e.g., in Australia and South Africa. Because of the nature of 
their business and the expertise required to sell their products, the sales had to be 
organized locally. As described by a manager being involved in setting up sales 
processes: 
We had in all of the most important markets and most important countries our own 
offices, where we had local employees. 
We use local salespersons and they all have own contacts. 
They [salespersons] are always local, especially those who are in our infrastructure 
sales. 
In 2001, the international market climate started to change. Costly UMTS license 
investments in Europe weakened the position of telecom operators, which also 
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negatively affected the smaller high-technology companies that provided solutions for 
operators; Alfa was one of these companies. The global economy started its downswing 
in 2001. Alfa also had internal problems. The integration of acquired companies into the 
business had not gone as planned. There were internal tensions and problems with 
different organizational cultures and products. The strategy and the focus of the 
business were not clear. The old CEO, one of the key people responsible for the 
establishment of the venture, left the company and a new CEO was appointed for the 
venture. 
 
There were difficulties in finding new customers and the management did not achieve 
the goals set for the venture business. To adjust to the new situation, Alfa downsized its 
organization. However, the aggressive partnering strategy continued in 2001. More than 
25 different international partnerships, joint ventures, and co-operations were 
announced. Despite the tough market situation, Alfa succeeded in increasing its sales to 
EUR 36 million and decreasing its costs. The international diversification continued, as 
well as technological diversification. 64% of sales came from software products; 
geographically, sales were distributed amongst Europe, the Middle East and Africa 
62%, Asia 27%, and America 11%. 
Table 8. Quantitative analysis of Alfa 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales (MEUR) N/A 14 18 36 
Profit/Loss (MEUR) N/A N/A -63 -77 
EVA* N/A N/A -178 -77 
Foreign sales as a percentage of total sales (%)* N/A 80% 90% 95% 
Top management international experience (percentage of 
international/Finnish in management team) 
0% 0% 50% 75% 
The number of countries in which the company has foreign 
business operations (n) 
2 6 N/A 41 
The number of diverse social cultures of the countries in which 
the company operates (H/M/L) 
L M H H 
The geographic diversity of a company’s foreign markets 
(H/M/L) 
L M H H 
Number of foreign subsidiaries (n) 0 4 12 15 
*estimates 
 
Table 8 summarizes the quantitative data of Alfa. It shows that most of Alfa’s markets 
were abroad, and Alfa’s operations were truly international as it had 15 foreign 
subsidiaries. The venture grew through two big acquisitions in 2000, which is visible as 
a big change in terms of revenues and the number of countries where the company has 
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business operations. In addition, the composition of the management team changed 
mainly because of these acquisitions. During the whole investigation period, the 
business was suffering heavy losses and it was not able to create value for the parent 
organization. 
5.2.2 Relationship with the parent organization 
In Alfa, the venture creation decision and objectives for internationalization were set in 
the strategy process of the parent organization and the strategists involved most heavily 
in the planning were also the ones transferred to the venture organization to start the 
business. This laid the ground for good personal relationships between the managers of 
the parent organization and the venture.  
 
The people that were involved in the strategy process during the time of Alfa’s first 
steps described the process as follows: 
As a result of the strategy process — that's how I interpreted it — was born this 
idea… We have two arrow heads — namely [Epsilon] and [Alfa]. 
It all started about four years ago, when we [from parent organization] started to 
form a unit around… 
After the venture was established and organized into a separate unit, the parent 
organization gave the acting management of the venture fairly free hands to create 
business planning and act on it. There was not much operational governance between 
the organizations. The lack of operational control was also due to the fact that Alfa 
operated in a specialized niche market that was quite far from the core business of the 
parent organization. There were no complementaries or synergies between the 
organizations. Knowledge was not shared between the operational organizations of the 
venture and the parent. The managers in the parent side saw that they had no 
competence in Alfa’s business area: 
People in [parent organization] side knew from the beginning that the [parent 
organization] does not have the competence to guide this business area and 
understanding this area — international software business… 
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…It's better to give this kind of 'arm's length relationship' and this empowerment to 
that, to do and show. 
The parent organization took a role of a financial investor, as described by the CEO of 
Alfa: 
The position of the parent has been more like a financial investor, because the 
parent’s core business is so different from ours. 
The financial support that the parent organization provided Alfa with was strong. 
Because it was seen by the analysts that the markets would grow fast and that the 
business opportunity was big, an aggressive marketing strategy was chosen by Alfa. It 
had the freedom to develop its own brand and start significant international marketing 
operations. All of the market signals seemed to be positive and, based on these signals, 
a high growth strategy was formed for the venture: 
It started very much as a part of [parent organization]… [Alfa] tried to take use of 
[parent organization] on a wide range, established subsidiaries here and there and 
got a physical footprint in Belgium, London and some guys were in the States… We 
did early stage piloting. 
The actions required significant investments from the parent organization. The 
managers from Alfa’s side were even amazed at the support and trust the parent 
organization showed: 
We wondered how long that enormous financial support from [parent organization] 
can continue… 
In the beginning, we had that imago support, which as related to financing and to 
acquiring certain credibility. Perhaps that was even too successful, the whole brand 
and road shows and so on. 
Even though Alfa was not tightly controlled by the corporation, the relationships 
between the management of the parent organization and the management of Alfa were 
close. They had intense interaction and frequently shared knowledge. This interaction 
increased as Alfa’s operations progressed. In 1999, the CEO reported directly to the 
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parent organization CEO and in 2000 and 2001. The chairperson of Alfa’s Board of 
Directors was also appointed to the management group of the parent organization in 
2001. Hence, the personal networks in the management between Alfa and the parent 
organization seemed to play an important role, particularly in the early stages of venture 
development. One of the employees quite close to the CEO described the governance in 
the following manner: 
I would say that during [Alfa's CEO’s] time, all of the managing that came, came 
from [the parent organization’s CEO] to [Alfa’s CEO]… 
The overall high-technology market grew fast and in the beginning of 2000, Alfa was 
incorporated and changed its status from internal unit to wholly owned subsidiary of the 
parent organization. This move was done to further separate the operations of the 
venture and the parent. There were plans for carrying out IPO for Alfa and mergers and 
acquisitions were also already being planned. It was also considered to be easier for 
Alfa to do the integration as a separate legal unit. 
From the beginning of 2000, [Alfa] was incorporated, whereby it became a wholly 
owned subsidiary of [parent organization]. Thanks to the incorporation, [Alfa] can 
offer its services independently of [parent organization’s] … functions and react 
faster to the changes taking place in new … services. 
In Alfa’s case, the ultimate expression for trust from the parent organization was visible 
in the resource availability for acquisitions made during 2000. Even though their 
reasonability was questioned by the experts that scanned the companies, the CEO 
announced that these acquisitions should be made. The parent organization management 
accepted and financed the transactions. This was done by using the shares of the parent 
organization in the acquisitions. 
 
However, towards the end of the year 2000, there were personal relationship problems 
between the CEO of Alfa and the CEO of the parent organization. The integration of the 
acquisitions had not gone as planned and the direction of the company was under 
dispute inside Alfa. The acquired products and Alfa’s own products under development 
— partly the result of the innovativeness of the CEO — were in conflict. The process 
ended with the appointment of a new CEO in March 2001, and the old CEO leaving the 
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company. This did not, however, drastically change the operational relationship 
between the organizations. Alfa continued as an independent subsidiary, even though 
the parent organization tightened financial control over it. During 2001, Alfa downsized 
its organization heavily and the overall business focus was narrowed to correspond to a 
new more pessimistic market situation and tighter financial frames. 
5.2.3 External inter-organizational relationships 
As stated in the longitudinal description, Alfa was the most active in establishing 
relationships with other companies. During the investigation period, Alfa announced 
more than 30 different relationships loosely labeled as partnerships, even though many 
of them did not actually involve any operational exchange of resources of any kind. 
Most relationships involved very few and infrequent interactions.  
 
In Alfa’s case, the following categories of external relationships may be distinguished: 
• Technology partnerships 
• Sales partnerships/joint customer projects 
• Strategic customers 
• Marketing partnerships 
• Mergers and acquisitions 
Evidence related to them is presented in the following. There is evidence of 
relationships that can be considered to have been successful and to have failed. Both 
types of relationships are discussed below.  
 
During 2000 and 2001, Alfa, in particular, favored establishing technology-related 
partnerships and announcing “compliance” between Alfa’s and the other party’s 
technological solutions. Technology partnerships refer to relationships where the 
primary purpose is to share knowledge or resources related to certain types of 
technology. Development co-operation, interoperability partnership, joint membership 
in a standardization body, or an alliance to standardize technology could be examples of 
this type of relationship. Alfa was keen to publish such relationships since Alfa’s 
products were based on standardized interfaces to other third party products and wide 
interoperability was seen as important purchase criteria. Some of these relationships 
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may also be categorized as marketing partnerships, as the main purpose was to send a 
message to the potential customers of the wide support for different technologies and 
compliance between the parties’ products. After the chaotic first years, Alfa established 
more analytic partner programs to handle the partnerships more effectively than 
negotiating and governing on a case-by-case basis.  
 
In technology partnerships, Alfa created trust and encouraged knowledge-sharing 
between the organizations by offering a full virtual demo environment for its partners 
and offering a knowledge base for the partner to use. This environment also enabled a 
joint marketing tool to show the results of the partnership to the customers. It was a 
concrete result that could be used from the beginning of the relationship. One of the 
managers in Alfa elaborated the idea with the following words: 
At the same time, we have this kind of virtual setup here inside [name removed], that 
we can offer to test and evaluate to our partners, so they can test their applications 
in that development environment, and then we can move them to our demo 
environment. Then we can show demonstrations globally to our customers about our 
partners' application products. 
There were numerous similar technology co-operation arrangements; some of them 
were labeled as “application” partners. A director noted that these partners must be 
treated equally for the operation to be successful and on obtaining commitment from 
them:  
Then this equal treatment of partners is always an issue, when there is this 
subjective point of view also. 
One of the managers in Alfa emphasized the importance of the local salespersons and 
their contact networks in the creation of the partnership in a market. The local 
salespersons had a lot of freedom to operate in the market and to create the necessary 
partnerships for the business and their role was emphasized in Alfa’s business model. In 
this kind of activity, the history of personal relations is essential: 
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It is very much dependent on you having the right Account Manager there, who has 
the contact network and the drive to create versatile partnership agreements and 
negotiate the whole thing and then also get the legal support there. 
In Alfa’s history, there were several relationships that can be categorized as failed or not 
reaching the objectives set for them. An example of this kind of co-operation was 
described by interviewees in Alfa. In this relationship, the co-operation was created with 
a certain potential competitor, although no intentions to actually take use of this 
partnership existed. The partnership was seen as a strategic tool to confuse the markets 
and the competitors, but in the end, it seemed to confuse the venture organization more. 
One of the interviewees elaborated: 
[Name removed] was seen by [Alfa’s CEO] as a bad competitor, and right way to 
soften the competition was to make a partner agreement with them… Nobody from 
[Alfa] knew that we had co-operation with [company - name removed], but then 
somebody found from [company - name removed] website a release announcing, 
that they are [Alfa’s] partner. 
Another example of a relationship that did not produce the expected results was a sales 
partnership with a global corporation. The intention was to approach customers and 
deliver overall solutions together. In Alfa, this partnership was considered to be 
especially important for the purposes of internationalization, as the partner had presence 
in several markets. However, commitment from the partner’s side was poor.  
The situation was such that there were people on [partner’s] side that were very 
eager to co-operate, but then we started a joint project in Hong Kong, there were no 
right people on their side for that project and they did not actually put any effort to 
it. They had an attitude like ‘we can try this with you’. 
Alfa also had several big customer cases it considered more as a partnership rather than 
as a pure normal supplier-customer relationship. Since the products that Alfa provided 
were complex and sometimes tailored solutions, it was important for the company to 
obtain feedback and new development ideas from its customers. The projects were 
sometimes long and Alfa employees were heavily involved in the customer’s processes 
during the installation and production deployment projects. These relationships 
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provided Alfa important information about the customer needs and knowledge about the 
market environment. One of the interviewees elaborated: 
This is project business, this is consulting, if you do not get new products out, you do 
not have revenues in a month. That’s why you have to invest in the future all of the 
time and you have to finance it somehow. 
All in all, most of the interviewees saw that in internationalization, Alfa did not take 
good advantage of the partnerships it had. Even though many partnerships were entered 
into during the investigation period, the interaction between the parties was not deep 
and the relationships were poorly governed in most of the cases. Even though Alfa had 
vast financial resources from its parent organization, in addition to the technological 
innovations and products it had developed or acquired, it was not able to use the 
external inter-organizational relationships as a vessel to achieve an international 
competitive advantage. The CEO of Alfa summarized their view on the result: 
Most of the partnerships that were published, probably 98%, were of no use, except 
for the marketing company that made the press release. That goes for [Alfa’s] 
partnerships as well as for everybody else’s 
5.3 Beta 
Beta’s international growth was the most modest of all of the cases. It started later than 
the others did and due to a change in the market environment and the harsh cutting off 
of costs from the parent organization, it could not establish a position in several 
markets. Beta did, however, have opportunities and during the investigation period, the 
management of the venture tried several different paths to achieve international growth, 
from local offices and acquisitions to partnering. 
5.3.1 Longitudinal analysis 
Case Beta was initially a number of internal units directly under the parent organization 
that provided different IT-based services internally for the other units in the corporation. 
There were also some external revenues, but on a very small scale. A business decision 
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was made during 1998 to start offering the services to external customers. The 
interviewees described the establishment of Beta, the pursued strategies and the 
justifications for choosing the internationalization strategy in the following manner: 
So there was this strategic rationale, that new business is network independent and 
so we can start with small investments. 
To begin with, there were three strategies and they all were utilized in parallel. One 
was organic growth strategy, own sales office established and through them selling 
those concepts, what was available there and producible. Another strategy, that took 
very long to implement, was to negotiate an international co-operation 
arrangement, that enables our products to internationalize or through that 
arrangement, our products are internationalized. And the third were acquisitions. 
It started from Finland being so small of a market and in those markets only certain 
volumes can be reached and we started to find growth in the developed mobile 
internet markets that can be found from Western Europe and we did a roadmap in 
what order we go those markets… 
The resources were regrouped into a unit. At the beginning of the investigation period, 
the organization changed its form quite frequently, as more businesses were started and 
added to it. During 2000, international operations were launched. Because the strategic 
relationship with the parent organization was close, Beta also had to choose its target 
markets according to the parent organization’s strategy. This process is described by 
some of the interviewees in the following: 
In fact, [parent organization’s] strategic markets are one criterion. 
In practice, there were few criteria in choosing the target markets. One criterion is 
that the markets must be reasonable from the point of view from [parent 
organization], i.e., such that [parent organization] has a wider presence there. 
Some parts of the businesses had already done some small-scale operations in the 
international markets, mainly in Sweden. During 2000, operations in Sweden and 
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Germany were started and local subsidiaries were established. It was seen by the 
venture managers that the service concepts can easily be transferred to other European 
markets. The overall longitudinal development of Beta’s internationalization and other 
milestones are described in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Longitudinal analysis of Beta 1998–2001 
The volume of business was very small in the beginning, revenues in 1999 stood at a 
couple million euros, and it was basically 100% coming from the other internal units of 
the corporation. The annual growth rate of the business during 1998–2001 was 35–45% 
and the revenues in 2001 totalled EUR 72 million. Most of it was still coming from the 
home market, however. Beta did a small acquisition from Sweden at the end of 2001. 
The acquired organization was a production unit of a company and it was supposed to 
act as a vessel for growth in the Swedish market. The basic strategy was to push Beta’s 
product through to Sweden by the support of the new organization: 
Sweden emerged purely through an acquisition, meaning that we bought a 
subsidiary from [name removed] called [name removed] and integrated it to [parent 
organization's] and [Beta's] business. 
With that, we got the basic organization to Sweden and it works as a platform for 
growth there. 
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[Acquired company] was started to change effectively to that form that it would 
serve as a support channel for the products and sales organization. 
The acquired company was a production organization that already had several big 
customers. The integration went quite well according to the key people. The acquired 
organization was quite quickly transformed into a part of the Beta’s governance model 
and the project organization responsible for integration succeeded well, considering the 
objectives set for it. As an example of one gauge of success, very few employees left the 
acquired organization after the acquisition. An internal case presentation of “successful 
acquisition” was prepared from the project and presented to other units in the parent 
organization.  
 
Several other acquisitions were looked into, but none were actually realized. In addition 
to Sweden and Germany, other markets were also scanned. In the UK, Beta even had a 
few people working and plans were made to move the unit’s headquarters to London. 
After the actual integration project from the Swedish acquisition, some problems in the 
market started to emerge. The rollout of Beta’s products in Sweden did not succeed as 
planned, it took longer, and some of the interviewees suspected that the products were 
not suitable for the market. The revenues did not grow and some of the big customers 
that brought revenues to the established organization left after the acquisition. The 
people that were involved in the operations described the situation: 
There are existing revenues. That acquisition, the sales at that time were something 
like 5–6 MEUR, if I remember correctly. We haven't been able to increase that… 
Partly it was due to that we were selling under the wrong concept there. Then we 
were late in product rollout there. The third issue... We lost one big customer and it 
dramatically affected to the revenues of the company. 
…In Sweden that was bought ready, this part of [acquired company], for some 
reason it has started to go down after it was bought. Big customers are leaving 
there… 
These difficulties caused pressure to create cutbacks. The parent organization had a 
significantly tighter budget framework than before. All new business operations were 
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halted and the German operations were closed in 2001. During that year, Beta also 
downsized its organization and started extensive cuts in expenses.  
In the beginning, all of these implementation strategies were utilized. Now only one 
[partnering]. 
Table 9 shows in numbers how Beta’s international growth and other performance 
indicators have developed during the investigation period. It can be seen that Beta was 
not able to make its operations profitable during the investigation period and its 
international operations were starting off slower than in the other cases. Beta’s top 
management was completely Finnish. 
Table 9. Quantitative analysis of Beta 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales (MEUR) N/A 0 53 72 
Profit/Loss (MEUR) N/A N/A -42 -25 
EVA* N/A N/A -43 -25 
Foreign sales as a percentage of total sales (%)* N/A N/A 1% 8% 
Top management international experience (%) 0% 0% 0% 0% 
The number of countries in which the company has foreign 
business operations (n) 
2 2 4 3 
The number of diverse social cultures of the countries in which 
the company operates (H/M/L) 
L L L L 
The geographic diversity of a company’s foreign markets 
(H/M/L) 
L L L L 
Number of foreign subsidiaries (n) 0 0 1 2 
*estimates 
5.3.2 Relationship with the parent organization 
Until 2000, Beta’s operations were an integral part of the parent organization. It was an 
internal unit and parts of its business operations were scattered across the organization.  
 
In the spring of 2000, the unit was registered as a subsidiary of the parent. However, the 
relationship was kept very close and, even though Beta was an independent subsidiary, 
with its own sub-brand and independent management, the relationship with the parent 
organization was in the governance sense the closest of the cases in this study. The 
following quotes from the key informants describe the early phases of the venture and 
the relationship with the corporation. 
 109 
If we think about the decisions and choices we made 4–5 years ago, then we pursued 
to find new business that would be outside [parent organization] business and so 
moving up on the value chain. 
In practice, there cannot be such strategy in [Beta], which would be [Beta's] own. 
Strategy has been framed from the corporate strategy… 
Creating business like [Beta] would not have been possible without [parent 
organization] strategy acceptance. In other words, it was one decision that came 
from corporation then. I know it well, because I was making it myself, that strategy 
back then. Strategy made it possible to create a business like [Beta]. 
In Beta’s case, the operational relatedness to the parent organization meant that there 
were very limited options to realize, due to the strict budgetary frameworks of the 
parent organization. Hence, the role of the parent organization was as a financial 
investor and the financial frameworks given were stricter and the strategic options were 
always accepted and followed by the parent organization’s management: 
After that, the management has been mainly budget management. They have given 
us the financial frameworks, under which we can move… But other control there has 
not been… I would say that strategic guidance, yes, that come from there, meaning 
that is it possible to do a certain move. And the financial control, meaning how 
much money is given. 
Focus was in following numbers, not in developing business or developing business 
area. 
In Beta’s case, the level of involvement in the parent strategy process was not that high. 
There were no clear set objectives from the parent side to grow internationally. The 
sharing of knowledge between the management of Beta and the management of the 
parent organization was not as frequent as with the other cases. To show this, the 
following words are from key informants from Beta: 
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Head quarters’ attitude towards this current … business, when the frameworks were 
created, was not too supportive to be frank. Was it that then they didn't understand 
it. 
We had good starting points, good possibilities. Partly they were terminated by 
Finland, the headquarters terminated some of them, and then these EBITDA 
requirements terminated the rest… We did nothing, just waited for the costs to be 
cut… And we know what that does to a new business – it ends it. 
They gave us numbers [of cutbacks], we couldn't say anything else except thank you, 
and we’ll handle this. 
Beta was not able to obtain support from its parent organization and the necessary 
advantage to make its strategic moves. This was also due to the downturn in the markets 
and the restrictions on the parent organization’s business. Other ventures that had 
started their operations earlier were also already consuming the parent organization’s 
financial resources and they had the advantage of a longer history and, to some extent, a 
more mature business than Beta. 
5.3.3 External inter-organizational relationships 
Beta’s inter-organizational relationships were at first not managed very formally, 
instead being handled by different organizations in the venture. There was no 
centralized partnering management and new relationships were formed opportunistically 
by individual managers when the need came up. The following types of external inter-
organizational relationships can be distinguished from Beta’s operations: 
• Technology partnerships 
• Marketing partnerships 
• Production partnerships 
• Sales partnerships 
• Mergers and acquisitions 
Most of the external relationships were some form of technology co-operation, where 
Beta would use technologies provided by their partners and use the relationship also for 
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marketing purposes, to promote Beta’s solutions. Many of the technology partners were 
big international or global companies and the level of interaction was not deep.  
 
The person responsible for organizing the partnering activities described the situation in 
the early phases of the venture as follows: 
In the establishment phase, the partnerships were born quite chaotically in that 
sense, that this business manager or somebody other preferred it or by coincidence. 
Two large international partnerships were announced during 2001: the first being an 
international sales partnership and the second a global production partnership. The 
purpose of the partnerships was to boost international sales and create savings. It was 
considered that the partnerships would open the way to international markets. The two 
companies had co-operated in several occasions earlier, there were ready contacts and 
this increased the trust between the parties: 
We have had many kinds of co-operation earlier, which is of course normal. 
This partnership led later to a very large-scale co-operation where Beta outsourced some 
of its core operations to the partner. One of the key people behind Beta’s strategy 
elaborated the setup: 
They [the partner] are interested in taking care of this production, which is their 
core business and we are interested in getting our … products to market through 
them. We have seen that this is a win-win situation for both. 
However, this partner did not provide Beta with a channel to foreign markets, as it had 
expected. One of the interviewees described the reasons for this: 
One of the key challenges is with [company - name removed] is how do you get your 
product in that huge organization with thousands of products to be brought up. How 
do you get those people to sell your product? 
We are just a sales company and if you want to get to other countries … you must go 
through to the headquarters to USA, so that it becomes a corporate product. Then 
they sell, when it comes down as a corporate product. 
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The interviewee saw that the sales partnership with a small local player and a global 
corporation did not succeed because of the asymmetry between the parties and the setup 
for the co-operation. Beta expected that the salespersons in the global company would 
handle their sales and this did not happen. There were also no proper governance 
mechanisms for the relationship, since the deal was not made with the headquarters of 
the corporation but a smaller local unit.  
 
An example of a more successful governance structure was the supplier relationship 
with Beta and a global IT provider. The IT provider supplied technology and software 
for Beta’s services, which meant that new intellectual property rights were generated in 
the process. Here the expected value was in ownership for the developed technology. 
The governance structure ensured that the rights for the technology were owned by 
Beta. This kind of situation was optimal according to Beta’s informants, who also 
considered it to be quite rare of an occasion since the partner was a global player and 
had quite a bit of negotiation power. The Beta representative emphasized the advantage 
of the setup: 
There we got - which is very rare with [name removed] - that they cannot use the 
technology we have paid for as such in other cases. We own it. 
One of the interviewees saw that the main reason for not getting everything out of the 
relationships was the incompetence of the people put in charge of the projects. 
According to the person responsible for the partnering program in the organization, 
inexperienced people were put in positions where they were responsible for managing 
international projects and the results were not good. In the quotes below, the key 
informants refer to people appointed to positions in international projects being not 
experienced enough, not having enough training for the task, only a “letter course”:  
It feels ridiculous that they give some kind of letter course to people that have not 
proven in any way to be well suited for that kind of environment. 
Another thing that has a significant impact is people. In practice, you must have 
people that have nerves and experience with international business. You can't go 
and practice. You should have done this kind of thing once or twice earlier. 
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In summary, Beta’s international relationships did not bring growth for the venture. 
Some of them provided cost efficiency or other advantages mainly in its home market 
and in certain local markets, but Beta’s strategy to internationalize through partnerships 
was not seen by the informants as successful, and the collected secondary data supports 
this. 
5.4 Gamma 
Organizationally, Gamma was the largest of the cases. At the end of the investigation 
period (the beginning of 2002), it had about 1,000 employees. It was also the least 
“venture-like” business of the cases. Gamma was a big player, a market leader in its 
home market. Its businesses included both high-technology services and people-based 
services (that were basically the reason for the large organization) and it was a wholly 
owned subsidiary of the parent organization. During the investigation period, it was 
offering its services to service providers and operators in need of certain technology 
solutions and it had an extremely focused range of business-to-business services. There 
were basically two separate business units in the organization, old telecommunications -
based services that have a very long history and a new electronic business that can be 
described as the “venture side” of the business. The expansion of these businesses to 
new markets was seen as the venturing activity. 
5.4.1 Longitudinal analysis 
Gamma’s business was a part of parent organization’s value added service portfolio 
before it was made a separate entity. It had had similar business activities for a long 
time, but only in the late 1990s, with new mobile and Internet content services, did the 
importance of this particular technology in the value-added services grow significantly. 
The parent organization also owned several minority stakes in similar ventures in the 
home market and some shares in foreign ventures operating abroad. Figure 9 provides 
information about the overall longitudinal development of the case. 
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Figure 9. Longitudinal analysis of Gamma 1998–2001 
To name the significant foreign operations at the time of the establishment of the 
venture, the stakes in foreign small companies included joint ventures in two companies 
in France (50% and 100%), one company in Italy (51%), one company in Great Britain 
(45%), and minor shares in a company in the United States (25.5%) and Ireland (10%). 
In addition to these, the venture had some small-scale operations in Spain, Switzerland, 
Austria, and Sweden, when the venture was established. The implementation of 
internationalization on a larger scale started from the beginning of 2000. Before that, it 
only had small operations and its base business in Finland. Some testing occurred in 
international operations during the early 1990s. Hence, some experience in the 
international environment existed in the organization. The employees described the 
formation of international goals and strategies in the following way: 
We are globally a very, very small company, and we have little muscles. We have 
some balls, but little muscles, we cannot put the thing up by ourselves. We have to 
look for partners to go to markets. 
It started from, if I remember correctly, from last year's November, December when 
we started to discuss how to approach these different geographical areas in a more 
structured way. 
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There were basically two reasons for larger scale international operations during 1999–
2000. One was deregulation and the other was the large-scale internationalization of 
Epsilon. First, Gamma’s business required certain regulatory restraints to be removed 
from the markets. These regulations existed in several European countries and these 
markets started to be opened in 1999. Second, as Gamma’s business was seen as being a 
supporting service for Epsilon, these two organizations could complement each other. It 
was expected that Gamma’s business would support the internationalization strategy of 
Epsilon. These expectations came from the management of the parent organization and 
from the management of Epsilon (which had a strong influence in the parent 
management). 
 
The new internationalization strategy of the venture meant starting operations in several 
markets. The main focus was on getting new operations up in as many markets as 
possible, and it was allowed to decrease its profitability. One of Gamma’s management 
group members described the objective: 
Really, internationalization was done so that it was given priority, that profitability 
can be lowered as long as there is international growth. 
One of the interviewees saw the backgrounds of the management board members as a 
guiding factor on how the international growth strategy was built up: 
Well, I could say that the personal backgrounds of the management board members 
are one very clear thing [why] we have used certain internationalization models. 
Several different entry modes were pursued simultaneously in different markets: 
acquisitions, joint ventures, greenfield operations, and partnerships. International sales 
partnerships, R&D alliances, and joint ventures were established. The choice of target 
markets was done according to a market analysis and the parent organization also had 
an influence on the search for new markets to enter: 
In practice, the countries were chosen according to with whom we could operate… 
And then this kind of countries like [country removed] came through [the parent 
organization's] international ownerships, there we had [company name removed] 
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and other shareholder companies, meaning that we had to show that there is 
synergy prospects in internationalization, so we had to go there. 
We looked from the points of view of these business markets and the requirements of 
this business competition. We have done quite a bit, especially in European 
countries, market research and market screening, competitor analysis, etc. 
Another major criterion has been number service and database distribution and 
usage emancipation, regulatory reasons that have been essential. 
I got as my task to find out… To map the possibilities to business and to develop 
them in the Nordic countries and in the Baltics and of course it started from 
investigating the current state of affairs. Meaning that what is found where, what 
are the markets, who are operating there, what kind of services there are available 
and what is the price level and what are the volumes and what are the technologies 
used in mobile phones. 
Geographical area of operation was also an issue for Gamma as the most significant 
business was carried out in Europe, in markets that were well known to Gamma, which 
used local consulting offices on the market: 
We have wanted to stay quite close, meaning Europe, only small operations in Asia 
and USA. 
Then in the end of the autumn, in November–October we started doing this project 
"Adam" there. We hired this consulting office called [name removed] there, and they 
started to do it. That was our local partner there and then we also had local people 
here. 
One large change in the business was done in towards the end of 2000, when the 
business was organized from global responsibilities to area and country-based 
businesses and responsibilities. In Q4 of 2001, the parent organization signed a letter of 
intent to sell Gamma. The whole business is strongly consolidating and because of the 
market situation, Gamma was one of the most valuable businesses at that time. This was 
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a move anticipated by the markets; other telecommunications corporations in Europe 
had also been selling their similar businesses. 
 
Table 10 depicts the quantitative data of the case. The venture was established as an 
independent subsidiary and the major and minor stakes in other companies were also 
transferred to that new company. This is why no exact figures were available for the 
first two years before the incorporation of the unit. The new subsidiary was established 
in December 2000 and its revenues during 2000 amounted to EUR 62 million. The 
operations were profitable since before the incorporation of the venture. This is due to 
the fact that the business itself was not new, even though it was conducted through a 
new venture — the markets and the players in different countries had already existed for 
a longer period of time. 
 
Gamma acquired a major stake in a French company in May 2000 and by doing so, 
became a strong presence on that market. The revenues from France were EUR 4.7 
million during 2000. In 2001, full ownership was acquired of the company and the 
revenues grown to EUR 8.3 million. The investment was significant from the point of 
view of Gamma. The acquired company remained very independent after the acquisition 
and it operated with its own established brand in the French market. The market was 
seen that different from the other Gamma’s markets that there was no willingness to try 
to drastically change the operating mode. 
Table 10. Quantitative analysis of Gamma 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales (MEUR) 48* 55* 66 71 
Profit/Loss (MEUR) N/A N/A 12 5 
EVA* N/A N/A 3 5 
Foreign sales as a percentage of total sales (%)* N/A 4% 12% 12% 
Top management international experience (%) 0% 0% 0% 20% 
The number of countries in which the company has foreign 
business operations (n) 
N/A 3 9 10 
The number of diverse social cultures of the countries in which 
the company operates (H/M/L) 
L L L M 
The geographic diversity of a company’s foreign markets 
(H/M/L) 
L L L M 
Number of foreign subsidiaries (n) N/A 1 2 1 
*estimates 
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Gamma succeeded in getting a foothold in several markets, although it did not manage 
to get sustainable operations running during the investigation period in some. The 
relative share of international sales did not grow during 2001. Some reasons for this 
were identified by the interviewees. The requirements for internationally competitive 
products were not thoroughly known, some false assumptions were made. In the words 
of one of the managers: 
Our product development could not respond to the challenges that were there in the 
markets. 
There were similar ideas about the international delivery capability of their new 
products: 
Let's say so that the one basic thing we've had, we've known the conceptual side of 
these electronic services and we've had a good vision, but we haven't had that 
delivery capability. What I mean is that if the customer says that I'll take this, then 
we would have had an awful panic: ‘Now that one customer actually has ordered. 
What shall we do now?’ 
One interviewee also identified the lack of international experience as a reason for not 
getting operations up in certain markets. Gamma was not able to keep its internationally 
experienced employees in the company: 
It has had so much impact that there has not been any genuine international 
experience and experience about going to international markets … We recruited one 
very tough high-class guy, who had been in international business, and for about 
two months he looked at this and then politely said thanks and left. 
Through its minor stakes and joint ventures, however, Gamma was able to get 
international operations up and running and, at the end of the investigation period, it had 
several operations starting in different markets, unlike the other case organization. 
There were no actual major setbacks in the process and the unit was able to maintain its 
profitability throughout the period, even though the speed of internationalization was 
not what was expected in the beginning. Based on the case analysis, it can be argued 
that Gamma was able to create value and achieve competitive advantage in certain 
markets, even though the actual financial profits were modest. 
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5.4.2 Relationship with the parent organization 
Gamma already had large operations in its home market and the realized strategies came 
mainly from the inside the unit. When considering strategic relatedness, Gamma’s 
operations were close to those of the parent organization, as it had had businesses that 
had been running as a part of the parent organization for a long time. The links between 
the management of Gamma and the management of the parent organization can be 
described as distant. The idea for the venturing organization had not come from the 
parent organization, but from the venture itself and the objective was to grow a new 
business from profitable old operations. The parent was not deeply involved in the 
planning process. However, the parent organization strongly trusted the plans made by 
Gamma, as the following quotations show: 
Yes, they [resources] have come from there. But we have grown so that we've made 
profit, so that has not been a problem for us. 
I never felt that there [in parent organization] was any kind of advising, governance 
or control on how you should do this internationalization. Not at all. 
In Gamma’s case, the trust was generated from a long history of conducting the 
traditional “non-venture” side of the business in the home market. To some extent, there 
was a “paradox of trust” situation. The interviewees saw that the parent organization 
was not able to make proper judgments or decisions concerning Gamma’s business. The 
following quotation shows how one of the interviewees saw financial resources being 
given out by the parent organization: 
The basis on how you got money in [parent organization], was more than amusing. 
There was no control on what kinds of plans were accepted — any kind of 
preliminary idea, all of them were accepted. Even our management said that they 
always gave away EUR 10 million per five minutes. 
Another interviewee from Gamma thought that the operational support given by the 
parent organization did not amount to much. The capabilities of the parent organization 
to support new international business in areas where the parent itself did not operate 
were not good in the interviewee’s opinion: 
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Otherwise the corporation had very poor support for internationalization — on the 
HR side etc… [Parent organization] is not any kind of international company. 
Third interviewee criticized the way the decisions were made. As an example, there 
were two potential companies for acquisition in Sweden, but these plans were not 
accepted by the management board: 
There were two cases [M&A] in Sweden, and they were taken to the Board. They 
said that we wouldn't do it. 
On the other hand, there were also some positive effects for Gamma from the linkage to 
the parent organization. The responsible manager for the business development in 
certain market area described the help given by the parent in the following manner. 
In practice, the good reputation of [parent organization] has helped a lot — opened 
doors. I mean this kind of general brand, for example, in the USA approaching 
[name removed], with [parent organization's] name, especially a year ago, was of 
value. 
Having a big corporation as a parent organization helped open doors to certain 
negotiations and the networks that were already created by the parent could be utilized 
by Gamma. In summary, there was, to some extent, contradictory evidence about the 
mechanisms between Gamma and the parent organization. 
5.4.3 External inter-organizational relationships 
As Gamma had very different activities in different markets, it had several different 
types of external relationships. The following categorization could be applied to 
Gamma’s different inter-organizational relationships: 
• Distribution partnerships 
• Sales partnerships 
• Joint ventures 
• Marketing partnerships 
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One manager saw that the lack of focus in internationalization led Gamma to try to 
many different entry modes and that too many relationships were also pursued: 
Maybe in [Gamma] that kind of focusing, we went to too many places and did a lot. 
We should go somewhere and focus, buy a ready business from that market. 
In Gamma’s case, finding a local distribution partner was a necessity rather than an 
option and Gamma had to find a way to commit its partners to co-operation in each 
market: 
This is the same situation as in every country; we need this distribution partner, 
when we talk about our electronic services. 
This meant that Gamma had to work on each local market to find the proper partner and 
usually this was done first by getting the base operations for the market through 
acquisition or joint venture. In some markets, e.g., in China, Gamma had to use a local 
partnership to gain access to the markets. The Chinese markets were so regulated and 
different that Gamma could not use entry modes similar to those it had used in some 
European markets. 
 
Gamma had several co-operation arrangements where the governance structures can be 
described as loose. One example is the internal co-operation between Gamma and 
Epsilon. It was a sales partnership, where Epsilon marketed Gamma’s services as part of 
a portfolio and Gamma utilized Epsilon’s capabilities and presence in the markets and 
Epsilon could offer more value in the product portfolio with Epsilon. By the words of a 
representative in Gamma: 
Well, let's say that [Epsilon] has always been ahead us in internationalization. We 
have a deal with [Epsilon], a frame agreement and then in each country we have a 
case-specific deal. The basic idea is, that there where [Epsilon] is, we deliver [word 
removed] services. So, in that sense it is a good case. 
This relationship cannot, however, be described as successful. Both representatives 
from Gamma and Epsilon verified this. No value was created through this arrangement 
for either of the parties. One of the key informants from Gamma described the co-
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operation as good, because Epsilon had carried out all of the financial investments, 
which also implies a lack of mutual commitment and trust in the relationship: 
[Epsilon] co-operation has been good, because [Epsilon] has put almost all of the 
money in it. Our financial investments have been minimal. 
The biggest problem in the relationship was that the governance structure was too loose 
and there were no control mechanisms to follow the development of the co-operation. 
The representatives from Gamma did not receive information; there were no appropriate 
knowledge-sharing routines between the parties. A manager from Gamma described the 
outcome of the co-operation with the following words: 
We gave [Epsilon] a tremendous amount of freedom to operate. Commercially, we 
didn’t control them strictly to produce for us. In retrospect, it was not a good thing. 
Both [Gamma] and us [Epsilon] saw it [co-operation] as strategic, that [Gamma] 
wanted to come to those countries where we went and the other way around; we saw 
their product as important, but the end result was that it did not fly that well, 
because it just wasn't that good. 
Another problematic external relationship that came up in the interviews was a joint 
venture co-operation in the UK market, where there were serious problems with trust 
issues. It was a minor stake investment made by Gamma in the UK together with an 
Irish company. There were political struggles on the Board of the joint venture. The end 
result was not good: 
It [co-operation] has been very poor at the point when the trust between partners 
vanishes. 
One of the interviewees described this project with the following words: 
We own 10% of [name removed], which is Irish. And with them, we have a joint 
venture called [name removed]; we own 45% and they own 55%. This joint 
company was established in January 2000 …Already they receive… similar volumes 
as in Finland. 
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The joint venture grew fast; the volumes were at the same level as in Gamma’s Finnish 
home market and they rose quickly after the establishment. Gamma, however, had 
difficulties with the joint governance: 
So the Irish have all the time tried to push us out of the company and blamed us for 
not doing enough there, but we can't do anything else with a minor stake than to 
give them money there.  
It is very bad when the trust between partners is lost, it is clearly visible there. Our 
people haven't done the best possible work in this matter. 
Even though Gamma had a person sitting on the Board of the joint venture, this did not 
solve the problems. There were cultural clashes as well as some political issues between 
the parties. In addition, the change in ownership of Gamma that occurred in 2001 
caused even more suspicion between the parties. In the case of Gamma’s co-operation, 
both adequate individual and structural attachment were missing. Eventually, the stake 
in the venture was sold to the other party and the relationship was terminated.  
 
In another partnership with Gamma, a pilot with the employees of the partner created 
the initial trust between the organizations and this led to commercial activity. Piloting 
gave the parties the necessary confidence to make the commercial commitments in the 
relationship. The person responsible for the project elaborated: 
They’ve allowed us to conduct a pilot, with all of the employees of [name removed] 
in North America. The feedback is excellent and it looks like it is going to be a 
commercial relationship as well. 
The manager saw that this was, most of all, a personal relationship issue and that the 
individual social relationship meant the most in the success or failure:  
At that point, I would think that it comes down to my personal relationship with that 
individual, what is the quality of my follow-up, and what is the quality of the service. 
And really, that's it. 
In one co-operational arrangement, Gamma started to use the other party’s resources. 
This relationship was with a big global player, so Gamma was able to take use of the 
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marketing capabilities and brand of the partner. The product was marketed as a part of 
the partner’s portfolio and this helped to establish Gamma’s position on the 
international market. One of the interviewees described the relationship as follows:  
It has been presented and sold in some fairs and it has helped [name removed] as 
well as us, because this product was one of the first that they could pilot and show to 
the customer. 
In Gamma’s case, access to certain resources, i.e., customers, was mentioned as a 
reason for starting co-operation. There is a non-physical asset specificity, namely access 
to a certain market segment. A concrete case of this kind of situation was Gamma’s 
entry on the North American market. Such partnerships were sought and created where 
access to certain market resources was possible. 
[Name removed] already has direct access to like [name removed] and [name 
removed] as well…So, we want to work hand-in-hand with [name removed] to reach 
these operators. 
During the investigation period, however, this relationship did not provide Gamma with 
presence in that market. 
 
In summary, there was evidence of 10 relationships during the investigation period, 
most of which can be described as deeper than just “arm’s length”. Gamma maintained 
communication with its partners quite frequently and was able to obtain operations that 
had been started in the markets. Even though a couple of the most strategic partnerships 
did not work out, Gamma was able to shift its operational focus elsewhere and 
concentrate on those mechanisms and relationships that created concrete results. 
5.5 Epsilon 
Epsilon was the most aggressive of the cases in its international marketing strategy. One 
of the reasons for this is that Epsilon’s business model was to create services for 
consumers and it considers brand to be a very important factor in business. Its business 
model also required aggressive partnering. 
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5.5.1 Longitudinal analysis 
Epsilon was initially established to obtain access to international markets, in particular. 
During 1998, the strategists in the parent organization tried to find potential new 
business areas, where fast international growth would be possible. It was believed that 
significant international market opportunities existed. The new business was supposed 
to be based on the competencies of the parent organization and to be built on top of the 
parent’s current services and employ the current organizational knowledge, as the 
following quotes show:  
We thought in [parent organization] ‘99 strategy process, in the spring of ‘99, that 
where [parent organization] could have a chance to internationalize…  
And of course, one condition was that somehow those competencies should be such, 
that they stem from the [parent organization’s core business]. 
Business plans were developed and a new unit was formed during the fall of 1999. The 
business was offering value-added services to consumers, combining the different 
competencies found in the corporation. The basic aim was to list the new company on 
the stock exchange and create a unit completely independent from its parent 
organization. During the fall of 1999, the first international partnerships were formed 
and market-scanning operations were started. The decision to incorporate the unit was 
made and the new subsidiary commenced operations in the beginning of 2000.  
We made a plan for the management group and Board of Directors and, in fall ‘99, 
the first employees transferred, in September ‘99, about ten people. 
When we obtain that business rolling, we aim at IPOing the company, so we can 
obtain the financing right. That would mean that [parent organization] doesn't have 
to finance at all… 
During the spring of 2000, the country operations in several different markets 
commenced. At that time, the people involved in the planning felt that in order for the 
venture to succeed, they had to move fast and be first on the market. It was seen that the 
first-mover advantage was real in this business. It was believed that as there is more 
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knowledge on the operational level, it is easier to build up products and services that 
can be sold internationally. To put it simply, one of the interviewees in Epsilon stated 
the following about learning: 
The faster you can go to market, the better, because only then you know… You are 
never ready, the faster you can get to market, the faster you learn what to change. 
The target markets were scanned according to different criteria. The existing networks 
of the parent organization were also used. The aim was to maximize the growth and 
commence operations in several markets as quickly as possible. The key informants 
described the search for potential target markets as follows: 
[Epsilon’s] services are consumer services; that’s why those countries have been 
chosen with different criteria. We could not have gone to the same places as [parent 
organization] with the same criteria, since the target is completely different. And the 
markets have been chosen so that there are enough users, the market is sufficiently 
developed, and the people know how to use those services. The differences are quite 
big in different countries, for example, American users are still not at that level. In 
Europe, those services are used. 
In practice, the countries were chosen according to with whom we could operate… 
And then these kinds of countries like [country removed] came through [parent 
organization's] international ownerships, there we had [company name removed] 
and other shareholder companies, meaning that we had to show that synergy 
prospects in internationalization exist, so we had to go there. 
Because of the aggressive growth strategy that was selected for Epsilon, it had to carry 
out several tasks in parallel, building several parts of the organization and business 
simultaneously. These hectic early phases of the venture were described by the 
interviewees in the following manner: 
Anything concrete to internationalize these services and launch internationally, that 
didn't exist back then in 2000. Actually, [Epsilon] didn't have a development 
organization either. 
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At the same time in 2000, we had not just made the deals with operators, but also 
setting up the local organizations in these countries, local organizations in place, 
technology up und running integrated technology parts to operators… 
In Epsilon, internationally experienced people were recruited to key positions from 
outside, since the management felt they needed experienced people to handle the 
venture’s business development. One of the main strategists of Epsilon stated the 
following: 
Yes, we recruited those [internationally experienced people] from many directions. 
It was a key issue in [our] success. 
Not all recruitments, however, were successful. Epsilon recruited a CFO from a larger 
international company, only to notice that the person was not suitable for the dynamic 
growing venture, as one of the directors described: 
This kind of start-up CFO's work is a bit different, when skills and contacts are in 
place, but generally in a start-up, or in a smaller company, things happen in a 
different way. 
The first international operations were announced in the beginning of 2000, with 
Holland as the first market. One of the reasons for this was the presence of another 
subsidiary of the parent in the same market. It was possible that there could be some 
synergies between these two operations: 
In August 2000, we launched the first market, which was Holland. Holland, because 
we already had personnel and operations there from [subsidiary of the parent], and 
we could utilize that to some extent. 
As shown by Figure 10, several market operations were started and partnerships 
announced in the first half of 2000. At first, the targeted markets included the 
Netherlands, the Philippines, Germany, and the USA. Later, Singapore, Italy, and 
Malaysia also followed. Figure 10 describes the other milestones of the venture in 
different markets. In addition, the most important announced partnerships are included. 
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Figure 10. Longitudinal analysis of Epsilon 1998–2001 
The business model of the venture required that certain types of partnerships, 
distribution agreements, be made with the local telecommunications operators on the 
market. Negotiations in the chosen markets were very aggressively pursued and good 
contracts were achieved in several markets. Potential acquisition targets were also 
scanned, although at Epsilon, the market situation was not considered to allow such 
moves: 
There were possibilities [for acquisitions] every now and then, or a case came up, 
but the valuations were at that point so very high that we didn't see it making any 
sense. 
On the product side, Epsilon aimed at multiplying the same concepts in as many 
markets as possible. The following quote shows the approach that Epsilon had for 
localization: 
We aim that every country runs the same services… There are different cultures and 
different services are needed, but that's not actually true. The user group is so 
homogeneous and technology poses so many restrictions… 
During 2001, the market had not grown as expected. Epsilon was forced to cut its costs, 
pull out of several markets, and downsize its organization by almost half from about 
300 to 150 worldwide. In the beginning of 2001, however, launches were carried out in 
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Germany, Italy, and the UK. Market operations in Turkey, USA, and Holland were 
closed down or sold. In the case of Epsilon, growth management meant shutting down, 
downsizing, or selling certain operations due to the change in market situation or the 
failure to meet objectives. The following quotes show how the criteria for downsizing 
were viewed by the managers of Epsilon: 
We moved our head office from England back to Finland, closed certain countries: 
USA, Holland, Turkey; all for the same reason, we saw that they will not be 
profitable fast enough, but every country had some specific reason why. 
We threw the rest of the companies away, or the remaining country organizations 
were sold, after which we were left purely in that phase, only looking at the bottom 
line, which ones made money. 
The technologies the venture relied on had not taken off as was planned and the 
development of the market environment in general forced Epsilon to focus a lot on the 
most potential markets. By the end of 2001, Epsilon operated in six markets around the 
world. The summary of the data is shown in Table 11. 
Table 11. Quantitative analysis of Epsilon 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales (MEUR) N/A N/A 7 21 
Profit/Loss (MEUR) N/A N/A -107 -182 
EVA* N/A N/A -114 -182 
Foreign sales as a percentage of total sales (%)* N/A N/A 5% 55% 
Top management international experience (%) 0% 0% 20% 20% 
The number of countries in which the company has foreign 
business operations (n) 
1 3 9 7 
The number of diverse social cultures of the countries in which 
the company operates (H/M/L) 
L L H H 
The geographic diversity of a company’s foreign markets 
(H/M/L) 
L M M M 
Number of foreign subsidiaries (n) 0 0 9 8 
*estimates 
The revenues grew quickly, even though this required aggressive investments in 
marketing and thus a lot of financial resources from the parent organization. Revenues 
in 1999 were practically zero and grew to EUR 7 million in 2000 and to EUR 21 million 
in 2001. Most of it was still coming from Finland in 2000, although by 2001, the other 
markets were also bringing in a steady stream of revenue. 
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In a way, it's that even though countries have more power in certain issues, they also 
have more responsibility. In a way, increasing the sales goals has increased, they 
have quite high objectives. Through that, the control is also tighter. 
By the end of the investigation period, Epsilon had operations and a solid foothold in 
several markets. Some markets were becoming profitable, even though the overall 
losses were still high. The operations had grown from nothing to a serious business, 
even though the required financial investments had been significant. 
5.5.2 Relationship with the parent organization 
The significance of a close relationship with the parent organization was shown in the 
case of Epsilon, where parent organization commitment and resources were used to 
create growth for the business. The business was started by the parent organization and 
the parent strategists were heavily involved in the planning process. The basis for 
planning was the parent organization’s core competences. The following quotes 
describe the establishment of the venture and its planning:  
In ‘99, the spring strategy process focused on what capabilities and assets [parent 
organization] had, technology expertise and other mobile capabilities, as well as 
how we could utilize them in international markets. 
And at the end of that strategy process — that's how I interpreted that — was born 
the idea, that here on the service side we have two arrow heads, that were taken 
forward, [Epsilon] and [Alfa]. 
In the beginning of August, the [parent organization’s] Management Group — or 
was it the Board of Directors — accepted that this kind of project has been launched 
and it was given the authority to collect resources and certain financing that was 
agreed to be checked on during fall, when the plans start to be ready. 
Epsilon’s CEO had a strong influence within the parent organization. There was a two-
way direct link to the highest management in the parent organization. In 1999, Epsilon’s 
CEO directly reported to the CEO of the parent organization and, in 2000 and 2001, 
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Epsilon’s CEO was a member of the Management Group of the parent organization. I 
found evidence of frequent formal and informal communication between the 
organizations. The investments made for the creation and launch of Epsilon 
internationally were significant for the parent organization. The continued trust and 
empowerment towards the management of Epsilon also showed that, when the markets 
started to decline in 2001, heavy losses were shouldered by the parent: 
 [Parent organization] has financed this operation the whole time. Many start-ups 
have stopped their operations during this time. 
Some of the interviewees even suggested that it was the parent organization that 
encouraged the venture to continue on its chosen path, even though the venture 
managers themselves had doubts about the business growth. This implies that the 
commitment was indeed a crucial factor for the survival of Epsilon. The following 
quotes are from two managers: 
This project had the support of highest management; it helped to take these 
decisions forward. I've seen many such projects that have been killed much earlier 
because of different internal passions; this was pushed through and we 
accomplished things. I don't believe that without [parent organization’s] stake and 
support we had put this together so fast. Or no way would we have put this together 
so fast. 
And then, despite all, [parent organization] as an owner has been quite good and 
patient. All that support that we have got from there, at the same time when many 
other company has fallen and the faith of the owners has ended. Now that one looks 
at our financial figures, well [parent organization] has been quite right in that we 
should not stop this. 
Because Epsilon’s business was quite close to what the parent organization defined as 
their core business and there was a clear strategic relationship between the 
organizations, there was also much more interaction regarding the actual business and 
product development. In the early phases of the venture, much of the product 
development resources came from the parent organization. One of the Vice Presidents 
of Epsilon elaborated: 
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We received quite a lot of specialist help from [parent organization], and that was 
more than necessary. 
There was also direct support for business operations as pertains to the financial 
systems, sourcing and logistics, as the following quotes show: 
We have all the time been supported by [parent organization’s] financial systems. 
Sourcing and logistics service have supported us, when we built the services up… 
To sum it up, the evidence implies that the parent-venture relationship of Epsilon has 
been very close on both the management and operational level. The relationship has also 
remained quite close throughout the whole investigation period and no major setbacks 
were identified in the data. 
5.5.3 External inter-organizational relationships 
The following categories of external inter-organizational relationships were identified 
from the case data of Epsilon: 
• Distribution partnerships 
• Sales partnerships 
• Marketing partnerships 
• Technology partnerships 
• Production partnerships 
 
Distribution partnerships were the basic condition for market operations for Epsilon. To 
be able to offer its services, Epsilon needed a mobile telecommunications operator as a 
channel in each market. Some of these operators were also co-operation partners for 
Epsilon and the relationships resembled more an alliance than a supplier-buyer 
relationship. The importance of these relationships was mentioned in several interviews. 
Overall, 12 distribution partnerships were included in the data during the investigation 
period.  
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In addition to the contracts with the local telecommunications operators, Epsilon formed 
several technology partnerships, sales and marketing partnerships and partnerships with 
different kinds of local and global content providers. Two very big product development 
partnerships were also announced in 2000, although neither one of them actually 
realized revenues for Epsilon. Other indirect values created by the relationships can also 
be questioned. 
We thought that we could build a centralized product strategy; build these product 
families that are then localized in countries. 
On the technology side, the idea was choosing that kind of main suppliers, with 
whom we try to have very close co-operation, but let's say, that in that setting up 
technology and in that market situation in a way there was no time to negotiate such 
tight partnerships, especially, when the market changed all the time. 
The other technology co-operation was Epsilon’s product development partnership with 
a big international company. The purpose was to integrate the competencies of both 
parties and create a new offering for the international marketplace. The press release 
also described the co-operation as marketing and sales co-operation. Because the other 
party had a global presence, it would have enabled a global channel for Epsilon. An 
agreement and a joint plan were created and the governance structure was in place: 
We chose [name removed] and did a product development agreement with them, a 
plan. 
According to the representatives of Epsilon, the co-operation lasted for a year, but no 
concrete results were reached. One of the reasons mentioned was that the knowledge 
only flowed in one direction: 
With [name removed], we announced this product development co-operation, but it 
was not fun, because we taught them, told them that they are doing the same 
platform in 11 places. 
It seems that both parties did have a strong motivation to co-operate, but not much 
resulted from it. The governance structure that had been selected did not support the 
objectives of the partnership and there were also other problems, such as the partner’s 
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changing organization. The interviewees saw, however, that there was trust and 
commitment. One of the management team members from Epsilon summarized the co-
operation as follows: 
We planned and carried out continuous co-operation for about a year, even though, 
in the end, there were not many results. 
Epsilon started partnership negotiations with a big company in the USA, as there were 
contacts in the company from earlier negotiations. This “path dependence” was 
described by one of the Vice Presidents in Epsilon in the following manner: 
We went to [company removed], because [parent organization] was on the Board of 
[company removed] due to ownership so the contacts were ready and the demand 
for these services was also there on the operator’s side. 
The partner was chosen because of already established contacts in the organization. The 
previous history of both personal and formal ties made it easier to choose this partner. 
Co-operation did not, however, produce results quickly enough and the US operations 
were shut down once downsizing began. 
 
A very deep co-operation was developed with one distribution partner in markets in the 
Far East. The trust between the organizations brought success, success brought more 
trust, and hence more knowledge was obtained from the relationship: 
This [name removed] was very willing to carry out deep co-operation with us 
starting with marketing and stuff. 
This partnership in the market generated business and, because there it rather quickly 
succeeded, this, in turn, created more commitment from each party: 
We have carried out very close co-operation with the operator when their volumes 
were such that we would have never believed [them to be so]. 
This meant the utilization of a partner’s capabilities in local marketing and new product 
development and commercialization and using Epsilon’s technology expertise and ready 
production capabilities: 
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One operator that we have succeeded in [getting into closer co-operation] with is 
[company - name removed] in [country removed], the results have been quite good. 
We have succeeded in taken use of it; it's an optimal setup, where we can utilize the 
advantages of both parties. 
Another director from Epsilon described the same relationship with the following 
words: 
We also saw that the management of that operator was very powerful, very capable, 
very networked in that area and so forth. We saw that if we get a good partner in 
that area, where we can utilize it in that area, so we can use that market as a 
starting point and roll other markets by using that. 
This partnership gave both parties more competitive power in the markets they were 
operating and through success a deeper relationship was forged. Success brought 
more trust and commitment and it also enabled the utilization of other party’s 
capabilities. 
The opposite effect was experienced in an international marketing and technology 
relationship, where initial trust was not accumulated. Eventually, neither party was 
ready to commit. The partner aimed at closing deals and this aroused suspicion and lack 
of commitment from Epsilon’s side. Trying to obtain commitment from the other party 
without the actual generated trust did not lead to the desired results. The partnership did 
not lead to deeper co-operation:  
[Name removed] was looking so much to making deals on their side; they wanted 
that we would have done everything with them. 
An example of the effects on technological development was a partnership between 
Epsilon and a global company, where Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) was used. 
The co-operation was terminated, when the parties noticed that the technology was not 
mature enough and that there were several problems in the implementation of the joint 
concept. 
At some point when the problems with WAP got into publicity, [name removed] 
decided to postpone this thing, which meant in practice to stop it. 
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In summary, Epsilon’s business model required a high level of interaction with different 
market players, and the internationalization would not have been possible without the 
successful management of complex organizational networks. Epsilon was able to 
dynamically adjust itself to different institutional environments and the changes in the 
global development of the markets.  
5.6 Ex post analysis of cases 
As the investigation period was only four years long and it may be questioned whether 
or not the true value creation potential of organizations can be realized during that time, 
I present here a short analysis of the cases after the investigation period. This analysis 
supports the actual case studies by showing how the case organizations developed 
during the period spanning 2002–2004. Even though the analysis is carried out on a 
high level and superficially, it shows whether or not significant changes in the 
businesses occurred and it helps to draw conclusions on the cross-case analysis portion 
of this dissertation. The analysis is based on my observations of the organizations and 
on public sources (web pages, industry reports etc.). 
 
After the investigation period, the intention of the parent organization was to spin out 
Alfa. During 2002, the majority of the business was sold to private investor companies. 
The price of the transaction was only a fraction of the value that was anticipated for the 
business during the investigation period. Alfa was, however, able to maintain its 
business and grow as a more independent organization during 2002–2004. The main 
business of the company was transformed into something very different from the 
original idea; mostly, it was based on the product line of the other companies acquired 
during the investigation period. There was no accurate financial information available 
on Alfa for that period and thus exact conclusions about the rate and level of growth 
cannot be drawn. In any case, it can be concluded that the parent organization was not 
able to extract value from the business when considering the investments made in 
establishing the business. At the end of 2004, the company had approximately 200 
employees and was operating worldwide and had offices on several continents. The 
parent organization still owned a minor share of the company at the end of 2004. 
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In 2002, Beta was merged back into its parent organization. After the merger, some 
parts of the business were continued as internal units of the parent organization and 
some parts were closed down, outsourced, or sold. The parent organization struggled to 
create sustainable business from the operations, although it was not able to create real 
success, when considering the growth of the revenues or profitability. Most of the 
international operations were eventually closed down. As the business strategy of the 
parent organization changed, Beta was no longer considered a key area of new growth. 
 
Gamma was spun off during 2002 according to the plan mentioned in the case analysis. 
A private company bought Gamma’s businesses and the company continued its 
operations as a separate independent venture. During 2002–2003, the business grew to 
some extent, although the growth was moderate and mainly occurred in Finland and 
France, the main markets of Gamma. In 2003, the company had approximately 1,000 
employees, mainly located in Finland or France. The new operations in the United 
States or in China did not grow to become significant business after the investigation 
period. As a whole, Gamma was still able to generate profits and grow. 
 
Epsilon was able to grow during 2002–2003. In 2003, it had revenues of approximately 
EUR 83 million and was still operating in several markets around the world. Epsilon 
established its position in at least six markets and grew quite significantly. The 
operations were not, however, very profitable and in 2004, the parent organization sold 
the business. The case for Epsilon was very similar to the one for Alfa: the selling price 
did not recompense the investments made. 
 
In conclusion, none of the case organizations were able to generate return on investment 
for the parent venture. Even though three of the venture organizations can be defined as 
a sustainable business after the investigation period, the parent organization did not 
obtain the anticipated value out of them. The spin-offs created for three of the four case 
ventures were mainly carried out because the parent organization did not want to 
continue fostering the businesses. 
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6 Cross-case analysis and theory development 
In this chapter, I continue to analyze the empirical data that has been collected by 
combining the data across different cases and introducing the themes and their relations 
that were found in the data. During the cross-case analysis process, I categorized the 
results with different techniques and these categories and their justifications are 
presented first here. I continue this chapter by putting forth the results of the cross-case 
analysis and developing models drawing on the discussion. Finally, I create a synthesis 
of the results by introducing an integrative model.  
6.1 Initial categorization and search for themes and interrelations 
The main objective in the cross-case analysis was to analyze the inter-organizational 
internal and external relationships of internal corporate ventures, and to understand how 
they affect the value creation and the ability to attain an international competitive 
advantage. During the analysis process, I investigated the data with four different 
analysis approaches: 
1. By using the relational view as a framework 
2. By organizing the evidence into a process 
3. By searching for new themes emerging from the data 
4. Linking these themes to the existing frameworks and shaping them 
I categorized themes and concepts on several different dimensions and levels; the high-
level categorizations and their themes are briefly discussed below. 
 
After organizing the data, I ended up with three categories into which the themes can be 
divided. These three categories are: 
• Parent-venture relationship 
• Venture organization 
• Inter-organizational relationships 
 
 139 
This categorization seemed natural to me based on the initial scanning of the data and 
on the literature analysis. All of the themes found could be categorized as belonging 
under one of these concepts.  
 
I started the analysis from the most important relationship: the parent-venture 
relationship. The first focus was on the initial conditions under which the venture 
creation and other major decisions related to the life cycle of the venture. I started 
working on the biggest milestones in the parent-venture relationship during the 
investigation period. By using the relational view framework as a starting point for the 
analysis, I listed the different mechanisms and factors that determine the nature of the 
relationship. Table 12 summarizes the results. 
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Table 12. Analysis of parent-venture relationships in the cases 
Category  Facilitating sub-
process 
How the process manifested in the parent-venture 
relationship of the cases 
Duration of 
safeguards 
Alfa: Frequent interaction at the beginning of the 
investigation period. 
Beta: — 
Gamma: Long history as a business unit of the parent 
organization 
Epsilon: Frequent interaction and informal safeguards 
(trust) throughout the investigation period  
Relation-specific 
assets 
Volume of inter-
organizational 
transactions 
Alfa: Significant financial investments in acquisitions, 
marketing and R&D 
Beta: Financial support for acquisition 
Gamma: Joint ventures and minor stake acquisitions  
Epsilon: Personnel transferred from the parent to the 
organization, significant financial investments in 
marketing 
Absorptive capacity Alfa: — 
Beta: Recognition and utilization of parent 
organization’s partnering knowledge 
Gamma: — 
Epsilon: Recognition and utilization of parent 
organization’s R&D and business knowledge 
Knowledge-sharing 
routines 
Incentives to 
encourage 
transparency and 
discourage free 
riding 
Alfa: Shared vision of the management 
Beta: Shared goal setting in the strategy process of the 
parent organization 
Gamma: — 
Epsilon: Shared vision of the management, dense social 
interactions between the strategists 
Ability to identify 
and evaluate 
potential 
complementaries 
Alfa: Utilization of the parent organization brand and 
credibility in marketing and partnering 
Beta: Utilization of the parent organization brand and 
credibility in marketing and partnering 
Gamma: Utilization of the parent organization brand 
and credibility in marketing and partnering, utilization 
of the parent organization international joint ventures  
Epsilon: Utilization of the parent organization brand in 
marketing, utilization of the R&D resources from the 
parent organization, utilization of the parent 
organization’s business support systems 
Complementary 
resources/capabilities 
Role of 
organizational 
complementaries 
Alfa: — 
Beta: Similar processes and organizational structure 
Gamma: — 
Epsilon: Utilization of the organizational resources of 
the parent organization, similar competences needed for 
operations 
Ability to employ 
self-enforcement 
Alfa: Financial control  
Beta: Financial control 
Gamma: Financial control, internationalization by 
utilizing own capabilities and resources 
Epsilon: Financial control from the parent organization 
Effective governance 
Ability to employ 
informal self-
enforcement 
Alfa: Trust, informal communication 
Beta: — 
Gamma: Trust 
Epsilon: Trust, informal communication 
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Relation-specific assets may be considered to be the financial and other assets invested 
by the parent organization in specific venture operations. The duration of safeguards 
was most clearly seen in the cases of Gamma and Epsilon. In Gamma, the long history 
of successful business activities is considered to be a safeguard for continuing to 
support the organization. In Epsilon, the durable safeguards were built on frequent, 
informal communication during the investigation period. When considering the scale 
and scope of the invested assets, the most striking data can be found from Alfa and 
Epsilon. Significant financial resources were invested in Alfa’s acquisitions and in 
Epsilon’s international marketing campaigns. Financial support continued throughout 
the investigation period, while in Beta, there was some support in the early phases of the 
venture life cycle, although the financial investments decreased towards the end of the 
investigation period. In the evidence pertaining to Gamma, no similar level of 
significant financial transactions carried out by the parent organization was found, 
although joint venture operations and some minor stake investments were carried out 
using the parent organization’s resources. 
 
Under knowledge-sharing routines, absorptive capacity in the parent-venture context is 
considered to be the venture organization’s ability to identify and apply the knowledge 
residing in the parent organization for commercial means. Beta utilized the parent 
organization’s partnering models and knowledge and Epsilon got product development 
and business operations support from the parent organization. In Alfa and Gamma, no 
knowledge sharing from the parent organization to the venture was evident. The key 
informants of these organizations saw that the business of the venture was so different 
from the parent organization’s business that there was no strategic relatedness and no 
possibilities to utilize the knowledge as such. 
 
Incentives to encourage transparency and discourage free-riding were found in the 
cross-case analysis. Based on the analysis, informal incentives for knowledge-sharing 
routines seemed to play an important role in the early stages of the venture life cycle. 
Knowledge-sharing in turn facilitated the creation of shared vision. In the cases of Alfa 
and Epsilon, there was clear evidence of intense informal interaction between the 
management of the parent organization and the venture strategists. The actual plans 
were laid out during the strategy process of the parent. In the cases of Beta and Gamma, 
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the level of interaction was not as high. Beta’s initial plans were, to some extent, laid 
down together with the management of the parent organization, but the interaction did 
not continue as strongly later on. Especially in Gamma’s case, the relationship seemed 
to have very few informal characteristics. 
 
Complementary capabilities and resources were more or less utilized by the case 
organizations. All case ventures took use of the reputation, the brand, and the credibility 
of their parent organization; it gave them one intangible asset that independent new 
ventures usually lack. The name was used in partner negotiations, customer and sales 
negotiations, or in marketing campaigns. In the early phases of their life cycle, all of the 
ventures profiled themselves as a unit of the parent organization in their marketing. Alfa 
and Epsilon, however, were quite quick to start parting from the image of the parent 
organization — both of them had a business model that was very different from the 
parent organization’s business and it required an independent image not connected to 
the parent organization’s corporate image and business model. The case organizations 
started to use the parent organization’s intangible brand asset in a different way, 
although each of them found some benefit in the big corporation and its image backing 
the business. This issue came up in interviews for all of the cases. In addition to 
reputation, Epsilon was able to quite extensively find synergies and complementary 
resources in product development and business support. Other cases also took use of the 
business support systems of the parent organization, although the issue did not come up 
as significantly as with Epsilon.  
 
Substantial evidence of organizational complementaries between the cases and their 
parent organization was not found. Some of the interviewees stated that the venture 
deliberately aimed at creating different processes, operating modes and organizational 
cultures from that of the parent organization since the operating environment was 
considered to be different. It came up clearly in the interviews that venturing activity 
must be separate in terms of culture and from the parent organization to make the most 
of the entrepreneurial vision. Most organizational synergies were identified between 
Epsilon and the parent organization, mainly because the highest strategic relatedness 
and Epsilon’s business were built on top of the parent organization’s “core 
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competences”. Beta also continued to operate in quite similar mode to what the parent 
organization was operating in. 
 
Finally, governance played an important role in the parent-venture relationship. 
Governance in this context refers to how the parent organization asymmetrically 
governs the operations of the venture. Self-enforcement versus third-party enforcement 
in the parent-venture relationship is not a relevant comparison for internal corporate 
ventures, since, by definition, wholly owned internal corporate ventures are governed by 
self-enforcement rather than legal contracts. In all cases, this meant financial control 
and, in the case of Gamma, enforcement also came from the venture’s own resources; 
growth was expected to occur though using the profits of the venture itself. When 
considering formal versus informal self-enforcement, the most evidence of dense 
informal communication and governance through trust was found in Alfa and Epsilon. 
A strong evidence of trust was also found in data related to Gamma. 
 
In the cases of Alfa and Epsilon, the support throughout the four-year investigation 
period was very good; the parent organization seemed to be highly committed to the 
plans, even though both of them encountered substantial difficulties in the 
implementation phase. The expected objectives were not reached as planned and more 
support was needed than anticipated. The planned IPO was not performed in either of 
the cases. In the case of Beta, support from the parent side varied more and led in the 
end to significant cut-offs and the closing down of markets and the rejection of new 
plans. Gamma had support, although it operated more on its own resources and there 
was empowerment generated from the trust between the organizations. Gamma differed 
from the other cases as it did not use the parent organization’s resources in a similar 
manner to what the other cases did. Even though the internationalization operations of 
Gamma required financial investments and resources, it was done by decreasing the 
profitability of the unit itself. Gamma needed, however, the approval of its plans from 
the parent organization side; the data analysis shows clear evidence of trust between the 
organizations. It is evident, that the parent-venture relationship enables access to 
tangible and intangible resources and knowledge. 
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Based on the analysis of the parent-venture relationship, I conclude that some of the 
case organizations were clearly more dependent on the parent’s resources and support 
than the others were. I shall call this quality parent-venture dependence and it is defined 
as the level of reliance between the parent organization and the venture under it. My 
analysis suggests that parent-venture dependence relates to the performance and growth 
of the corporate venture. The concept of parent-venture dependence, its meaning and 
determinants, shall be discussed in more detail in the following chapters. 
 
In the category of factors related to the venture organization, I found evidence of several 
different types of characteristics or mechanisms related to the organization that had an 
effect on either the generation of value in the organization or on supporting the growth 
of the organization. Even though my original framework only concentrated on factors in 
inter-organizational relationships, the organizational characteristics and mechanisms 
came up so strongly in the data that they were included in the cross-case analysis and 
theory development. The following types of organizational variables and mechanisms 
were identified in the data: 
• Resource-related: assets, reputation, products and services, IPR, IT systems 
• Knowledge-related: learning, experience, managerial skills 
• Capability-related: organizational capabilities, processes, focus, managerial 
practices 
These themes were further analyzed and relations to inter-organizational as well as 
parent-venture-specific factors were investigated. I will deal with these organizational 
mechanisms in more detail later in this chapter. 
 
The categorization of external inter-organizational relationships proved to be a 
challenging task since the terminology around them is far from being precise. For 
instance, different interviewees in the same organization might have seen the role of the 
other party in the relationship differently, due to the difference of their own task in the 
process and due to the other party having several different roles in the organization. The 
same company may have work together with the marketing department on marketing 
issues and it may also supply technology to the product development department. The 
terminology used around the different arrangements is also sometimes confusing. 
Sometimes the role of the co-operation partner was not defined in any way; it was just 
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loose “co-operation”. For the sake of clarity, I shall use the word “partnership” to refer 
to all types of co-operative arrangements, alliances and partnerships, no matter what 
word was used by the interviewees. In addition to partnerships, joint ventures, 
customers, and merger and acquisition projects were also considered in the external 
inter-organizational relationship category. The different types of external inter-
organizational relationships identified in the data were: 
• Sales partnerships 
• Joint ventures 
• Marketing partnerships 
• Distribution partnerships 
• Production partnerships 
• Technology partnerships 
• Strategic customers 
• Mergers and acquisitions 
In addition to these, the parent-venture relationship was treated separately due to its 
special nature in internal corporate venturing, as described before. 
 
During the investigation period, the external inter-organizational relationships were 
divided between cases as shown in Table 13. The table includes all of the external inter-
organizational relationships that were found in the data that was collected. The year is 
defined according to when the relationship was publicly announced or during what year 
the arrangement was mentioned by the interviewees to be commenced and mainly 
conducted. 
Table 13. Number of external inter-organizational relationships in the cases 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total 
Alfa  0 4 14 18 36 
Beta 0 1 1 4 6 
Gamma 0 0 6 5 11 
Epsilon 0 1 14 3 18 
Total 71 
 
As it can be seen from the table, Alfa had, by far, the largest number of different inter-
organizational relationships. Epsilon and Gamma came in second and third and, 
according to evidence, Beta had the least external partnering or other inter-
organizational activity. In all of the cases, data for 1998 involved only information 
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about the parent-venture relationship and the establishment of venture activities 
internally. 
 
I further investigated each partnership in the light of the evidence acquired about it. The 
first analysis was done based on the geographical area that the partnership had an effect 
on. It was counted on how many markets, i.e., how many country operations were 
directly affected by the partnership. The direct effect was defined as how the inter-
organizational relationship was published (did the press release or announcement 
mention the geographical area where the co-operation took place) and cross-checked it 
against the interview data (how the interviewees described the relationship and the areas 
that were affected by it). For instance, if a marketing partnership was published, the 
number of markets these marketing activities were implemented in was checked. In a 
product development partnership, it was counted on how many markets the produced 
results (technologies) were applied. Indirect effects, for example, using a customer 
acquired in one country as a reference in another country was not considered in the 
analysis as affecting several markets. Table 14 shows the results. 
Table 14. Geographical effect of IORs 
Number of IORs per case One or several markets 
Alfa Beta  Gamma Epsilon 
One  16 3 6 15 
More than one 20 3 5 3 
 
I assumed that the more data available about a certain relationship (documentation, 
interview data, press releases), the “deeper” the relationship was. In a deeper 
relationship, there is more frequent communication between the parties, data over 
several years and a clearer track record that something had been done in the 
relationship. Hence, a rough distinction was made between an inter-organizational 
relationship (IOR) that may be considered to be at arm’s length and an inter-
organizational relationship that involved the development of deeper mechanisms. By 
“deeper” mechanisms, the processes described in the theoretical part of this dissertation 
refer to the sources for relational rents in the framework of the relational view. If the 
only document found about the relationship was the press release or a paragraph in the 
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annual report, the relationship was considered to be arm’s length. Figure 11 shows how 
the different cases were positioned in this analysis. 
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Figure 11. Total number of IORs and number of IORs involving “deeper” mechanisms 
in cases 
As the figure shows, Beta and Gamma had fewer relationships, although these 
relationships also seemed to involve more interaction, whereas Alfa published a lot of 
relationships and had extensive inter-organizational networks, but only a few of these 
relationships actually involved the mechanisms described in the relational view. Of 
Epsilon’s 18 inter-organizational relationships, evidence of deeper mechanisms was 
found in 10; therefore, it had the most data on “deeper” relationships by far. This was a 
rough distinction, but provided information on the general partnering strategy of the 
cases. 
 
I analyzed the interview data on deeper external inter-organizational relationships 
against the framework of the relational view and searched for evidence of different 
mechanisms related to the generation of international competitive advantage. I also 
collected other factors that did not fit under the framework of the relational view. By 
combining the categorization of the factors found from the data, the process analysis 
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and the relational view framework, I intend to build an integrated theoretical framework 
in the following chapters. The analysis is started by investigating the parent-venture-
dependence. 
6.2 Parent-venture dependence 
From the case data, I concluded that the early stages of the venture planning and the 
parent-venture relationship at that time seem to play an important part. Much of the 
support and many of the decisions made in the later stages are affected by the initial 
conditions in which the first plans are created and the first commitment acquired from 
the parent organization. The initial conditions under which the venture is established 
and how the relationship between the parent organization and the venture organization 
is defined seem to have a substantial effect on the mechanisms in the relationship once 
the venture has started its operations. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the venture organizations have a different level of 
dependences on their parent organizations. The parent-venture dependence describes 
how much the venture relies on the resources given by the parent organization and what 
the level of commitment and empowerment between the organizations is. 
Empowerment is defined here as giving authority or power and to promote the self-
actualization7, i.e., providing the freedom to show the strategy realization without 
interfering with the actual strategic moves made. Based on the case data, the 
empowerment can be created for several reasons: because the parent organization does 
not have the required skills to actually understand the business of the venture, shared 
vision, proven track record, etc. In the venture establishment phase, the venture is being 
set up with the parent company’s resources. In the early phase of the venture, the parent 
venture dependence is high. This was the case with Alfa, Beta, and Epsilon, because 
they were built up from scratch during the investigation period. Gamma already had 
running operations and it had its own revenues and profits that it could use to build new 
business. 
 
                                               
7
 definition modified from the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 
 149 
Based on the data analysis, the parent-venture dependence is affected by at least the 
following three factors:  
• Personal relationships between the managers (frequency and depth) 
• Strategic importance of the venture 
• Invested assets by the parent organization in the venture operations.  
 
The data shows that personal relationships play an important role in the corporate 
environment and corporate entrepreneurship requires “political” skills to make it 
possible to realize the plans. Epsilon’s CEO had a strong influence in the parent 
organization side. In 1999, both CEOs (Alfa and Epsilon) reported directly to parent 
organization CEO and in 2000 and 2001, Epsilon’s CEO was a member of the 
management group of the parent organization. The chairperson of Alfa’s Board of 
Directors was also appointed to the Management Group of the parent organization in 
2001. The commitment that has been created in the very early stages of the venture 
operations has a positive effect on resource availability in the later phases of the 
process. Both the frequency and depth of personal relationships have a meaning. Based 
on the data, the high-level managers of Alfa and Epsilon were frequently interacted in 
the early stages of the operations, while the managers of Beta and Gamma remained 
more distant. The depth of these personal relationships can be evaluated, for example, 
based on the shared vision between the organizations. For instance, in Annual Report 
2000, the CEO of the parent organization specifically describes Alfa and Epsilon in his 
review, while Beta and Gamma are not mentioned. Several of the interviewees in Alfa 
and Epsilon mentioned the good relations between the CEOs. 
 
Strategic importance can be considered to be the second determinant of parent-venture 
dependence. I analyzed the strategic importance by evaluating how the venture 
operations were described in the parent organization strategic plans and how they 
manifested themselves in the public documentation of the parent organization (e.g., in 
the description of strategy in the annual report). In addition, the interviewees described 
the relation of the venture strategy to the parent strategy and how tightly these were 
integrated and how the interviewees saw the importance of the venture from the point of 
view of the parent organization. 
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In the cases where the strategy planning of the venture has arisen from the strategy 
process of the parent organization, more resources have been added by the parent 
organization to the venture creation and growth operations. For instance, the 
involvement of key people from Alfa and Epsilon in the strategy planning of the parent 
company increased support from the parent company for internationalization. 
Discussions about the plans also lead to greater appreciation of the strategic importance. 
The more people participate in these conversations, the more they feel energized. This 
was shown to occur with the strategy planning of the cases in the data. 
 
In two of the case ventures (Alfa and Epsilon), the venture creation decision and 
objectives for internationalization were set in the strategy process of the parent 
organization and the strategists involved most heavily in the planning were also the ones 
transferred to the venture organizations to start the business. In Beta’s case, the level of 
involvement in the parent strategy process was not that high; Beta was considered to be 
a part of the parent organization’s strategy, even though its importance did not come up 
in the overall strategy plans of the parent company. In Gamma’s case, the actual 
involvement in the strategy process was quite minimal. Gamma was already an 
established player in its home market and the decision to grow beyond the national 
borders came more from inside the venture, and the growth was achieved by decreasing 
profitability rather than by using the parent’s resources. Epsilon’s growth strategy was 
one of the factors affecting the decisions, although it was not the main reason according 
to informants. The interviewees implied that there were only superficial discussions 
between them and the parent organization and the discussions related to financial issues 
more than the strategy itself did. 
 
The third descriptive characteristic of the parent-venture dependence is the cumulative 
stock of invested assets and resources. The more investments and financial 
commitments are made for setting up and running the venture operations, the more 
likely the venture will be dependent on these resources and the more difficult it is, from 
management point of view, to refuse further investments and consider alternative 
options, when possible. There are different types of investment commitments 
manifested in the data. The most clearly shown are the different financial transactions 
made by the parent organization. In Alfa’s case, the two acquisitions totalled EUR 
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1,147 million. This transaction was paid with shares of the parent organization as 
measured by the stock exchange price on the dates of the transactions. Significant 
financial investments were also made in setting up the organizations of Alfa and 
Epsilon. Beta’s acquisition was valued at EUR 6 million and was paid by the parent 
organization in cash. Epsilon’s international marketing campaigns required significant 
financial resources and Gamma’s joint venture operations were also financed by the 
parent. Besides financial investments, there was evidence of different types of human 
asset investments made by the parent company to their venture organizations. When 
setting up the organizations, most employees were transferred to the new units from the 
parent organization. During the investigation period, Epsilon took use of the product 
development resources from the parent. All of the case organizations utilized the HR, 
legal and IT support resources from the parent organization. In addition to financial and 
human resources, other types of assets were also invested and utilized by the ventures. 
These types included IT systems, facilities, marketing material, etc. 
 
The analysis carried out above is summarized in Figure 12. At any given time, the 
dependence between the parent organization and the venture under it can be determined 
by the frequency of personal contacts between the management of the organizations, the 
depth of these personal relationships, the strategic importance of the venture, and the 
cumulative stock of invested human, financial, and other assets by the parent 
organization. Personal relationships and invested assets are path-dependent variables, 
i.e., one must consider the history of the relationship in order to be able to define their 
value. 
 
parent-venture dependence
personal relationships (frequency and depth)
strategic importance
invested assets (human, financial, etc.)
 
Figure 12. Determinants of parent-venture dependence 
Based on the data analysis, I argue that there is a relationship between the parent-
venture dependence and the performance of the venture. Three of the case organizations 
were suffering losses throughout the investigation period. These three — Alfa, Beta, 
and Epsilon — also seemed to have more parent-venture dependence than Gamma did. 
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Gamma was clearly further ahead in its life cycle and therefore also less dependent on 
the parent company. In the early stages of the venture, however, it is clear that parent-
venture dependence is needed to obtain the operations started and create the critical 
mass necessary for the venture to enter the markets. This also makes the corporate 
ventures more competitive than independent ventures and provides venture managers 
with more strategic freedom to make decisions regarding the business.  
 
The analysis suggests that a certain level of dependence and commitment facilitate the 
competitiveness and performance of the venture organization, but as the dependence 
reaches certain level, the effect is actually negative. Personal trust may turn into politics, 
resources are given without adequate justifications, and strategic importance causes 
blindness in venture management decisions. The venture is not able to grow and 
perform independently and is actually feeding off the parent’s support and its 
organizational development is not optimal from the point of view of performance. 
Hence, this initial analysis suggests that the relationship between the parent-venture 
dependence and the performance of the venture organization is curvilinear in nature. 
Performance refers to the venture organization’s economic cost-efficiency, i.e., the 
organization’s ability to create value for the investments made in it. More value 
generated with less investments and operating costs implies more performance. The 
notion of performance, the ability to create value and the determinants of this ability are 
discussed further in the following chapters. 
6.3 Value creation mechanisms 
The different mechanisms that have a positive effect on the growth and on the ability to 
create value came up in the data. Even though the original emphasis was on 
investigating inter-organizational mechanisms, during data gathering and analysis, it 
became obvious that certain venture characteristics cannot be excluded from the results. 
There were reoccurring themes that came up in the interviews and relations that have an 
effect on the value creation process and thus the rent-generating ability of the 
organization. Therefore, I argue that organizational value can be created inside the 
organization or between organizations, and both options must be considered, when 
investigating the overall value creation ability of an organizational entity. Thus, the 
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sources for economic rents can reside in the organization or in inter-organizational 
relationships; usually both must be considered. In what follows, the results of the 
analysis are presented by first discussing the different mechanisms related to the focal 
organization. After that, the value creation mechanisms residing outside the focal 
organization are put forward. Examples of the mechanisms from the case data are given 
in the analysis. 
 
Organization-focused value creation mechanisms were initially categorized into three 
classes. I provide several examples of resource-, knowledge- and capability-related 
value creation mechanisms below. The analysis is started by presenting different 
resources that created value. 
 
The resources brought up in the data can be divided into tangible and intangible. Of the 
tangible resources, technology and products were considered to be one of the value-
creating resources. In addition, some IT systems or platforms were considered to be 
valued assets. Epsilon built operation centers around the world, where similar 
technological innovations were used and this type of platform was, at the time of its 
building, valuable, rare, and not fully imitable. Gamma had a technological platform 
that served as a basis for its new services. All of these were considered to be value-
creating resources or assets. Related to products and technology, intellectual property 
rights were considered to be a value-creating intangible resource. This was the case 
especially with Alfa, where initially the whole business idea was built around certain 
patents. 
 
In the interviews, some of the often-mentioned value-creating intangible resources were 
reputation and brand. It was seen that operating under the established and international 
brand of the parent organization might give corporate ventures some advantage over 
independent new ventures. The independent ventures must usually go through the 
process of creating credibility and a name for themselves. Alfa and Epsilon were also 
given the right to build a brand of their own, although they used the name of the parent 
organization when initiating contact with international entities. How important 
reputation is was seen in the early stages of the internationalization, when discussions 
with potential partners and customer were initialized. The first customers were acquired 
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mostly through the parent organization’s credibility and name. The question of 
reputation and brand came up with all of the cases. 
 
As a market name already exists, the venture can use it instead of building a name of its 
own. The availability of reputation as an intangible resource saves marketing efforts, 
and according to the interviewees, “opens doors” to discussions with different market 
players. Hence, it may have a positive effect on the success in the entry process to 
certain markets. It requires, however, that the parent organization really does have a 
known reputation or brand in the target market. For example, Epsilon targeted many 
markets where the parent organization did not have any presence and therefore could 
not use the parent organization’s reputation. The parent organization was also 
internationally a small player and not well known globally, and therefore the name of 
the company was known only in certain geographical areas and by certain industry 
players. One might suggest that if the parent organization is truly a global company with 
a valuable consumer brand, the use of the brand might be even more justified, and the 
relation between these two variables is more obvious. Many of the interviewees 
emphasized that the brand of the parent organization has not directly helped them in 
actual customer marketing, although the ventures did have to market themselves in a 
manner similar to any independent venture competing in the same business area. The 
effect of reputation was more indirect; it helped in individual discussions with potential 
partners and suppliers. 
 
When considering knowledge and learning of the organizations, internationally 
experienced key people help to speed up the process of finding the focus for the 
operations and using the resources for the right things in the right order to achieve a 
more controlled growth. Conducting international business requires certain management 
models. Previous experience helps recognize what kind of procedures work and what do 
not. Experience was seen as a valued quality for the managers in case organizations; for 
example, Alfa gained more experience through acquisitions and after the integration of 
the acquired companies, this experience helped to develop the global management 
practices. In Epsilon, several experienced managers were recruited from outside the 
company to improve the competitiveness of the organization. In addition, Gamma 
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increased the number of its internationally experienced personnel once operations 
became more international. 
 
Experience with corporate politics also facilitates the creation of value from inside the 
corporation. In the cases of Alfa, Gamma and Epsilon, several of the key people in the 
organization had already been in the company for a longer period of time. They were 
not new to the practices of decision making, resource allocation, communication, and 
planning in the parent organization. This made it easier for them to link to the necessary 
planning processes inside the corporation. 
 
Based on the data, I argue that one of the roles of management seems be to facilitate the 
acquisition of collective knowledge for the organization, i.e., learning. The object of the 
knowledge depends on the nature of the operations, be it marketing knowledge, 
technology knowledge, product development knowledge, or knowledge about the 
customer environment. Management practices are a factor in creating an environment 
where the organization has the optimal setting for learning and thus for creating value. 
When organizational knowledge about the institutions, customers, technology, and the 
environment abroad accumulates through conducting international operations, it 
manifests itself in two things: products and processes/routines. As there is more 
knowledge on the operational level, it is easier to build up products and services that 
can be sold internationally and create processes that support international business. 
 
Several dimensions can be identified for which the products and services of the venture 
must be competitive. In Alfa’s case, the main product was complex software that 
needed local components (e.g., language versions) and service components (e.g., 
consulting, installation support, and maintenance support) locally. Without this, the 
product would not have been sellable internationally. Being able to create value for its 
customers meant combining different elements into a comprehensive solution. At 
Epsilon, the international orientation of products and services meant local distribution 
and content deals. Since Epsilon’s business concept was targeted at consumers, they 
also needed language support for their local language. Some technology modules also 
had to be tailored to the local partner’s systems, although the technology was mainly 
produced in a few centralized service centers for all markets. This concept was also 
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developed through learning about the markets. In the case of Beta, the problem was 
essentially with the international orientation of the products. In the home market of 
Beta, sales were good and the markets targeted did not differ substantially from the 
home markets. However, it was a general view by the interviewees, that the products 
were not internationally oriented. The same problem existed with some of Gamma’s 
product development. The requirements for internationally competitive products were 
not thoroughly known and some false assumptions were made.  
 
To sum up, based on the analysis above, the value-creating mechanism related to the 
product portfolio required both tangible and intangible resources as well as knowledge 
and capabilities to create value. I suggest that when the organizational knowledge 
accumulates, the compatibility becomes more embedded in the products and services 
from the beginning of the product development process and the costs related to the trial-
and-error process are reduced. As the knowledge of the organization is accumulating, 
the business processes related to the operations are adjusted and optimized to the 
specific markets. Even though the products themselves might be competitive in the 
market, processes such as marketing, sales, and delivery might also still be incompatible 
with the requirements of the market. The organization’s ability to adjust its capabilities 
to the needs of the market-specific inter-organizational relationship is a factor in how 
the competitive advantage can be achieved. Processes are assembling assets in 
“integrated cluster spanning individuals and groups so that they enable distinctive 
activities to be performed” (Teece et al., 1997). 
 
In the growth phase of the venture, where several things are happening at the same time 
and business is growing fast, quick decisions have to be made on the prioritization of 
activities and projects. In the case of internal corporate ventures, where lots of resources 
are available, the role of focus is highlighted. Focus is defined as the directed attention 
or center of activity and attention. In focused operations, the available resources are 
used in the most effective manner in order to achieve the set objectives. With all of the 
cases, it came up at some point in time that there was hesitation about the focus of the 
business and the management of the available resources. Representatives from all the 
cases stated that at some point in time there were too many activities going on and that 
by focusing in a more controlled fashion, faster growth would have been achieved. In 
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the case of Alfa, for instance, no experience with handling acquisitions existed. Still, 
two big acquisitions were made and lots of new resources were acquired. Focused and 
optimal utilization of these resources were lacking. The operations were not organized 
so that their organization has the optimal setting for learning and thus meeting its 
objectives. In the case data, this was particularly visible in the failed projects, where the 
management could not organize the operations so that the capabilities could be fully 
used; for example, this was visible in Beta as a loss of control over the local country 
organizations and as overall confusion about the direction of the business and the 
responsibilities of the different parts of the organization. The managerial ability to 
reconfigure the processes and facilitate learning can be considered to be a value-creating 
capability. 
 
By conducting a deeper analysis on the geographical area of operations related to the 
inter-organizational relationships in the data, I concluded that over half (40 out of 71) of 
the operations and the effects of a certain inter-organizational relationship took place in 
the context of one national market. National borders represented discontinuities even in 
inter-organizational relationships loosely labeled as “global”. This was particularly the 
case with the following types of inter-organizational relationships: 
• Sales partnerships 
• Marketing partnerships 
• Distribution partnerships 
• Production partnerships 
• Strategic customers 
Even when the other party in the relationship was an international or global corporation, 
the implementation and the mechanisms in the inter-organizational relationship took 
place on the national level. Local sales partnerships, customer projects, or joint 
marketing activities produced a competitive advantage or growth in the market where 
they were conducted. Furthermore, the value creation can take place either in the home 
market of the venture or in a specific foreign market. 
 
Home-market-specific relationships enable value creation for the venture by generating 
the resources or capabilities needed for market operations. In the case data, this was 
particularly visible with Gamma and Epsilon. They were market leaders in Finland in 
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their own business area. Gamma could use the profits generated in the home market and 
for Epsilon, the home-market business provided technological capabilities and 
marketing experience. In the case of Alfa, the home market was not really significant as 
it did not offer substantial growth opportunities for Alfa’s business. Beta was not able to 
gain a significant market share in its home market before it commenced 
internationalization, which was also one of the reasons seen by the interviewees as to 
why the case organization partly failed in its internationalization plans. Some of the 
business concepts and governance mechanisms used in the home market could also 
have been replicated in foreign markets. The mechanisms learned by the organization in 
the home market could have been used in international market operations. 
 
Self-evidently, the creation of the competitive advantage through inter-organizational 
relationships in a foreign market has an immediate impact on international growth. A 
secondary effect, through resource acquisition and learning, also exists. Conducting 
inter-organizational relationships in other markets and acquiring local partners may be 
of benefit for the organization when repeating the process in another market. For 
instance, Epsilon had to negotiate a similar deal with mobile operators in each market it 
entered. There were clear synergies and learning effects in making the deals, even 
though they were never the same. Each contract had to be negotiated separately and the 
terms and details were always different. Epsilon was able, however, to use the 
experiences learned from previous negotiations. A similar situation existed with the 
distribution and content partnerships of Gamma. By creating a good concept in one 
market, it was able to replicate the structure in other markets. 
 
The history of personal contacts is emphasized in the implementation phase of the 
foreign market entry, when the potential partners and suppliers are scanned in the local 
area. Creating trust in an international environment is more challenging, because 
cultural factors may play a larger role. Corporate and business cultures may vary in 
different geographical areas and overcoming this cultural barrier may be easier, if 
previous personal contacts exist in the co-operating organizations. Local knowledge 
about the cultural factors also helps to establish trust in the beginning of the 
relationship. Alfa, for instance, relied very much on a local sales force, since the sales 
processes were long and complex and required good contacts in the market. Epsilon 
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also gave the country organizations responsibility over sales. Gamma changed its 
organization during the investigation period so that it had area-based responsibilities. 
Beta had a centralized organization that was responsible for its international operations. 
Many of the interviewees named this structure as one of the reasons for several 
shortcomings in the internationalization process of Beta.  
 
Case data suggests that the capabilities usually needed by the new market entrant are 
somehow related to the local business and the entrant must offer the local player some 
form of complementary that it lacks in order to be able work together. In Gamma’s case, 
finding a local distribution partner was a necessity rather than an option and Gamma 
had to find a way to commit its partners to co-operation in each market. In addition to 
these characteristics, many of the interviewees mentioned the concrete resources or 
assets that must be present for the relationships to act as a vessel for international 
growth. Typically, making a particular type of relation-specific investment requires a 
fixed, up-front cost. Making a commitment to this kind of investment might require 
some other asset to be present. In many cases, this means a paying customer that acts as 
a showcase or as a justification for starting the co-operation. In Gamma’s case, access to 
certain resources, i.e., customers, was mentioned as a reason for starting to work 
together. There was non-physical asset specificity: access to a certain market segment. 
A concrete case of this kind was Gamma’s entry to the North American market. Such 
partnerships were searched for and created when access to certain market resources was 
possible. 
 
Based on the interview data, the utilization of complementary capabilities is affected by 
the commitment of the parties to co-operate. Even though there are complementary 
capabilities, they are not necessary utilized in an optimal way if trust does not exist. 
Together with the proper knowledge-sharing routines, trust and commitment, the 
advantage created by these capabilities is more easily realized. In summary, the 
evidence presented in the case analyses illustrates that the processes and safeguards 
described by the relational view are indeed valid value creation mechanisms for the case 
ventures. 
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In the international context, the inter-organizational mechanisms have an effect on 
several markets simultaneously. The relationships of this type were usually, by nature, 
high-control transactions or co-operative arrangements that affected some of the core In 
particular, the following types of inter-organizational relationships had such qualities: 
• Production partnerships 
• Technology partnerships 
• Mergers and acquisitions 
• Joint ventures 
 
In production and technology partnerships, the results of the co-operation can be applied 
in several markets, for example, a new product or a new centralized production facility. 
Alfa, for instance, had several technology co-operations where new technologies were 
developed and applied together with a partner. These inter-organizational relationships 
produced technological innovations that provided the business with even more of an 
international competitive edge. There were also many attempts to create international 
sales or marketing partnerships, where the parties would have entered several markets. 
Beta and Gamma, particularly, relied on global companies to act as a channel for their 
products and services. Most of these relationships were considered to have failed, 
usually because of the asymmetry between the small venture and the big corporation. 
The expectations related to the relationships were also seen by many of the interviewees 
as unrealistic. Evidence of the sources for relational rents was not found in these 
relationships. 
 
The case data included some high-control inter-organizational transactions that more 
drastically changed the nature of the business in several markets. There were four 
acquisitions, two of them made by Alfa, one by Beta, and one for Epsilon in the early 
phases of business. In addition to these, some of the joint ventures and minor stake (less 
than 50%) investments made by Gamma may be considered to be high-control 
transactions. 
 
The evidence implies that high-control transactions, like acquisitions, may dramatically 
help to speed up the internationalization process, although managing these transactions 
may turn out to be a costly and time-consuming task and the actual value is thus not 
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created. Risk management and the integration experience inside the organization are 
emphasized in these kinds of projects. In particular, this is so if the changes in the 
acquired organization are carried out over a short period of time and the mode under 
which the organization operates is changed. It was found that the more differences and 
changes during the integration project in the following areas of the organization’s 
operations, the greater the risk of failure and delay are: 
• Product portfolio of the organization 
• Market segment 
• Brand and marketing strategy 
• Management practices 
 
By changing the nature of the organization’s operations, more instability, and thus 
employee resistance, was created for the integration process. The concept of trust came 
up as one of the factors facilitating value creation in high-control transactions. The other 
parties in the relationship, the acquired organization, and the buyer or the partners in 
joint venture must have trust in each other in order to reach the goals of the relationship. 
 
The larger and more complex the partnership is, the more important the governance 
structure seems to be. Governance structure and the knowledge-sharing routines in the 
relationship are related. This relation is often self-evident since the formal agreement 
sets many of the limitations for how knowledge can be shared, e.g., intellectual property 
rights. Knowledge-sharing routines, however, can also mean sharing information about 
the development of the relationship, meeting the objectives or generally about any issue 
that needs to be shared between the parties in order for the relationship to be successful. 
The governance structure can either promote or hinder this kind of behaviour and it 
must be adjusted according to the nature of the relationship. By induction, it is 
suggested that the most important quality of the governance model is the fit between the 
governance structure and the objectives of the relationship. In other words, fit means 
that the chosen governance structure must support the goals of the relationship by 
enabling the right knowledge-sharing mechanisms. 
 
To sum up the evidence and analysis carried out in this chapter, Figure 13 describes the 
results of the analysis on a general level. Value creation mechanisms existed in the case 
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data in organizational and inter-organizational context. The resulting factors can be 
related to the resource-based view of the company (Barney, 1991), knowledge-based 
models (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1994) as well as the capability view (Teece et al., 1997). 
The presented inter-organizational mechanisms can be linked to the categories of the 
relational view (Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
 
Inter-organizational
value-creation mechanisms:
Relation-specific assets
Knowledge-sharing routines
Complementary capabilities
Effective governance
Organizational
value-creation mechanisms:
Assets and resources
Knowledge
Competences and capabilities
Value creation
+
Ability
to create
value
 
Figure 13. Organizational and inter-organizational value creation mechanisms 
6.4 Value destruction mechanisms 
What was striking in the case data was the lack of added economic value generated by 
the cases in spite of the value creation mechanisms described in the previous Chapter. 
Even though all of the case companies grew aggressively, had vast stocks of both 
financial and other tangible and intangible resources in use, in addition to being 
extremely well networked, three of the case ventures were not able to generate 
economic profits during the investigation period (Fig. 14). Even though no exact data is 
available for the first two years, at least Beta, Alfa, and Epsilon did not produce any 
external profits during that period, since activities had just commenced and revenues 
were small, while the initial investments in establishing the venture organization and 
market launch were high. Based on my observations of the organizations during that 
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time, it can be said for certain that most of them were consuming a lot of resources. The 
development of economic value added was not linear during 1998–1999, although it has 
been depicted as a dotted line in the figure for presentation reasons. Gamma already had 
business up and running in 1998 and was profitable and did not require any significant 
investments. 
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Figure 14. Economic value added of the cases during the investigation period 
One could argue that economic profits cannot necessarily be expected to be achieved in 
four years and this was how some of the interviewees argued the financial situation of 
their organization. Clearly, however, the parent company expected return on investment 
during the four years of business and the business plans made for the ventures also 
included these kinds of expectations. 
 
It can be concluded based on this simple analysis, that none of the case organizations 
were able to international competitive advantage, as it is defined in the scope of this 
dissertation. The international criterion is fulfilled. All the case organizations were 
competing in an international arena, establishing operations on several markets and 
facing competition from other international or global companies. As competitive 
advantage over other companies can be achieved only by generating economic profit, 
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only one case organization qualifies for that evaluation. Gamma was the only case that 
had economic value added over zero during the investigation period, but even in 
Gamma’s case, the value creation ability of Gamma cannot be considered as exceptional 
or superior. Gamma was able to run its operations without making loss, but creating true 
return to investment was not achieved. Complementing qualitative analysis of the 
interviews, observations and industry reports gives similar results – none of the case 
organizations did not achieve international competitive advantage during the 
investigation period. Most of the interviewees considered that advantages at any levels 
were not generated during the investigation period. There was evidence of some 
learning and capability development mechanisms that were expected to create value for 
the case organizations in the future, but even this was speculation and based on ex-post 
analysis, did not lead to significant changes after the investigation period. 
 
This analysis led me to investigate the factors that prevented the expected value from 
being created. Even though it has been recognized that venturing business is a high-risk 
activity, the parent organization still invested its best resources and extensive financial 
assets in the operations. The analysis of the mechanisms in and between the case 
organizations showed that strong evidence can be found on the elements required for 
conducting successful market transactions. All of the ventures were able to acquire an 
extensive customer base and develop a strong position in their own market segment. I 
conducted a similar analysis on the data as with the value creation mechanisms and 
came up with factors that had a negative effect on the value creation ability of the 
organization. I shall call these factors value destruction mechanisms. These factors shall 
be presented in the following. 
 
My analysis suggests that the value destruction mechanisms can similarly be divided 
into organizational and inter-organizational categories and some of the mechanisms 
existed on both levels. I also propose that value destruction mechanisms cannot 
necessarily be identified by only analyzing value creation mechanisms, i.e., value 
destruction mechanisms are not always a lack of some value creation mechanism. Both 
value creation and destruction mechanisms can co-exist in the organization and only by 
considering both, can the organization’s overall ability to create value be determined. 
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The first types of organizational value destruction mechanisms are various management 
failures. By failure, I refer to a state of inability of the managers to perform a normal 
function. Decisions are either not made or they are made based on criteria that cannot be 
considered rational. This kind of giving away during the decision-making process 
creates commitments that do not add value and cannot be undone by other decisions. 
Two types of basic management failures were found from the data: hesitation and 
hubris. Both types lead to decisions that are not justified or based on rational analysis. 
Hesitation occurs when strategic decisions are passed on by the managers, which can 
happen due to several reasons. There might be a lack of adequate information when 
making the decision, it might be related to power struggles inside the organization, or 
the managers simply do not have the experience to make the decision in the right time. 
In the interviews, hesitation was mentioned in connection with several strategic 
decisions; for example, decisions related to several competing product lines in Alfa and 
the appointments of international project managers in Beta can be pointed out. Hubris, 
on the other hand, has the opposite effect on decisions: they are put forth issues that do 
not add value. Based on the data, hubris seems to be an even more destructive force than 
hesitation is. Decisions involving hubris were, for example, Alfa’s decision to make 
acquisitions at a price that the experts did not recommend and Epsilon’s major 
marketing campaigns in markets where it did not have any significant business 
operations. My observations in the organizations and discussions with other informants 
seem to support this analysis. More detailed examples of management failure and their 
related evidence in the data are provided in Table 15. It is worth noting that some of the 
examples given in the table are more systems of decisions rather than a single decision 
made by the manager or Board of the organization.  
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Table 15. Examples and evidence of management failure in the data 
Decision Management 
failure 
Case Evidence 
Decision on acquiring a 
company 
Hubris Alfa “…We had a due diligence group that went 
to investigate the company and they said 
that it’s not worth buying, but [the CEO] 
wanted to buy it and it was still bought, 
even though the experts said not to.” 
“I did the basic… analysis, the investment 
paper, but if I had known what kind of 
prices we are talking about in the end, I 
would probably never have put the paper 
forward.” 
Decisions related to 
competing international 
product lines 
Hesitation Alfa ”The management of the company didn't 
know which of these the real business was 
and where to concentrate.” 
“...Too big leap was made from technology 
development phase to next, meaning that 
we took too ambitious objectives after the 
first year-year and a half... In Sweden there 
were own products and there was even 
overlap and then the company management 
wondered whether to sell these or those. 
There was also — I would say — 
unintended hesitation in decision-making.” 
Appointment of 
international project 
managers 
Hesitation/hubris Beta 
 
“If you have international business, you 
must have international people… A single 
product manager can terminate the whole 
business by just saying so from Finland.” 
“At one point we did not know at all who 
was responsible for what… When some 
task was allocated to me, some other guy 
went to the trip with the partner without 
informing … and agreed there whatever.” 
Target setting and 
investment decisions for 
new services 
Hubris Gamma “…Internationalization and growth were the 
main issue, profitability did not matter. It 
led to establishing and starting all kinds of 
projects. And the investments were not in 
proportion to the expected returns.” 
“We pushed blindly money and people to 
these electronic services…” 
“There was no holding back. It was like you 
must use more money … Movement was 
more important than the goal.” 
Prioritization of 
activities 
Hubris Epsilon “In practice everything we heard, we 
thought let's do that and this. There was less 
and less priorization and to be able to do 
priorization, we should have done our 
homework.” 
“[Epsilon would have needed] focus, tight 
focus all the time. Focus on a few important 
things and achieve them and then you can 
go to the market faster and start expanding. 
You cannot do so that you do all of the 
things you read from the paper that your 
competitor is doing… You have to decide 
what the three most important things are 
and do them first.” 
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The second type of organizational value destruction mechanism identified in the data is 
opportunism. Opportunism can exist on a personal level or on a group level, e.g., a 
certain team in the organization takes use of an opportunity to increase the group’s 
power and, in some way, prevents value from being created. Evidence related to 
opportunism is difficult to identify in the data, as the interviewees do not openly discuss 
such issues. Evidence of such behaviour could, however, be observed in the 
organizations, and some interviewees did speak about the issue. Opportunism is a 
concept widely discussed in the transaction cost economics literature (Williamson, 
1999) and I will not further discuss it here. Based on the data and on my observations, it 
can be stated that allowing managers and employees to freely act as they see fit 
promotes self-interest seeking and can thus destroy the value created by the 
organization. Some evidence from the interviewees is presented in Table 16. 
Table 16. Evidence of opportunism 
Evidence 
"At one point there was so much money that awful lot of people was recruited, who should be 
competent… Discipline is that kind of word that is not used in here, but we couldn't get these people to 
deliver…” 
“…The capabilities to manage this kind of business are still quite ‘thin’. Here we have such high speed 
of personnel rotation, people change jobs, so that knowledge hasn't accumulated, maybe there has been 
something, but we couldn't take advantage of that in these new cases, because the responsible people 
have been new, and they have learned these things again.” 
“Intelligent people understand that if nobody manages them, they start to act very opportunistically.” 
“We got one very tough class guy, who had been in international business, and about two months he 
looked at this and then politely said thanks and left.” 
“The key positions were taken by the Swedes… There were claims that they had played some games…” 
“It was very typical that we hire one and then he or she starts to hire more people and in the end he or she 
has seven employees in the team and then we do not even know what the first one was supposed to do… 
If we recruit young people, they like to get employees under them. “  
 
Politics and bureaucracy comprise the third category of value destruction mechanisms. 
Political relations are related to opportunism. If it is possible to act very 
opportunistically in an organization, politics and power struggles will spread. As such, 
politics is part of every corporate culture, but when it increases to a level, where 
activities characterized by artful and often dishonest practices, decisions and tasks are 
carried out not for creating value, but for means of self-interest. This kind of mechanism 
leads to value destruction. Bureaucracy, on the other hand, is a system of administration 
marked by officialism and proliferation that freezes the decision-making processes and 
decreases the capability to reconfigure resources and competences. Both politics and 
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bureaucracy were detected in the investigated organizations, even thought substantial 
interview data was not collected on these processes. For example, the internal co-
operation between Gamma and Epsilon was very bureaucratic; the following quote from 
Gamma describes the internal co-operation negotiations: 
There are one’s own challenges from the point of view of the organization. When 
some deal is made, there's [Epsilon’s] lawyers, our lawyers and the corporation's 
lawyers — many times, you think that somebody should blow the whistle… 
It may be assumed that these phenomena come up more often especially in the corporate 
environment than in independent ventures, as they are more common in large 
organizations. 
 
I call the fourth organizational value destruction mechanism collective blindness, which 
refers to a state in an organization shared or assumed by all members of the group, 
where they are having no regard to rational discrimination, guidance, restriction, or are 
unable or unwilling to discern or judge information related to the organizational 
activities or market environment. The signals received from the external market are 
either false or are interpreted falsely. This kind of state can exist inside the organization 
or in a relationship between the organizations and it may lead to management failure or 
other value destruction mechanisms — or, it may simply direct the organization towards 
routines that are not actually creating value. Forecasting the market was the most clearly 
shown form of collective blindness in the case data. Practically all interviewees stated 
that false assumptions about market development were one of the major reasons for not 
performing as expected. My discussions and observations in the organization support 
this analysis. The assumptions were based on overall atmosphere in the market, in stock 
exchanges, the public opinion, market analysts, etc. In other words, the collective 
blindness extended far beyond the focal organization. The origins of such collective 
blindness are often in the macro-economic and cultural environments. From the 
management point of view, it is very difficult to observe collective blindness ex ante. 
Collective blindness can also be the expectations related to a certain technology or to 
the capability of the organization. Relationships between organizations can be based on 
collective blindness and therefore be value destructing relationships rather than value 
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creating. Table 17 summarizes some of the evidence from interviews related to 
collective blindness from the cases. 
Table 17. Evidence of collective blindness 
Case Context 
 
Evidence 
Alfa Adoption of technology “The technology never broke through. There are lots 
of people who still believe in it, that it will come, 
but it has not still emerged.” 
“Our own expectations were that the markets will 
grow on such a pace, that we do not have time to 
waste all the money we get.” 
“There were many issues on unrealistic basis… the 
plans were wild.” 
Beta Market development “Well, our problem was the market. Markets, even 
though they developed fast, they did not develop as 
fast as we thought in the plans.” 
“…There was some incomprehensible illusion … 
about the customer need for the products.” 
“It was that time when there was market growth 
hype … and speed blindness could be seen on many 
fronts.”  
Gamma Co-operation with a partner based 
on the usability of certain 
technology and the customer need 
“They had probably 100 people working on it and 
resources were put to develop it…It was a good 
starting point and it had real potential for success…” 
“At some point when the problems with 
[technology] got into publicity, [name removed] 
decided to postpone this thing, in practice stop it.” 
“The main reason for ending the partnership… They 
didn’t believe that there would be use for the 
service.” 
Epsilon Market development, time-to-
market 
“We thought that we are late in the market… The 
end result was quite much different, we were early.” 
“Everybody believed in it — including the market 
actors — that now we are in a hurry and we must be 
the first on the market… Technology development 
and market development did not go at that pace we 
thought.” 
“We had a strong belief and the markets in general 
had a strong belief that the service business will be 
significant.” 
“The problem was that we were in a new market, 
nobody had information. We tried to trust the 
analytics' reports, what of course should have been 
known that they do not know so much, because they 
never have done that job themselves.” 
 
On the inter-organizational level, in addition to collective blindness, several other 
mechanisms were identified that may destroy value. These mechanisms were conflicting 
interests, power asymmetries and cultural complexity. I shall present these mechanisms 
and the analysis related to them in the following. 
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Conflicting interests are considered to be a contradiction in the motivations of the 
partners to enter and operate in partnerships. There were numerous such examples of 
inter-organizational relationships in the data where the commercial or other interests of 
the co-operating parties did not meet and thus it led to value destruction or zero value. 
Most of the agreed partnerships that did not lead to any real deeper activities were 
terminated due to some form of conflicting interests. Even though all of the necessary 
governance mechanisms were in place, complementarity and required resources existed, 
some form of organizational or strategic change led to a situation were the interests 
conflicted and prevented value from being created in the relationship. Based on the data, 
conflicting interests can, for example, cause an abuse of trust or a lack of commitment. 
 
Power asymmetries are created when the parties co-operating in the relationship do not 
have equal opportunities to use the results created in a partnership. In common terms, 
this is not a win-win situation in the partnership, as either of the parties is actually 
draining value from the other organization rather than both creating it for a joint 
purpose. In power asymmetry situation, the other party is “drifting” and the other party 
actively steers the relationship. I suggest, based on the data analysis and observations in 
the organizations, that power asymmetries are not necessarily linked to the size of the 
organizations, although in the case data, these types of mechanisms exist especially in 
the relationships of large international companies, where the case organization was 
clearly a smaller player and had less power and credibility to negotiate in the 
relationship. In this kind of partnership, the meaning of the relationship is more crucial 
to the smaller and less credible partner. Usually the more powerful partner then starts 
dictating the rules of the relationship or changes the initial agreements during the co-
operation. Power asymmetries can for example lead to contracts that cause more harm 
than benefit to the other party and end up destroying value. Some evidence from the 
case data on different power asymmetries is presented in Table 18. 
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Table 18. Evidence of power asymmetries 
Case Co-operation Evidence 
Beta Production, sales and 
marketing partnership 
with a global actor 
“The question with these big organizations is how 
you get your own product through in that huge 
organization, where they have thousands of 
products… How do you get them to sell your 
product? … The only possibility to success is that 
you have some internal incentive to sell it.” 
“It seems that bigger the company is more 
shamelessly they vacuum you.” 
“In 2000, we tried this co-operation, and it did not 
work.” 
Gamma Sales and marketing 
partnership with a 
global actor 
“We get to utilize their international sales.” 
“That deal was not for them a question for life and 
death. It was more like one additional component 
in their offering, like cross the box, if you want… 
It was just one option among others.” 
“They did similar co-operation with others.” 
“That [co-operation] hasn’t been any use to us, we 
haven’t got a penny from it, never. And they 
[partner] didn’t sell that platform so much either. “ 
“The common business concept just did not fly.” 
Gamma Sales partnership with 
Epsilon 
“We haven’t put much financial investments in the 
relationship… On the other hand, you can ask 
them what happened, all we could do was to 
follow from aside. It did not fly.” 
“That [co-operation] was a catastrophe… Our sales 
people were too lazy and just followed [name 
removed] and waited that they will make the 
deals.” 
“If [name removed] had succeeded, we would have 
succeeded. Our strategy was following them.” 
“The basic assumption has been that where they 
are, we will go there also.” 
Epsilon Technology co-
operation with a global 
actor 
“Their organization is messier than ours – they do 
not know at all what they are doing. We concluded 
that it’s better to go forward alone, they are just 
slowing us down.” 
“They have changed it [co-operation], they have 
gone forward, but they have continuously changed 
it, the unit has changed… It just ended slowly.” 
 
Evidence on cultural complexity is presented in Table 19. There were several cases 
where an international partnership ran into problems mainly because of cultural 
differences between the participants and the peoples’ inability to identify and 
understand the cultural nuances between the co-operating partners. Cultural complexity 
adds the probability of failure in the social exchange of knowledge and can have a 
negative effect on knowledge-sharing routines as well as on the utilization of 
complementary capabilities. It may also hinder the partners’ capabilities to effectively 
govern the relationship. 
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Table 19. Evidence of inter-organizational cultural complexity 
Evidence 
“We stumble into them [cultural differences] in a bad way, even though we are as close as in Sweden, 
even there we simply fail. We are just so different us Finns and the Swedes. Both are probably good and 
professional, that’s clear, but if somebody would even understand that we are different, that would help a 
lot.” 
“There are different cultures and that also means understanding different nuances, what means, when 
somebody says something. If everybody interprets as Finns, it doesn't go like that.” 
“It's easy to say that transferring learning from country to another should have worked better, but all the 
countries were in the same phase and it does not help, when the common language has not formed yet.” 
“In every country we do not have that credibility [as in Finland]… For example in Germany, the culture 
was such… They couldn’t buy anything from us… A French dealer told me on a dinner, that we French 
are proud that we have different wines, food and other stuff, but he couldn’t imagine that he would buy a 
French computer…” 
“Culturally, Finland and Sweden are not as close as one would expect.” 
“In some cases I have felt that the partner has had a view that if we co-operate, we are trying to overrun 
them.” 
“The reason why we can fail as an international company is that the cultural differences are 
problematic.” 
“We recruited lots of Brits there. We run into them [cultural problems], as they did not concentrate on 
the essential issues but instead the concentrated on ensuring their own place in the company.” 
“There was that cultural difference. The Swedes wanted to have massive manuals and the Finnish did 
not.” 
 
To summarize the analysis regarding the value destruction mechanisms, Figure 15 
depicts the concepts that came up in the process. Fundamentally, I argue that the 
organization’s ability to create value is negatively affected by the different 
organizational and inter-organizational value destruction mechanisms described in the 
figure. These mechanisms stem from different sources in the organization, routines and 
in the macro- and micro-environment. 
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Figure 15. Organizational and inter-organizational value destruction mechanisms 
Organizations and partnerships are handicapped due to the value destruction 
mechanisms in them, while the value creation mechanisms add economic value.  
6.5 Interrelations between the mechanisms 
During the data analysis process, it became evident that isolating the mechanisms and 
treating them as single determinants of value creation or destruction does not lead to a 
model that would describe the reality on an adequate level. The phenomena under 
investigation were more complex and there were interrelations between variables that 
could not be described with one-to-one cause-effect relationships. Value creation and 
value destruction mechanisms are related to each other and, over time, some value 
destruction mechanisms can lead to value creation and vice versa. The mechanisms may 
also be dependent on each other; for example, certain management failures might not 
take place without cultural complexity and politics and personal opportunism are 
interdependent, etc. Below, I address the different aspects of interrelations between the 
variables that came up in the data. Table 20 describes the relations that were observed. 
Each of the mechanisms is treated separately. 
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Table 20. Interrelations between mechanisms 
Mechanism Relates to 
Assets and resources Personal opportunism 
Management failures 
Power asymmetries 
Knowledge Collective blindness 
Knowledge-sharing routines 
Personal opportunism 
Politics and bureaucracy 
Competences and capabilities Personal opportunism 
Politics and bureaucracy 
Collective blindness 
Knowledge 
Assets and resources 
Complementary capabilities 
Relation-specific assets Personal opportunism 
Collective blindness 
Knowledge-sharing routines Personal opportunism 
Collective blindness 
Knowledge 
Complementary capabilities Assets and resources 
Knowledge 
Competences and capabilities 
Effective governance Politics and bureaucracy 
Conflicting interests 
Management failures (hesitation/hubris) 
 
Personal opportunism 
Politics and bureaucracy 
Conflicting interests 
Power asymmetries 
Competences and capabilities 
Assets and resources 
Personal opportunism Management failures 
Politics and bureaucracy 
Knowledge 
Competences and capabilities 
Politics and bureaucracy Management failures 
Personal opportunism 
Conflicting interests 
Cultural complexity 
Effective governance 
Collective blindness Management failures 
Personal opportunism 
Assets and resources 
Knowledge 
Competences and capabilities 
Conflicting interests — 
Power asymmetries — 
Cultural complexity Personal opportunism 
Politics and bureaucracy 
Collective blindness 
 
Value creation mechanisms can relate to value destruction or to other value creation 
mechanisms. The first observed example is the organization’s asset and resource base. 
The more assets and resources there are, the more power the organization has and the 
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more likely it is that power struggles, politics, bureaucracy, and personal opportunism 
will emerge. All of the case ventures were given a vast amount of resources to establish 
operations; this also caused an arena for potential power struggles. As another example, 
management failures, such as hubris, might require some initial success and financial 
power to be achieved. 
 
The relationship is similar for organizational knowledge and value destruction. In Alfa, 
there was a vast knowledge base of certain technologies and this lead to a situation 
where the organization blindly believed in the growth of the business based on this 
technology. The growth never realized as expected, though. The knowledge that seemed 
very valuable at the time caused an environment of collective blindness in the 
organization. Knowledge may also be a source of politics and personal opportunism. 
When some of the individuals in the organization possess valuable knowledge, they 
have power, which was visible in the case of Alfa, where many of the early innovations 
of the venture were made by a few individuals. This knowledge led to power struggles 
with the acquired organizations. In addition, the inter-organizational knowledge-sharing 
routines are dependent on the existence of applicable knowledge. 
 
A routine that has been a source of value can turn into bureaucracy if the environment 
changes; therefore, capabilities and competences are also related to such value 
destruction mechanisms as personal opportunism, politics, and bureaucracy. Certain 
capabilities are a pre-requisite for complementarity with other organizations. Through 
routines and reconfiguration, new knowledge or some physical assets can be generated 
as well. 
 
Relation-specific assets and knowledge-sharing routines may lead to personal 
opportunism, as the benefit gained from an inter-organizational relationship is used for 
personal gain instead of the organizational value creation. Complementary capabilities 
might similarly lead to new organizational knowledge or capabilities, for example, 
through insourcing, i.e., when the organizational resources are actually transferred from 
one partner to another. 
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Effective governance prevents opportunism and protects organizations from destructive 
transactions between them, although it might lead to politics and bureaucracy and, in 
some cases, conflicting interests, as the parties in the relationship might not be able to 
conduct the transactions or gain trust due to governance structures. Several inter-
organizational relationships existed in the data, where contract negotiations and setting 
up the governance structures caused friction between the parties. These contract 
structures were, however, necessary for being able to have the relationship in the first 
place. 
 
Management failures create an environment where personal opportunism, politics and 
bureaucracy might prevail. These three themes are very much interconnected and that 
also came up in the data analysis. For instance, there was evidence of situations where 
management hesitation created an environment where politics and personal opportunism 
were more probable. An example of this kind of situation was Alfa’s acquisitions, 
where integration and focus decisions were not made and this left too much room for 
speculation on the focus of the organization. In inter-organizational relationships, 
management failures can affect the creation of conflicting interests or power 
asymmetries. In Beta’s case, hubris (the belief that the one’s own organization is more 
capable than it actually is) led to a co-operation with partners that had conflicting 
interests with Beta. On the other hand, management failures may also create new assets 
or resources. As such, a chaotic situation in the organization might lead to 
reconfiguration of the resource base and thus to capabilities that start creating value. It 
may also lead to new innovations, as some of the members in the organizations are 
unintentionally given freedom and “slack” time. 
 
As stated before, personal opportunism relates to management failures, politics, and 
bureaucracy. Opportunism, however, is not necessarily purely a negative force; it may 
also be a motivating force in creating new innovations, knowledge and thus lead up to 
value creation. Opportunistic leaders might be more driven to lead the organization to 
success. 
 
Politics and bureaucracy mostly destroy value and slow the organization down, 
although they might also lead to a situation where inter-organizational relationships that 
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would otherwise be destructive are being governed more effectively. A bureaucratic 
organization might also be protecting its key knowledge and sources of competitive 
advantage more carefully than a non-bureaucratic organization would; for example, in 
the case of Gamma, politics, and bureaucracy prevented the organization from investing 
in a relationship that might have destroyed more value than it would have created. This, 
however, is speculation as the relationship was terminated and there was no actual 
outcome. 
 
Collective blindness usually leads to a situation where the competitiveness of the 
organization is decreased by decisions based on false beliefs about the market situation 
or development. This, however, might also turn into a new competitive advantage and 
economic profits over time if the environmental conditions should change. Strong 
collective blindness, a “visionary organization”, might turn into a value-creating 
organization, even though the initial assumptions about the market were wrong. As an 
example, the management of Epsilon had a strong belief in the high growth of the 
market. As a result, the parent organization invested significant assets in the 
development of the venture, which was a benefit to Epsilon, even though the 
investments were initially based on false assumptions. Collective blindness in a 
relationship might cause the other party to invest significantly in the co-operation and 
this might turn into a benefit for the other party in the relationship. 
 
There were several examples of cases in the data, where the differences between 
organizational or national cultures led to abuse of the situation for personal interests or 
conflicts about power and decisions. Hence, cultural complexities are related to personal 
opportunism, politics, and bureaucracy. Cultural misunderstanding can also be a source 
of collective blindness; for example, signals given by the local organization of Beta 
about the growth in Sweden were quite clearly misinterpreted in the head office, and 
thus false assumptions were made about growth opportunities.  
 
As a summary, the value creation and destruction mechanisms are interrelated and 
interdependent in complex ways. Simple cause-relationships do not describe the 
organizational and inter-organizational processes adequately. The case organizations 
were not able to gain or sustain competitive advantage during or after the investigation 
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period and pointing out single factors would not explain the phenomenon. However, all 
of the case organizations were growing (in revenues and organizationally) during the 
investigation period. This leads to the question of relationship between the growth and 
value creation/destruction and thus competitive advantage. Based on my analysis, the 
relation between these two variables is not simple. This question is further explored in 
the following section. 
6.6 Relationship between growth and competitive advantage 
Generally, growth is considered to be one of the main objectives for new businesses and 
high growth is seen as a positive thing. When measuring by revenues, all of the case 
organizations were growing strongly throughout the investigation period. Even though 
most of the organizations were downsized during 2001, their revenues grew; in 
particular, Alfa and Epsilon were still growing at a rapid pace in 2001 and afterwards, 
as well. There is clearly a relation between the competitive advantage and growth, but 
the nature of this relationship seems to be complex and requires further analysis. In the 
case of internal corporate ventures, the organizations were pumped full of resources and 
financial investments from their parent company and were able to grow, but not to 
create an international competitive advantage, as defined in the scope of this 
dissertation. Figure 16 describes the problematic relationships between the variables. 
Based on the results of the data analysis, the parent-venture dependence has a positive 
effect on the international growth of the ventures. It may also be suggested, as stated 
earlier, that there is a curvilinear relationship between the parent-venture dependence 
and the performance of the venture and thus with the creation of an international 
competitive advantage for the venture business. Because of the curvilinear relationship 
between the parent-venture dependence and performance, the parent-venture 
dependence leads to value destruction after a certain point in time. 
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Figure 16. Parent-venture dependence and growth 
I shall consider the curvilinear relationship between the parent-venture dependence and 
performance to be valid. In Figure 17, I give an illustrative example as to how value can 
be created through the mechanisms in parent-venture dependence and by increasing it 
with managerial actions and how value is created through the organizational and inter-
organizational value creation mechanisms. Two paths are depicted in the figure. In the 
early phases of the venture, increasing parent-venture dependence facilitates value 
creating mechanisms since more resources and knowledge can be attained from the 
parent organization and the ability to grow provides an advantage over competitors. 
This is the early phases of path 2 in the figure. The organization benefits from a bigger 
sponsor and is able to learn and build up operations more efficiently. If the parent-
venture relationship would not be used, the venture would need to start building value 
from zero; therefore, internal corporate ventures have a clear advantage over 
independent new ventures, particularly early on in the venture life cycle. Path 1 depicts 
the path of a typical, successful independent new venture. 
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Figure 17. Parent-venture dependence and value creation 
As the venture matures, the external market transactions should replace the internal 
parent-venture interaction (moving from path 2 to path 1 before they cross). Keeping 
increased management attention on the parent-venture relationship has a negative 
impact on the optimal value creation strategy. Value destruction mechanisms replace the 
value that would be attained if external market transactions would have been carried 
out. At this point, shifting the management focus onto the external market operations 
would bring more value than putting emphasis on increasing the parent-venture 
dependence, even though relying on the parent-relationship can bring more growth to 
the venture. After this point, the growth of the venture could be called “unhealthy”, 
destructive growth, where the cost-effectiveness of the organization and value are not 
increased.  
 
Based on this analysis, I propose that managing an internal corporate venture in a high-
technology environment requires the ability to maintain the delicate balance between 
the internal parent-venture relationship and the external market operations. In addition, 
being able to understand and control the optimal growth rate for the organization is 
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necessary, even though recognizing the point when growth no longer creates value is, 
by any standards, very challenging. The value creation and destruction mechanisms are 
embedded in organizational activities and analyzing and seeing the whole requires 
objectivity and tools that are not available for managers involved in the decision-
making processes. To summarize the framework of these factors, the synthesis of the 
overall results of the cross-case analysis and theory development is presented in the 
following section.  
6.7 Towards a competitive advantage systems model 
Based on the data analysis carried out in this dissertation, I propose that, at any given 
time, an organization’s ability to create value, and thus attain and sustain an 
international competitive advantage is determined as the overall effect that the 
organizational and inter-organizational value destruction and value creation mechanisms 
related to the organization have. Thus, economic rents are generated when the total net 
value created by the organizations and its inter-organizational relationships exceeds the 
negative effect of the value destruction mechanisms. This proposition and its elements 
are described in Figure 18. The suggested theoretical model integrates different 
mechanisms that either lead to or prevent rents from being created. In the scope of this 
dissertation, international competitive advantage and the determinants of economic rents 
were defined as economic profits (the difference between revenues and costs, including 
opportunity costs). 
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Figure 18. Determinants of an organization’s ability to create value 
In the system depicted in Fig. 18, the value creation and destruction mechanisms are 
also interdependent and interrelated in complex ways. This means that the sustainability 
of the organization’s ability to create value depends on the relationships between the 
different mechanisms and not only on the existence of the value creation and lack of 
value destruction. Over time, some value creation mechanisms may lead to value 
destruction and vice versa. The performance and sustainability of the whole system 
cannot be determined by analyzing single parts of the model, which is why it considered 
as a single entity and changes to it must be investigated over time. 
 
In the context of internal corporate ventures, one of the key forces driving the 
organization to value creation or value destruction is the parent-venture relationship. 
The parent-venture dependence is determined by the personal relationships between the 
organizations, the strategic importance of the venture to the parent, and the cumulative 
stock of invested assets to the venture operations. Even though parent-venture 
dependence creates growth, it only promotes value creation to a certain degree, after 
which value destruction mechanisms prevail.  
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7 Discussion and conclusions 
In this, the final chapter of this dissertation, I discuss the results and their contribution to 
new scientific knowledge. First, the results are reflected in the research questions and 
objectives of this dissertation, after which they are compared with earlier theories and 
previous research. Second, I discuss the implications of the results for the academic 
community and for business management. Third, some limitations of the results are 
pointed out and critical light is also shed on the models developed in this research. 
Finally, recommendations for future research are made based on the experiences gained 
during the research process. 
7.1 Discussion of results 
In this dissertation, the integrated model of value destruction and value creation was 
developed based on a multiple-case study and cross-case analysis. The concepts and 
their relationships in the model were constructed by induction, mostly through the use 
of qualitative data and analysis methods. The focal unit was an internal corporate 
venture. The different organizational peer entities in the inter-organizational 
relationships were, for instance, the parent organization, different market-specific and 
international partners, joint ventures, customers, or acquired companies.  
 
The main objective in this research was to explain how internal corporate ventures 
achieve and sustain international competitive advantage and the main pre-assumption 
was that inter-organizational relationships play the key role in this process. The 
objective was achieved by conducting an in-depth, multiple-case study on Finnish 
internal corporate ventures and developing novel models describing these phenomena. 
Based on the within-case and cross-case analysis, I constructed a list of variables, 
described the relationships between them, and how they are related to each other. 
Examples and evidence from empirical data were presented throughout the analysis 
process. 
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I defined the concept of international competitive advantage according to Peteraf (1993) 
as positive differential profits in excess of opportunity costs (including the cost of 
capital) that are sustained in equilibrium. This made the operationalization of the 
concept feasible and linked the concept to value creation, which means that an 
organization is able to generate economic profit and return on investment. I assumed 
that if the venture is having operations in different countries and in overall, the 
economic value added is positive, it is having a competitive advantage over other 
organizations and hence generating rent. My data collection then aimed at finding 
mechanism that lead to these rents. In addition, I collected secondary, more qualitative 
data to support the analysis of international competitive advantage. 
 
The concepts that came up in the data, and that were included in the model, have been 
addressed by previous works. Some recent research that was not discussed in the 
literature review part of this dissertation, but is relevant to discussions on the results of 
the empirical study exists. I shall carry out this analysis in light of the previous research 
and give pointers to the earlier results in the following sections. 
 
The overall results of this dissertation both complement and contradict the previous 
discussion on the creation of a sustainable competitive advantage. The value creation 
mechanisms and determinants for competitive advantage are in line with the factors 
suggested by Barney (1991), Peteraf (1993), Teece et al. (1997), and Dyer and Singh 
(1998). The contradiction of my results with these studies is that according to the 
findings, the single concepts put forward by the previous research may not be enough to 
fully explain the creation and sustainability of international competitive advantage. 
Based on the results of this study, I propose that both the organizational resources and 
capabilities and inter-organizational value creation mechanisms must be considered 
when determining the ability of the organizations to generate rent. In addition, the 
organization may destroy value at the same time and this phenomenon has not been as 
widely recognized by resource- and capability-based theories. There are some pointers 
to value destruction in the previous literature, for example Moran and Ghoshal (1999) 
referred to bureaucracy as a counter-force to value creation and appropriation. Ghoshal 
et al. (2000) continued this further by suggesting that “when people act only in their 
own interest, the company loses its very essence – what distinguishes from a market and 
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endows it with the ability to create value.” However, these mechanisms were not 
explored in depth nor analyzed in an empirical context. 
 
I observed that the involvement of the venture’s key people in the strategy planning of 
the parent organization seems to increase the support from the parent side early on in 
the venture life cycle. The initial conditions and the processes between the organizations 
create parent-venture dependence, which may facilitate the international growth of the 
internal corporate venture through resource availability. Some previous research on the 
topic of resource availability has been carried out. Dougherty and Hardy (1996) stated, 
in relation to product innovation and getting management committed to new product 
development, that senior managers can initiate the recursive process of changing the 
deep structure of power configuration and everyday action by actively and deliberately 
engaging in open strategic conversations about product innovation; this is supported by 
the findings of this study. The concept of internal fit (Miller, 1992) is also related to the 
relationship between the parent organization and the corporate venture organization. 
According to Miller (1992), in uncertain environments, informal linkages between 
organizations are emphasized. This held true for the cases of this research: those cases 
that had most informal management communication with the parent organization were 
able to get most support. Frequency of contacts between the executives was an 
important factor. 
 
It may be questioned whether the support from the top management of the corporation 
is a good thing. It has been suggested by Augsdorfer (2005) and Abetti (1997), for 
example, that certain types of ventures should be kept secret from the corporate 
management in order to achieve success. This type of “bootlegging” makes it possible 
to create radical new innovations and operations that would otherwise be terminated by 
the top management. In the light of my results, I cannot give definite answers whether 
this is the case or not. It was clear that top management support made it easier for 
corporate entrepreneurs in the cases to get resources for realizing their plans, but 
whether they had to change their initial plans and adapt to corporate policies, it cannot 
be stated. In most of the cases, it didn’t seem so. However, the results are contradictory: 
for example, the CEO of Alfa resigned after disagreements with the corporate 
management. His initial plans were never realized and Alfa changed its scope after 
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acquisitions. Whether these plans would have realized if they were implemented 
secretly and whether the plans were realistic in the first place, it is impossible to tell 
based on my analysis. Based on my results, it can be proposed that it is beneficial to get 
support from the corporate management in the beginning of the venture life-cycle – in 
fact, this is one of the major advantages compared to the independent ventures. The 
venture must then be able to cut this support and “break free” as soon as it’s able to 
survive independently. Otherwise it will become too dependent on the support and this 
process may lead to value destruction. 
 
This concept of parent-venture dependence was found to be essential in the process of 
internal corporate venturing. The logic behind the idea is similar to the concept of 
confidence in partner co-operation as discussed by Das and Teng (1998). They 
presented the construct to be used in measuring the expectations of partners about their 
relationship. The problem of partner co-operation is somewhat different from parent-
venture relationship, although the underlying mechanisms are similar. Based on the case 
data, parent-venture dependence can be created for several reasons, e.g., when the 
parent organization does not have the required skills to actually understand the business 
activities of the venture. It may be considered more efficient if the venture can operate 
independently. The venture may not require actual resources from the parent or it can 
implement its own plans using its own resources by decreasing its profitability. Previous 
research has shown that trust is created from a shared vision and interaction ties and that 
trust and trustworthiness may result in different levels of resource exchange and 
combination (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). Tsai (2000) also stated that the benefits of intra-
organizational strategic linkages can only be achieved if trustworthiness exists amongst 
organizational units; the same applies to this type of relationship. Furthermore, the 
parent-venture relationship complements and integrates the concepts of strategic 
importance and operational relatedness developed by Burgelman (1984a). Operational 
relatedness has been addressed used by Sorrentino and Williams (1997). The result of 
this study complement the conclusions of Sorrentino and Williams: operational 
relatedness does not fully explain the success or failure of internal corporate ventures. In 
addition, relational and economic fit as concepts are related to parent-venture 
dependence (Thornhill & Amit, 2001). While Thornhill and Amit described how similar 
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the organizations are on different dimensions, parent-venture dependence concentrates 
on the state of the organizations being influenced by the subject of another. 
 
Das and Teng (1998) also stated that trust is one of the pre-requisites of confidence in 
partner co-operation. In the mechanism of trust development, personal relationships 
play an important role. As Locke (1999) pointed out, however, placing too strong an 
emphasis on personal relationships and the trust generated through them might lead to 
politicizing (i.e., whom you know rather than what the facts are) the organization’s 
dominant operating philosophy, which is not the desired situation. This was also found 
to be the case with the data analyzed in this dissertation. For instance, politics and 
opportunism were mechanisms that may be created by too much trust. I will explore 
these issues in more depth later on in this section in connection with the literature of 
power and politics. 
 
The role personal ties and the history between the key people in the organization have 
been identified as important factors in the development of any inter-organizational 
relationship (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Gulati (1998) noted that a social network of 
prior ties can promote trust. The interaction between trust and co-operation is also two-
way: trust lubricates co-operation and co-operation itself breeds trust (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998). Where there are high levels of trust, people are more willing to take 
risks in the exchange of knowledge (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Actors in the 
relationship must be motivated to participate and openly share valuable knowledge 
(Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). Trust is not the only source of confidence in co-operation; 
control mechanisms are also needed (Das & Teng, 1998). Trust, as well as the strong 
norms and mutual identification that may exert a powerful positive influence on group 
performance, can simultaneously limit the group's openness to information and to 
alternative ways of doing things, producing forms of collective blindness that 
sometimes have negative or even disastrous consequences (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). 
In trust literature, however, the explicit links between trust and value destruction have 
not been addressed. 
 
Value destruction mechanisms have been addressed in previous literature, but the 
discussion is scattered in different avenues of research. Value destruction as a concept 
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has been addressed especially in the case of acquisitions (Seth et al., 2002; Gopinath, 
2003). Similar ideas were suggested by Goold et al. (1994). They stated that parent 
companies without a strong strategy destroy the value of their businesses. Their analysis 
is mainly based on the stock market price of the investigated companies. In my research, 
the role of strategy did not come up as strongly. In parent-venture relationship, my 
results indicated that more important are the relatedness of the strategies of the parent 
and the venture and the shared vision between the managers of the organizations rather 
than just the strategy of the parent organization. 
 
Management failures have been, to some extent, considered in previous research. Roll 
(1986) was one of the earliest to present hubris as a factor in making decisions related to 
acquisitions. Furthermore, Hayward and Hambrick (1997) studied CEO hubris and its 
effects on the premium paid for large acquisitions. Seth et al. (2002) also investigated 
acquisitions and one of the related factors was hubris. My results are similar and 
complement these studies, although the context of my study also extends to other 
transactions besides acquisitions. Recently, for example Hiller and Hambrick (2005) 
have extended the conceptualization of hubris and the role of self-assessment in the 
decision-making. 
 
In this research, the starting point was that the competitive advantage of corporate 
ventures can be determined without addressing the issue of internal politics of the 
corporation. During the research process, it became evident that these phenomena must 
be considered as well. Politics and its pre-requisite, power, have been addressed widely 
in previous literature and this result is briefly dealt with here, as it was not touched upon 
in the literature review portion of this dissertation. Starting from some of the early 
authors in the field, e.g., Emerson (1962), Pettigrew (1972; 1973; 1985), and Pfeffer and 
Salancic (1978), it has been suggested that power, its sources, pre-requisites, and use are 
important factors in management research. Both the structure and behaviour related to 
this concept have been addressed. It has been recognized that power is context-specific 
and its precise meaning is tied to the situation where power is used (Astley & Sachdeva, 
1984). One of the important views is to see power as an inverse to resource dependence 
(Emerson, 1962; Brass & Bruckhardt, 1993), i.e., “people in central network positions 
have greater access to, and potential control over, relevant resources such as 
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information” (Brass & Bruckhardt, 1993). The resource-based view has been also 
applied in this theory framework (Medcof, 2001). As stated, information or knowledge 
has been seen as one of the sources of power (Pettigrew, 1972) and the results of my 
study directly support this view. Knowledge and politics are related, as are strategic 
resources and politics. When individuals have control over resources or possess non-
substitutable or valuable knowledge, they have power. Where there is the opportunity of 
using power, politics exists. Astley and Sachdeva (1984) identified several variables 
including resource control, hierarchical authority, non-substitutability, uncertainty 
coping, and centrality as sources of power and connecting links to organizational 
politics (Wilson, 1999). In this study, only a few of these were addressed indirectly, and 
the results were similar. 
 
The dynamics of politics has been an area of interest for several authors. Politics has 
been studied in connection with different organizational contexts, with the context of 
change being the most common one. Power shift situations, in particular, have been 
highlighted. “Political theories of organizations highlight the role of executive turnovers 
as an opportunity for realigning the company with its environment” (Ocasio, 1994). 
Links between politics and performance have been explicitly studied by Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois (1988), for example: “The companies with politically active teams exhibited 
slow growth and low profitability” (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988). They also 
suggested that “politics are time-consuming and information-restricting, creating 
communication barriers and inflexibility within a team” (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 
1988). These results support the notion of politics as a value destruction mechanism. 
The results of my study are similar and support the findings of Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois. Previous studies have not, however, linked politics and power very well to 
competitive advantage or other determinants of economic profits. In addition, I suggest 
that political power struggles can sometimes lead to new innovation, even if it is 
unintentional. 
 
Opportunism is a concept put forward, especially in transaction cost literature 
(Williamson, 1999). As such, the results of this study support what has been stated 
about the governance of opportunism. On the other hand, bureaucracy is the other 
extreme of governance, where processes are frozen by too much governance. The issues 
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of governance and their costs have been addressed previously and will not be discussed 
in detail here. The results of this study support the idea that governance must be 
balanced with promoting individualism in the organization and that resources bring 
value only if they are governed in the right way. This theory must also be extended 
beyond organizational boundaries. Similar fundamental ideas have been put forward by 
Madhok (2002; emphasis in original): “Strategic management is about coordination and 
resource allocation both within and across company boundaries.” There is clearly a 
need for “shifting the focus from a bilateral alignment to a triangular alignment between 
the triumvirate of transaction, governance structure, and resource characteristics” 
(Madhok, 2002). 
 
Cultural complexity has been addressed by previous works. Stanley (1981) studied and 
presented different sources of dissent in organization and managerial errors. Cross-
cultural issues were seen as one factor in the process. “It is tempting in turbulent times 
to artificially simplify the environment, by restricting opinions to those favorable to the 
leadership and by automatically omitting alternatives that are unacceptable or 
‘unthinkable’, considering the prevailing doctrine. But such preconditions imposed by 
paradigmatic blindness increase the likelihood of second-rate decisions” (Stanley, 
1981). Morris et al. (1994) considered the special case of individualism versus 
collectivism as one of the dimensions in cultural differences in corporate 
entrepreneurship. Cultural complexity as a concept has been widely discussed in other 
managerial literature streams8, although its explicit links to value destruction have not 
been considered in connection with strategy literature. In entrepreneurship literature, 
Dougherty (1992) had very similar results as I did regarding cultural complexity. She 
called it different thought worlds of organizations and it was seen as one of the barriers 
for successful product innovation. 
 
During its life cycle, the venture is changing of business focus according to the changes 
in the local environment or because of realizing new business opportunities. This is of 
course required from the entrepreneurial strategies that the ventures lead (Mintzberg & 
Walters, 1985). There has to be room for adaptation, since the planning phase has been 
carried out with inadequate information about the environment and the future 
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development of the business. In the previous literature on venturing, there have been 
several different suggestions on why corporate ventures fail. My results support these 
studies. Campbell et al. (2003) stated that “the greatest cause of corporate venturing 
failure is companies’ inability to define which model their venture is supposed to be 
following.” I am suggesting that there should be room for adaptation and changing the 
organizational and operational forms and focus, as long as the overall value creation 
system is considered. In the early phases of the venture, the right balance and focus 
cannot be immediately found. It might even be beneficial to search different directions 
in order to avoid the mistakes in a later phase. Ahuja & Lambert (2001) suggested that 
learning traps are one of the main reasons why organizations are not able to create new 
business through innovation. Learning as a concept was also addressed by McGrath 
(1995). That is one of the few studies were both successful and failed corporate ventures 
have been studied in particular. As a conclusion, learning from disappointment was 
suggested as one of the processes separating success from failure (McGrath, 1995). The 
focus on failure was continued in McGrath (1999), where real options theory was used 
to explain corporate venturing failure. However, McGrath (1999) did not investigate the 
processes inside the focal venture organization to explain failure, as was done in this 
dissertation. Chesbrough (2000) put forward the comparison between private capital and 
corporate ventures and proposed that mimicking private ventures is one of the reasons 
why corporate ventures fail. The results of this dissertation are partly similar – the case 
ventures which resembled independent ventures the most, were the cases were least 
success in economic terms was achieved. The management of these ventures was 
considering parent organization more as a financial investor than a possible source of 
advantage. 
 
In summary, the sources of value destruction were not as explicitly and widely 
investigated in previous studies as they were here. In addition, the investigation of how 
these mechanisms relate to the competitive advantage and growth of organizations has 
not been done as widely as here. The measures and qualitative analysis methods that I 
used were not used in the previous studies. In an internal corporate venturing context, 
this kind of thorough analysis of different mechanisms has not been carried out.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
8
 Cf. Sackman (1997) or Browaeys & Baets (2003), for the analysis of the concept 
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I am proposing that the model put forward here describes a novel phenomenon and a 
paradigm shift in management research. I believe that the underlying reasons for the 
phenomena described in this dissertation are due to an increase in complexity and 
abstraction level in modern business transactions. During the last few decades, the 
organizational forms, arrangements, and the nature of work have changed dramatically 
and this has also shown us what approach should be taken with the organizations and 
the different phenomena surrounding them. Even though the basic economic systems 
are still the same, the development of Western economy as well as the advances in 
computing and global networks have created ecosystems that are void of simple 
problems. Understanding organizations requires understanding large systems of systems 
and the analytic isolation of simple problems from these systems does not add value; 
integrative approaches must be taken.  
 
The abstraction level of management theories has increased as the abstraction level of 
work itself has increased. From such concrete concepts as products and production, we 
have moved on to services and resources and then on to knowledge and learning. 
Finally, we have put forth such high-level “meta-constructs” as dynamic capabilities or 
social capital. These concepts offer more explanatory power, although, at the same time, 
their definitions, operationalization and measuring create the challenge. This 
development has also added the elements of strict categorization and cliques to 
management science. We must be able to choose the theoretical school we represent and 
not cross over to the other side. I believe that management science is at a crossroads, 
where either we will find insight in the new approaches or we will be lost in endless 
debates about the applicability and nature of our science and the orthodox way of the 
scientific method. 
 
This dissertation has, for its part, attempted to create an integrative understanding of a 
phenomenon and make contributions to the competitive advantage theory. The 
contributions of the work are discussed in the next section. 
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7.2 Contributions 
As Parkhe (1993) stated, “if the most basic goal of scientific research is deeper 
understanding through theory development, then social scientists must be more flexible 
with respect to their choice of technologies (methods) in the service of that goal”. 
Furthermore, as noted by Numagami (1998), “the processes of explanation building 
through hermeneutics and syntheses will encourage reflective dialogue among 
professionals and researchers, both of whom are engaged in the making of a society”. 
One objective of this dissertation is to take part in this dialogue using a multiple-case 
study method. 
 
According to Whetten (1989), “the theorists need to learn something new about the 
theory itself as a result of working with it under different conditions” in advancing 
theory development. The question lies in whether or not the models developed in the 
scope of this dissertation constitute a “theoretical contribution”. By considering the 
different criteria listed by Whetten (1989), I intend to address this issue. The first 
building block of theory is the “what”, to have the factors logically being part of the 
explanation of the phenomena in question (Whetten, 1989). Parsimony and 
comprehensiveness can be considered the two main criteria of a good answer to the 
question of “what”. By just adding or deleting factors from an existing model, a good 
contribution is not achieved (Whetten, 1989). It has been suggested that “theory 
development starts with guesses and speculations and ends with explanations and 
models” (Weick, 1995). In this dissertation, I started by reviewing the existing models 
and using them as my “first guesses” on how the investigated phenomenon should be 
explained, and based on empirical data, ended up with a model that did not resemble the 
initial “guess” so much. The variables and the mechanisms developed in this 
dissertation were constructed by induction from the data, which is one of the main ideas 
of theory-building case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989). I believe that by reviewing a wide 
body of previous literature and objectively presenting the cases and the analysis, I was 
able to show that the variables offered by the current theories do not fully explain the 
phenomena in question. 
 
The second building block for theory is the “how”, i.e., the relationships between the 
variables in the model. Lists of variables are not a theory; a theory must explain how 
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and why variables come about and how they are connected (Sutton & Staw, 1995). With 
“how”, causality is typically added to the model (Whetten, 1989). In the scope of this 
dissertation, the main “how” connections were the relationships between the value 
creation and destruction mechanisms and the organization’s ability to create value and 
thus attain and sustain an international competitive advantage. In addition to this, the 
“how” mechanisms between the parent-venture relationship, growth, and value creation 
were explored. Compared with previous literature, the relationships between parent-
venture relationships, the determinants of competitive advantage, and growth have not 
been addressed and it is proposed here that these relationships constitute a contribution. 
 
The third building block of a good theory is answering the question of “why”. Why are 
the phenomena in question happening and why are the variables of the model related 
each other as they are? “This rationale constitutes the theory’s assumptions — the 
theoretical glue that welds the model together” (Whetten, 1989). Describing the “why” 
of a theory is, however, also the most challenging question, as it requires looking 
beyond the surface of the concepts and the causalities. Answering “why” requires that 
the phenomena’s context and the changes in the larger systems around the research 
questions be understood. In this dissertation, the “why” was addressed by describing the 
context and the environment of the case organizations. In addition, considering the 
different motivations as to why managers act the way they have in the cases and why 
some of the mechanisms found have emerged in the phenomena comprise the “why” 
discussion.  
 
The “why” question is also addressed by proposing that the ability to create value must 
be a system were interrelated mechanisms act. This system cannot be broken down and 
analyzed in pieces. The tentative theoretical model developed in this dissertation is 
partly answering to the “why” question by explaining why some organizations are not 
able to create or sustain economic rents. By extending the existing theory on 
competitive advantage, it can be stated that this dissertation addresses the question why 
the current theory does not explain the phenomena in some specific cases. This 
dissertation partly answers the question “why do some organizations fail to achieve or 
sustain international competitive advantage?” However, this was not an original 
research question for this thesis. This same issue is addressed by the discussion on the 
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interrelation between the variables – even though it is not explicitly stated in that part of 
the thesis. “Why” question is then left for the reader to assess, as theory is usually built 
on research problems that are “how” or “what kind of” questions. This holds true for 
this dissertation as well. Some further critical light in shed into the treatment of “why” 
question in section 7.4 analyzing limitations of this research 
 
The last of the building blocks for theory are the “when”, “who” and “where” questions. 
These are the temporal and contextual factors that “set the boundaries of 
generalizability, and as such constitute the range of the theory” (Whetten, 1989). I 
address these issues in more detail in the discussion on limitations in section 7.4. 
 
As a concluding remark on the theoretical contributions of this study, constructing a 
theory is a social process. The contributions of theory-building studies can ultimately be 
judged only after they have been published and time has passed. I can only self-assess 
the concept I have created in this study, and this kind of analysis is not comprehensive 
from the point of view of determining the true contributions of this dissertation. 
“Theory is created by its readers and writers – it is then recreated by the authors who 
employ it” (DiMaggio, 1995). 
 
The scientific contributions of this dissertation can be divided into four categories:  
• Contribution to the discussion on the determinants of a sustainable competitive 
advantage in resource- and capability-based research streams 
• Synthesis of the units of analysis in strategy research  
• Analysis of the relationship between the creation of international competitive 
advantage and international growth 
• Investigation of these phenomena in an internal corporate venturing context 
Each of these categories is discussed below. 
 
First, my starting point for developing this theory on the determinants of an 
international competitive advantage was the relational view developed by Dyer and 
Singh (1998). Thus, this study continues the line of research that argues that 
mechanisms in inter-organizational relationships may offer alternative explanations of 
competitive advantage and growth for resource-based views or industry structure views 
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(Dyer & Singh, 1998; Doh, 2000; Donada, 2002; Douglas & Ryman, 2003). These 
explanations and their links to the other alternative or complementary views were 
explicitly investigated in this dissertation. During empirical research, evidence of value 
destruction mechanisms was found. According to the findings of this dissertation, the 
creation of superior economic value and thus, competitive advantage, cannot be fully 
explained by organizational or inter-organizational resources and capabilities. The 
results of this study complement and continue discussion on “creative destruction” 
addressed by Moran and Ghoshal (1999). They suggested that “an organization that is 
not adequately enabling and motivating new possibilities is more likely to witness its 
own decline – a destruction of its own economic structure that will have been induced 
from within” (Moran & Ghoshal, 1999). In the empirical part of this dissertation, such 
decline processes were explicitly described and analyzed in the scope of internal 
corporate ventures and high-technology environment. In spite of any valuable, rare, 
non-imitable, and non-substitutable resources (Barney, 1991) that an organization or 
network may possess, the organizations might fail to create value and to sustain a 
competitive advantage. In spite of the managers’ ability to “integrate, build and 
reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing 
environments” (Teece et al., 1997) or the processes by which managers alter their 
resource base (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000), the organizations may not locate a 
sustainable competitive advantage. Even though partnerships and other inter-
organizational relationships include such mechanisms as complementary capabilities, 
relation-specific assets, effective governance, and knowledge sharing routines (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998), they may still fail and not create value. I argue that, in addition to the 
determinants of value creation and capture, the determinants of value destruction and 
the factors that hinder value from being created and captured must be considered. Both 
parts of the system are equally important and also interrelated in complex ways. 
Organizational and inter-organizational mechanisms may or may not lead to competitive 
advantage, and this process cannot be fully understood by investigating certain types of 
value creation and capture mechanisms since the value system must be considered as a 
whole. This dissertation has, on its part, pointed out those mechanisms that may define 
organization’s inclination towards value creation and appropriation or destruction 
(Moran & Ghoshal, 1999). I recognize that this is only a part of the overall market 
process and that from a larger perspective, the organization is forced to surrender the 
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created value to the market, as Moran and Ghoshal (1999) have described in their 
article. The results of this dissertation take a point of view of the venture manager’s and 
the contributions lie in that are. Therefore, the wider context of society’s value process 
is not discussed here. 
 
The second contribution relates to the units of analysis in determining the competitive 
advantage of organizations. Based on the results of the empirical analysis in this 
dissertation, I propose that both organizational and inter-organizational mechanisms 
must be considered parts of the value system that creates a competitive advantage for an 
organization. Observation of the phenomena beyond the boundaries of the organization 
creates the overall understanding of the organization’s ability to create value and the 
inability to prevent value from being destroyed. The results contribute to the discussion 
on the units of analysis in strategy research and complement the advancing theory 
development carried out by the likes of Williamson (1979; 1985; 1999), Barney (1986; 
1991; 2001), Peteraf (1993), Teece et al. (1997), Dyer and Singh (1998), and Madhok 
(2002). These results are supported by earlier research on power and politics, although 
these mechanisms have mostly been treated as having a purely negative impact on the 
future company performance or growth in that literature, as well. My results suggest 
that there might also be some relationships to value creation mechanisms. 
 
Third, the relationship between growth and value creation/competitive advantage is not 
obvious. As suggested by Ackoff (1999), growth is not always the right measure for 
organizational performance and success; it may be — or sometimes even should be — 
replaced by the concept of development instead. In addition, organizational decline 
should also be considered (Whetten, 1980). This view has been supported by the most 
recent research of Ray et al. (2004), where it was suggested that, in some circumstances, 
performance should be replaced by the effectiveness of business processes as the 
dependent variable, when using a resource-based view as the theoretical approach. I 
argue that using EVA as the main dependent variable also captures the effectiveness of 
the business processes. 
 
Fourth, the contributions described above were based on an investigation in an internal 
corporate venturing context. The special relationship between the parent and the venture 
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was explored and the theoretical concept of parent-venture dependence was introduced 
to describe the reliance between these two organizations. The data collected for this 
research includes unique information about four corporate ventures operating under one 
parent organization. The cases represent different theoretical polarities and thus offer a 
laboratory for extensive multiple-case study. I carried out qualitative interviews with 
key informants in the case ventures and collected secondary data from archives and 
public sources. Obtaining access to this kind of data is always a challenging task for a 
researcher. There is very little academic literature on the internationalization and 
performance of corporate ventures in particular. Few deep-scanning studies have been 
carried out on the inter-organizational relationships of corporate ventures; perhaps due 
to the fact that it is fairly difficult to obtain data from them. I was able to utilize my 
position as an insider in the organization to observe the cases. Organizing the data into a 
database and applying it for scientific research can be considered to be a contribution in 
itself. 
7.3 Managerial implications 
Several important implications for business management can be found from the results 
of this research. Some directions can be set from the point of view of corporate venture 
strategists and corporate entrepreneurs as well as the management of corporations that 
plan the establishment of new international corporate ventures. 
 
The relationship between the parent organization and the venture itself is of crucial 
importance. The venture will never be successful at any level without some support and 
commitment of the parent organization. On the other hand, too much support will 
destroy value and effectiveness. When considering the process of new business 
planning and corporate venture establishment, the importance of the strategy-planning 
phase cannot be overestimated. Corporate entrepreneurs must be deeply involved in the 
planning process and in setting the early goals of the venture business. It can also be 
recommended that the plans be made and presented at the highest level of the 
corporation strategy process, if the potential of the venture is deemed significant. The 
more sharing of the venture strategy and visions there is on the corporate side, the more 
the parent organization can commit to the goals set for the venture. 
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Corporate managers should try to understand the corporate entrepreneur’s point of view 
and the plans made for the venture. Extensive knowledge of the operational business is 
not necessary, although no real trust can be generated between the organizations if the 
general plans are not understood well enough. A shared vision helps in discussions 
between managers. The new venture business is usually very different from the 
corporation’s base business and daily operations. Making this fact clear for the 
corporate managers helps in the dialogue. Understanding the probability of success and 
risks involved in internationalization projects greatly helps in general strategy planning 
and forecasting. 
 
Corporate ventures usually “start big”, i.e., the organization does not grow organically 
during the early phases of the business. There are no opportunities of spending years 
learning, trying different things, and growing together with the market. The market 
potential must be big to begin with for corporate management to be interested in it. A 
lot of resources are gathered together and the business is expected to quickly grow to 
significant proportions. Because the time span for learning is shorter, experienced 
managers in key positions should be preferred over inexperienced ones. Experience also 
helps to find the focus in a shorter amount of time. The focus of operations is an 
important factor. By focusing operations, optimal learning and thus, the optimal growth 
rate can be achieved. 
 
What was surprising in these findings, from the point of view of venture managers, is 
how few of the partnerships that were aimed at enabling new market entry actually 
succeeded in achieving the objectives set for them. Usually, the reality was quite far 
away from what had been planned. Resources and time were wasted on relationships 
that did not benefit the business of the venture organization at any level. Even though 
partnerships are usually seen as an “easy”, “fast” and “low-risk” way of expanding 
beyond national borders, risk management should be emphasized when using this kind 
of strategy. There were very few actual success stories where an inter-organizational 
relationship had significantly helped with new market entry. Partnerships also require 
very versatile competences from the venture side in order to be successful. Legal, 
cultural, market-specific, and economic competencies are essential in the partnering 
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process. In addition, personal ties and social networks help in creating successful inter-
organizational relationships. By facilitating the right climate in the relationship as well 
as ensuring that knowledge is shared and the capabilities generated in the relationship 
are utilized, the probability for success increases. With these factors, the nature of the 
relationship is not really essential as the same issues come up in every type of inter-
organizational relationship. The reasons for failure are usually the same on the high 
level, regardless of the type of partnership. These reasons include lack of market 
understanding, trust, communication, complementarity, or governance. 
 
The promotion of active follow-up for bottlenecks, blind spots, and weaknesses, both 
inside the organization and between organizations should be carried out. The managers 
should be encouraged to actively bring up problems and proactively follow the 
challenges faced by their organization. Self-assessment has been suggested to improve 
the quality of strategic decision-making and reduce management failures caused by 
hubris (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005). Identifying politics, opportunism, or cultural 
problems is, of course, very challenging due to the subjective point of view of how 
these issues are considered. Usually, the value destruction mechanisms are embedded 
deeply inside the organizational culture or routines. This does not mean that 
identification and removal of problems should not be attempted in any case. The 
usefulness of finding blind spots is obvious. Even external auditors for this kind of 
activity could be considered. Usually, objective outsiders can see the organization's 
problems more clearly, thus, helping to create more effective operations. Again, the 
problems of subjectivity arise. It is difficult, if not impossible, for management to turn a 
critical eye on themselves and consider their own actions as the problem, if this is the 
case. In addition, for the external auditors to bring up these types of problems to the 
people who have hired them would be a surprise. 
 
Finally, new business planning in a high-technology environment is always a high-risk 
activity. Even the best plans may fail due to reasons that could not have been foreseen. 
When considering the nature of high-technology environments, the best possible 
predictions by experts are always well-educated guesses. The environment is always 
subject to changes and unexpected surprises. Markets are highly unpredictable and 
complex. The management should avoid making simplifications about the 
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organizational processes as well as about the operating environment. The operations 
should be planned so that, in the face of environmental changes, the venture can also 
change and adjust its objectives to match the new situation. 
7.4 Limitations 
In terms of external validity criteria, case studies are always limited in their statistical 
generalizibility (Numagami, 1998). The assumption in this dissertation has been that the 
quality of research insight is not necessarily measured by any external criteria. The 
objective of this study has not been to generate an invariant law or theory, but to 
contribute to the reflective dialogue among researchers and professionals. The criteria of 
nomothetic research are used, but the theory generated does not constitute to an 
invariant law. It simply shows similar patterns over a variety of social groups, thus 
triggering the question as to why these patterns exist. The epistemological position of 
this dissertation is that the knowledge and understanding gained are inevitably seen as 
being relative and specific to the immediate context and situation from which they are 
generated (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). Nonetheless, the results provide insightful and 
significant knowledge about the investigated phenomena. For professionals, it offers an 
opportunity to compare the developed theoretical models with their own organizational 
practices and strategies. It is left to the reader to judge whether or not the results of this 
dissertation are applicable in other contexts. The process of generalizing is not a 
mechanic one; it is always dependent on the subjective judgment of the individual 
applying the results.  
 
The data used in this dissertation included ventures operating under one parent 
organization and originating from one home market. This is a limitation that must be 
taken into account when considering the results. Even though the ventures were 
substantially different in the ways they operated, their business focus, and their 
customer base, they all originated from the same parent and same geographical area. 
The number of cases sets also some limitations to the results. Even though four cases 
have been previously used in multiple-case studies (cf. Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; 
Abetti, 1997; Andersson, 2000; Coviello & Martin, 1999; Chetty & Campbell-Hunt, 
2003) and according to Eisenhardt (1989), the number of cases should be between 4 and 
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10, using only four organizations might give a limited picture of the phenomenon. The 
applicability of the results for other markets and environments might be limited. The 
industries where the case ventures operated are telecommunications and IT-related. The 
applicability of the results in less dynamic and traditional industries cannot be assured. 
In environments where the macro variables, e.g., the number of companies or the 
growth rate of demand, are completely different, the theoretical frameworks developed 
in this dissertation might not be usable. 
 
When working with mostly qualitative data, the effects of possible bias and 
interpretation must be considered. The interpretation and analysis of data has been 
carried out by the researcher and is based on the subjective judgment of one individual. 
Replicability of this kind of analysis can always be questioned. On the other hand, 
replication has not traditionally been seen as appropriate when the goal is a new theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The phases of the analysis and the data that it is based on have been 
presented in this dissertation in as detailed a manner as possible. The original data has 
been archived to make it possible for other researchers to investigate it. The data was 
collected mostly after the events had taken place, so there is also a chance of 
retrospective bias by the interviewees. The effect of wrong recollection by the 
interviewees has been minimized by using several and different types of interviewees in 
the cases and by backing up the interview data by secondary archival data. In addition, 
being able to observe the organizations as an insider has made it possible for me to 
check and observe the discussed events more closely. This way, I am able to be more 
assured of their authenticity. 
 
Using international growth as one of the variables sets some limitations for the results 
of this research. It must be noted that not all corporate ventures or ventures pursue 
internationalization nor is it even suggested that they should. Expanding to new markets 
is only one of the many different motives for corporate entrepreneurship (Zahra, 1991). 
The results of this research are only applicable to organizations that have international 
growth as their objective and establish operations in foreign markets. Venture 
organizations may develop and be successful without this kind of growth and operate in 
areas where competition is not truly international. The purpose of this study, however, 
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was to investigate an explicitly high-technology environment, where the competition is 
always assumed to be international. 
 
This dissertation aims at finding mechanisms that affect the success of the international 
strategies of internal corporate ventures. Thus, the point of view is fairly one-sided, that 
of the venture manager’s. In general, studies where the objective is to answer one 
focused research question and where some factors are highlighted over others give a 
limited, simplified picture of the real world. As Ackoff (1999) wrote, “problems are 
abstracted from systems of problems, messes. Messes require holistic treatment. They 
cannot be treated effectively by decomposing them analytically into separate problems 
to which optimal solutions are sought.” This is also true for the results of this 
dissertation. This dissertation aims at providing an answer to a simplified problem in an 
artificially simplified, isolated environment. Even though the treatment of the problem 
is the integration of the different aspects of previous research and it utilizes different 
theoretical views, the models created do not completely explain the complex social 
phenomena they are describing. This leads to a somewhat limited analysis of the “why” 
question of the theory as described by Whetten (1989). Parts of the underlying motives 
and history remain hidden by the even most thorough and careful collection and 
analysis of data, and hence this kind of treatment of problems leaves the “why” question 
only partly answered. That can be considered as a shortcoming for this research. The 
complexity and unpredictability of reality, social behaviour, and human mind always 
produce systems, where theories can offer explanations only to a certain point. This fact 
has to be accepted by management scientists as well as any social scientist. 
7.5 Directions for future research 
There are several interesting avenues of research that could be taken based on the results 
of this research. The context in this study was Finnish internal corporate ventures. The 
generalizibilty of the results could be expanded by doing similar case studies in 
somewhat different settings. Extending the suggested tentative model in different 
environments would be the next step for developing the result further. The target of 
future research would be finding different cases and testing whether the same processes 
and factors exist in these environments; for example, investigating internal corporate 
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ventures in business cultures that are completely different than the Finnish markets 
might produce interesting results. In Japanese or American corporations, some 
extensions or differences to the presented framework might come up. This kind of 
research might also shed more light to the “why” question of the theory. 
 
I have also partly suggested in this dissertation that some of the models and the 
described concepts would extend beyond the context of internal corporate ventures. I 
have spoken about the organization’s ability to generate value on a general level, even 
though I have investigated the specific case of corporate ventures. Even though I believe 
that the results can be extended to other contexts, this should be verified by 
investigating other organizational forms. I would propose that doing similar studies on 
independent ventures and non-venture organizations would add value to the results of 
this study. 
 
Because I worked mostly with qualitative data, none of the concepts that were observed 
in the data during the empirical research were explicitly measured, in the quantitative 
meaning of the word. Investigating how to operationalize, e.g., collective blindness, 
bureaucracy, or politics would be the next step. As these concepts are fairly abstract and 
embedded in human behaviour, finding suitable ways to measure them would 
complement the results of this research. I propose that this kind of research should be 
carried out to further develop the findings of this dissertation. I am, though, skeptical 
about even attempting to measure concepts that are abstract and context-specific. Some 
of the mechanisms studied in this research are, in my opinion, systems that cannot be 
fully explained by analysis and quantitative measurement. 
 
All in all, more studies on cases where value was not created should be pursued. When 
the creation of competitive advantage is investigated, the sample should always include 
organizations that have not succeeded in creating value. Value destruction mechanisms 
and reasons for failure should be more thoroughly explored, since the results of this 
study suggest that they can co-exist in an organization. Measuring and concentrating 
only on “success” factors or value creation factors does not produce a comprehensive 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms. 
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The interrelations and dependencies between value creation and destruction should be 
studied further. It would be valuable to carry out research on organizations that have 
been able to turn their operations from making losses into profitable and vice versa. 
Uncovering the elements in this kind of process would develop the model put forward 
in this dissertation and further, clarify the “why” question. The findings in this 
dissertation touched these issues only superficially, and more research is needed to 
identify the mechanisms and relations between them more in detail and in different 
contexts. 
 
Finally, more integrated in-depth studies in different environments should be pursued. 
Combining different theories and views to obtain a more comprehensive understanding 
of the mechanics and factors behind the phenomena is recommended. In my opinion, 
crossing the lines between different theory schools would be a healthy exercise; for 
example, using economic, sociological, strategic, and marketing approaches on new 
business development in addition there integration would produce interesting and 
important research results. 
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Appendix 1: Interview framework 
Starting the interview • General information about the research, confidentiality, 
researcher’s own background, interview principles  
• Name of the venture 
• Interviewee: (name, position, how long he or she has worked in 
the venture): based on this, deciding which themes the 
informant has knowledge about and what issues can be 
discussed in detail. 
General about the venture • Age (and how defined) 
• General history, longitudinal description of international 
growth 
• Strategy 
• Revenue (year 2000 — other years) 
• Geographical scope international sales (absolute/relative), 
international employees 
Relationship with the parent 
organization 
• General description of the relationship 
• Effects of the relationship on the venture growth 
• Links with the parent organization’s strategy 
• Knowledge-sharing and collaboration 
• How is the venture governed? Contact people on the side of the 
parent company? 
• Resources and obtaining them, allocation, decision processes 
• Key individuals in the organization 
• The role of power and politics 
• Other important issues regarding the parent-venture 
relationship 
Internal co-operation • Are there links to other organizations inside the same 
corporation? 
• What kind of co-operation has there been and has this 
contributed to the internationalization projects? 
• Problems and advantages (e.g., internal competition)? 
External relationships • General partnering strategy of the venture, partner model and 
links to the business strategy of the venture 
• How the IORs are generally categorized: 
o Type: joint ventures, sales partnerships, strategic 
customers, technology/development co-operation 
arrangements, supplier-buyer relationships, marketing 
partnerships, production partnerships, distribution 
partnerships, etc. 
o Tailored versus standard, local versus global 
o Governance modes, contractual arrangements 
• For each IOR: 
o History, frequency of contacts 
o Relation-specific assets 
o Knowledge-sharing routines 
o Complementary resources 
o Effective governance 
o The effects the IOR has on the internationalization project 
o Problems 
o Other important factors of the partnership, e.g., trust, 
personal networks, etc.  
• Mergers & acquisitions: 
o Have any occurred? 
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o Description of background, project, integration, problems 
Other issues • Any other important factors in the internationalization 
projects? 
Ending the interview • Has something relevant been forgotten? 
• Who else should be interviewed about these matters? 
• Thanking and possibility for second interview 
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Appendix 2: Inter-organizational relationships in the data 
PRESS = Data from press releases, investor communication (for example annual report) 
or other public documentation  
Doc = Data from internal documentation 
INT = Data from interviews 
Code Case Data Type of IOR Published Geographical area 
 
     
IOR1 Alfa PRESS+Doc+INT Parent-venture relationship 1998-2001 global 
IOR2 Alfa PRESS Customer Q2-
Q3/2000 
trialing in Finland, 
global 
IOR3 Alfa PRESS+INT+Doc M & A kesä.05 Sweden (effect 
global) 
IOR4 Alfa PRESS Customer Q2/2000 Asia (Malaysia) 
IOR5 Alfa PRESS Customer Q2/2000 Asia (China) 
IOR6 Alfa PRESS+INT+Doc M & A Q2/2000 Sweden (effect 
global) 
IOR7 Alfa PRESS Customer Q3/2000 Finland 
IOR8 Alfa PRESS Customer Q3/2000 Austria 
IOR9 Alfa PRESS Customer delivery Q3/2000 Austria 
IOR10 Alfa PRESS+INT Sales partnership Q3/2000 global 
IOR11 Alfa PRESS+INT Technology partnership & 
Marketing partnership 
Q4/1999 global 
IOR12 Alfa Doc Technology partnership 1999 global 
IOR13 Alfa PRESS+INT Technology partnership & 
Marketing partnership 
1999-2000 global (especially 
Hong Kong) 
IOR14 Alfa PRESS+INT Customer Q4/2000 Italy 
IOR15 Alfa PRESS Customer Q4/2000 Europe 
IOR16 Alfa PRESS Customer Q4/2000 South Africa 
IOR17 Alfa PRESS Technology partnership & 
Marketing partnership 
Q4/2000 global 
IOR18 Alfa PRESS Customer Q4/2000 Australia 
IOR19 Alfa PRESS Technology partnership & 
Marketing partnership 
Q1/2001 Europe 
IOR20 Alfa PRESS Technology partnership & 
Marketing partnership 
Q1/2001 Europe 
IOR21 Alfa PRESS Technology partnership & 
Marketing partnership 
Q1/2001 Europe 
IOR22 Alfa PRESS Customer (trial) Q1/2001 UK 
IOR23 Alfa PRESS Technology partnership & 
Marketing partnership 
Q1/2001 global 
IOR24 Alfa PRESS Technology partnership & 
Marketing partnership 
Q1/2001 global 
IOR25 Alfa PRESS Customer project Q3/2001 US 
IOR26 Alfa PRESS Customer Q3/2001 US 
IOR27 Alfa PRESS Technology partnership & 
Marketing partnership 
Q3/2001 global 
IOR28 Alfa PRESS Sales partnership Q3/2001 Latin America 
IOR29 Alfa PRESS Technology partnership & 
Marketing partnership 
Q3/2001 global 
IOR30 Alfa PRESS Technology partnership & 
Marketing partnership 
Q3/2001 global 
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IOR31 Alfa PRESS Technology partnership & 
Marketing partnership 
Q3/2001 Scandinavia 
IOR32 Alfa PRESS Technology partnership & 
Marketing partnership 
Q3/2001 Japan 
IOR33 Alfa PRESS Technology partnership & 
Marketing partnership 
Q4/2001 Iceland 
IOR34 Alfa PRESS+INT Customer & Marketing 
partnership 
Q4/2001 Philippines 
IOR35 Alfa PRESS Customer & Marketing 
partnership 
Q4/2001 Sweden 
IOR36 Alfa PRESS Technology partnership & 
Marketing partnership 
Q4/2001 Europe 
IOR37 Alfa PRESS Sales partnership 1999 Global 
IOR38 Beta PRESS+Doc+INT Parent-venture relationship 1998-2001 Global 
IOR39 Beta PRESS+Doc M & A Q4/2000 Sweden 
IOR40 Beta PRESS+Doc Technology partnership & 
Marketing partnership 
Q1/2001 Europe 
IOR41 Beta PRESS+Doc Technology partnership & 
Marketing partnership 
Q1/2001 Europe 
IOR42 Beta PRESS+Doc+INT Sales partnership/production 1999 Finland 
IOR43 Beta Doc+INT Technology partnership 2000/2001 global/Finland 
IOR44 Beta PRESS Production partnership Q3/2001 Global 
IOR45 Gamma PRESS+Doc+INT Parent-venture relationship 1998-2001 Global 
IOR46 Gamma INT Joint venture 2000 Sweden 
IOR47 Gamma PRESS+INT+Doc Joint venture Q2/2000 UK 
IOR48 Gamma PRESS M & A Q2/2000 France 
IOR49 Gamma PRESS+Doc+INT M & A Q4/2000 US 
IOR50 Gamma PRESS+INT Sales partnership Q4/2000 Europe, North 
America, South 
America 
IOR51 Gamma INT Technology partnership 2001 Finland 
IOR52 Gamma PRESS+INT+Doc Distribution partnership Q3/2001 China 
IOR53 Gamma INT Technology partnership 2001 International 
IOR54 Gamma INT Sales partnership/internal co-
operation 
2001 Germany, 
Philippines, UK, 
Finland, Singapore, 
Holland, Italy, USA 
IOR55 Gamma PRESS+INT Sales partnership Q4/2001 China 
IOR56 Gamma INT Technology/sales partnership 2000 global/First England 
and then Germany 
IOR57 Epsilon PRESS+Doc+INT Parent-venture relationship 1998-2001 Global 
IOR58 Epsilon Doc M&A 1999 US 
IOR59 Epsilon PRESS+INT Distribution partnership Q1/2000 US 
IOR60 Epsilon PRESS+INT Distribution partnership Q1/2000 Turkey 
IOR61 Epsilon PRESS Distribution partnership Q1/2000 Germany 
IOR62 Epsilon PRESS+INT Distribution partnership Q1/2000 Philippines 
IOR63 Epsilon PRESS Distribution partnership Q1/2000 Netherlands 
IOR64 Epsilon PRESS Technology partnership & 
Marketing partnership 
Q1/2000 Global 
IOR65 Epsilon PRESS+INT Distribution partnership Q2/2000 Singapore 
IOR66 Epsilon PRESS+INT Technology partnership & 
Marketing partnership 
Q2/2000 Global 
IOR67 Epsilon PRESS Technology partnership & 
Marketing partnership 
Q2/2000 Finland 
IOR68 Epsilon PRESS+INT Technology partnership & 
Marketing partnership 
Q2/2000 Finland 
IOR69 Epsilon PRESS+INT Content partnership Q4/2000 Germany 
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IOR70 Epsilon PRESS Distribution partnership Q4/2000 Germany 
IOR71 Epsilon PRESS Distribution partnership Q4/2000 Germany 
IOR72 Epsilon PRESS Distribution partnership Q4/2000 Germany 
IOR73 Epsilon PRESS Distribution partnership Q1/2001 Italy 
IOR74 Epsilon PRESS+INT Distribution partnership Q1/2001 UK and Italy 
IOR75 Epsilon PRESS Distribution partnership Q3/2001 UK 
 
